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PAPER NUMBER II

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SOME ASPECTS OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE OFFICE
OF STRATEGIC SERVICES OPERATIONAL GROUPS
IN WORLD WAR II.

II. OPERATIONAL GROUPS IN THE CHINA THEATER, 1945.

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II. OPERATIONAL GROUPS IN THE CHINA THEATER, 1945

A. BASIC PROBLEMS AND AUTHORIZATIONS

Four factors led to the decision to employ the OSS Operational Groups in Central and South China in 1945 and helped to determine the way in which they were ultimately used in the field. First was the general strategic problem faced by the Allies after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Second was the political and diplomatic relationship between the Western powers and the Chinese government. Third was the military position of the Japanese forces in China. Fourth was the concept of the role of psychological warfare which was decided upon in 1942 and put into practice in the European campaigns.

Upon American entry into the war there arose the question of how best to utilize available forces to defeat the Axis powers. Allied policy-makers decided, after considerable discussion, to concentrate the major effort towards Europe and then following the conquest of Germany, turn to the problem of defeating Japan. In the meantime, forces in the Far East would attempt to stem Japanese advances and prepare the ground for the later campaigns. The military reasons for this decision were that the regular Allied military forces were unable to mount major operations simultaneously against both Germany and Japan. The Japanese were militarily stronger in China than the Chinese and able to defeat them in the field, but were not powerful enough to achieve a decisive success and remove them from the war. A stalemate ensued, brought about

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as much by Japanese weaknesses as by any particular Allied military strength. The Allies therefore selected psychological warfare as the interim means of attacking the Japanese.

The political and diplomatic problem differed vastly from that encountered in Europe. In Europe the major Allied powers had to deal with refugee governments who did not control any part of their home territories and consequently were dependent on British and American policy decisions and on British and American supplies for what small armed forces they were able to maintain in exile. Therefore, while political and diplomatic problems did have influence, they were of secondary importance.¹ In China, however, the situation was different. The Chinese government remained in control of a substantial portion of its territory. It was maintaining in the field a large army in active operations against the Japanese. Since the Chinese government and military forces did represent a potential, if not actual, means of pressure against the Japanese, it was felt that much more consideration must be given to Chinese sensibilities. In other words, therefore, Chinese views were able to exercise a greater influence on American and British military policy than did the views of the refugee European governments. The Chinese were also particularly sensitive regarding their treatment by the Western powers.² All these facts made the problem of organizing Allied intelligence services and guerrilla warfare operations in China far more complex than had been the case in Europe.

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1. It has been argued that a major Allied mistake was to subordinate political and diplomatic factors in Europe to the military aim of defeating Germany. The merits of this argument do not concern us here. The point here is that owing to their refugee status and their dependence on the United States and the United Kingdom these governments-in-exile were unable to exercise any major influence on policy decisions. Any government in control of the home territory under occupation was regarded as a puppet of the Germans and, of course, exercised no influence.
2. Volumes have been written about the Chinese problem since these events. These have been notable as much for their heat as for their light. It is not the purpose of this study to discuss the case for treating the Chinese government as equal or as subordinate. Suffice it to say that the Western powers did treat it as an equal and that that decision influenced greatly the use made of unorthodox warfare in general and the Operational Groups in particular during 1945. An example of the extremes to which writers have gone in their treatment of the Chinese question is to be found in War Report, Volume II, 359. Writing of the difficulties of mounting OSS operations in China, the author speaks of the Chinese government as follows:

"All American activity in China suffered from the soporific atmosphere pervading Chinese officialdom. Personal self-interest and corruption, as well as the partisan rather than national policy evidenced at all levels of the Chinese Nationalist Government, negated any efficient conduct of active warfare against Japan. The American program received Chinese cooperation wherever it entailed supplying or expanding Chinese agencies. Thus the activities of Naval Group, China, in building up China's internal security organization, evoked ample cooperation from the Chinese. On the other hand, the OSS plan for an independent American secret intelligence service in China, even though this would be aimed at Japan and Japanese activities, was blocked at every turn."

It is permissible to raise the question of whether, given the situation in China, the treatment of the Chinese government as subordinate and the establishment of a truly independent American intelligence service would have produced better results. This is of course assuming that the picture drawn by this writer is accurate.

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The military position of the Japanese in China in the spring of 1945 was in general terms as follows. The invaders held Manchuria and the bulk of China proper north of the Yangtze River. South of the Yangtze they held the major ports, such as Canton and Swatow, the major rail lines and rail junctions, the bigger cities, and the major river valleys. They had, as a result of their 1944 offensive, succeeded in establishing themselves in force and in controlling the major rail and road system from the Indo-Chinese border northward through Nanning, Liuchow, Kweilin, Heng-yang, and Chang-sha, to the Yangtze valley. From Nanning and Liuchow eastward they held the so-called "West River" valley as far as their coastal holdings in and around Canton and Hong-Kong. The region was otherwise in Chinese hands. It was impossible for the numerically superior but poorly-equipped Chinese forces to expel the invaders unaided. On the other hand, the Japanese were unable to extend their control beyond the areas mentioned and to gain a decisive victory over the Chinese.¹ It was thus evident that the situation was ripe for the development of psychological warfare operations, in particular those of sabotage and guerrilla warfare.

Faced with this situation and the factors discussed above, the Allies had reached a major decision in 1943. This was to keep Chinese forces in action "with as small an expenditure of American personnel and equipment as possible."² In February and March, 1943, the OSS Planning Group, the Joint Staff Planners, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff turned their attention to the problem of Asia and warfare against Japan. The

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1. See Tab A for map showing Japanese and Chinese held areas in China south of the Yangtze River. Situation as of March, 1945, when the Chinese Commando project was in its early stages.

See Tab A for map showing estimated dispositions of Japanese Army Ground Forces in China. Situation as of 17 February 1945. It will be noted that estimated Japanese strength in central and south China was 13 Divisions and 11 Brigades, with a total strength of 454,000 men. These units were distributed from Hainan Island and the Indo-Chinese frontier in the south to about 100 miles north of the Yangtze River in the north and concentrated in the corridors already mentioned in the text. Although this was the military situation as of early 1945, the same general characteristics were present in 1943, when J.C.S. 245 was issued.

2. War Report, Volume II, 359.

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1. Material used in this discussion will be found in OSS Archives - Washington.
Dir. AD, 44. Box 2. JCS 245.

This contains studies, recommendations, and the directive. The latter appears as Paragraphs 23-31 inclusive of the Report by the Joint Staff Planners. On 31 March, 1943, Captain Forrest B. Royal, USN, addressed a memorandum to: The Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division, War Department General Staff; Aide to the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet; Director of Strategic Services. The subject of this memorandum was: "Special Military Plan for U.S. Psychological Warfare Operations Against the Japanese within the Asiatic Theater." Paragraph 1 states:

- "1. The Joint Deputy Chiefs of Staff have approved the recommendations of the Joint Staff Planners as contained in J.C.S. 245, paragraphs 23 to 31, inclusive."

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2. For a discussion of this arrangement, see War Report, Volume II, 357-364, 415-460 passim. The present discussion is intended merely to provide a summary of the basic problems and to indicate the general authorization under which the Operational Groups functioned.
3. "SAOO" was the abbreviation for Sino-American Special Technical Cooperative Organization. This organization preceded OSS proper in the China Theater. For discussion of it, see War Report, Volume II, 357-364, 415-460 passim.

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result was J.C.S. Directive 245, March 31, 1943.¹ The staff study which led to this Directive departed from the basic premise that since the major United States military effort was to be in the European Theater, "psychological warfare offers a most effective means for leading assistance to China." Japan, declared the study, had penetrated so far into China, had "so widely and thinly spread her forces, that on all sides the Japanese are vastly outnumbered by hostile Chinese. The Japanese invasion of China has been cruel. Chinese hatred is bitter. All the implements of psychological warfare, especially sabotage, subversion, and guerrilla activities, will find the world's richest field in the China Theater." It was felt that here was a situation which offered the possibility of maximum return on minimum investment.

A cooperative working arrangement between Americans and Chinese was already in operation in the psychological warfare field.² This was to be continued on the same principles as before, which were to use American equipment and training to enable Chinese "agents, forces and bases, to conduct every form of sabotage, secret attack, guerrilla warfare, subversion and black propaganda against the Japanese." This effort was to be "in furtherance of actual or planned military operations" and was to be coordinated "by close cooperation with the theater commander." However, ultimate control was to rest in the hands of the Chinese government, since the chief of OSS activities in the China Theater was to prosecute psychological warfare "in cooperation with and under the direction of" the Director of SACO, "who is under the direct command of the Generalissimo, Chiang Kai-Shek."³ All OSS personnel and

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activities "in or concerned with China, Korea, Indo-China, and Thailand" were to "be placed under the command of the Chief of O.S.S. Activities, China Theater."

It has already been shown above¹ that United States psychological warfare operations had been subordinated to regular military operations, with operational control vested in the theater commander. This individual had the right to employ it or not, as he saw fit. Planning control had been vested in the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the OSS Planning Group, with the OSS having the responsibility for conducting psychological warfare operations. To this rather complex picture was added in China the factor of subordination to control by SACO and ultimately by the Chinese government, with the OSS still charged with the responsibility of actually "prosecuting" psychological warfare operations. Once again, therefore, the OSS was given responsibility without authority.

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1. See Paper Number I above.

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B. OSS ORGANIZATION IN CHINA FOR OPERATIONAL GROUP ACTIVITIES

A revised OSS General Order, effective December 26, 1944, set forth the principal parts of the organization, following the prescriptions of earlier OSS orders and J.C.S. Directives.¹ This order reveals that for the first time there was set up within the OSS an "Operational Group Command," with functions separate and distinct from those of the Special Operations Branch. These functions were described in the following terms:

"The Operational Group Command shall be responsible for:

- (1) The selection and training of operational nuclei for the activation of resistance groups in carrying out guerrilla operations.
- (2) Furnishing fighting officer patrols to invasion commanders.
- (3) Coup de main.
- (4) Attacking selected targets."

It must be admitted that interest in this particular General Order can be merely technical, since these activities had been going on for some time under the Special Operations Branch. It does, however, mark a further development of the organization conceived by Donovan back in 1941 and the grant of an independent existence to the Operational Groups.

On March 16, 1944, an OSS General Order set forth the "Organization and Duties of Principal Officers of OSS Theater Establishments."² It illustrates again the basic concept of psychological warfare operations defined earlier and provides the actual theater organization for the conduct of such operations.

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1. OSS Washington, General Order Number 9, Revised.
Issued and Effective on December 26, 1944.
A copy of this order will be found in
War Report, Volume II, 429-440.
2. OSS Washington, General Order Number 37.
Issued 16 March, 1944, effective 14 March, 1944.
A copy of this order will be found in
OSS Archives - Kuning.
Reg. OP.1.
OSS CT: GENERAL (to 1 Oct 1945) #6A

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The order makes the point that the authority and responsibility of the Strategic Services Officer, who is described as the officer in command of each OSS Theater Establishment, "is subject to the limitations imposed by the fact that the OSS theater establishment is not an independent and isolated unit but is part of an organization conducting coordinated operations in all theaters." Consequently, the organization as a whole must function so as to discharge simultaneously its immediate responsibility to the individual Theater Commander and to the broader requirements of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to whom "the Agency is ultimately responsible." This is of course a restatement of the principles laid down by the Joint Chiefs as far back as 1942. It should be remembered, too, that the situation in China was further complicated by the delicate question of Sino-American relations and its effect on military operations.

The Strategic Services Officer was to make recommendations for plans and policies to the Director of OSS and carry out recommended plans subject to the control of the Theater Commander. He was to "carry on all essential liaison with the U.S. Commanding General of his Theater and the Allied High Command thereof (if any) and procure from them whatever approvals are necessary for OSS activities within the Theater." Within OSS he was to exercise command and in particular was directed to "make final decision as to the activities of each branch in his theater," with the proviso that in case of a disagreement with "a principal officer on matters of policy" the Director in Washington was to have the final power of decision. The complexity and delicacy of this

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task is self-evident and illustrates the difficulty of waging warfare by coalition and of trying to combine under one military commander both regular and unorthodox operations.

Among those who were to assist him in the discharge of these and other functions were an Operations Officer and a Training Officer. These are of particular interest in connection with the Operational Group activities. The Operations Officer had the duty to "supervise and coordinate strategic services operations including specifically the operations of SO, MO, OG and MU and any special operations not assigned to one of the foregoing branches or offices."¹ This officer was to prepare recommendations "concerning current and proposed operations." He was to have charge of establishing requirements and making recommendations regarding the personnel, supplies, and equipment needed for operations. He was also to maintain liaison with similar Allied agencies, arrange for interchange of information with Washington headquarters and "other theater establishments concerning subversive operations," determine training questions, and consult with the Training Officer concerning training programs. The Training Officer was responsible for liaison with the Operations Officer concerning courses and qualifications of recruits. He was to "obtain from field agents advice and suggestions concerning training," maintain liaison, for the purpose of exchanging information, with other U.S. and the appropriate Allied agencies, and keep in touch for the same purpose with the Schools and Training Branch of OSS in Washington. On December 26, 1944, an OSS Special Order designated Colonel Richard P. Heppner, FA, as Chief of OSS, China Theater.²

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1. The above abbreviations stand for the following activities and for the sake of convenience will henceforth be used.
SO - Special Operations.
MO - Morale Operations.
OG - Operational Groups.
MU - Maritime Unit.
2. OSS Washington Revised Special Order Number 26, Supplement 1, issued 26 December, 1944, effective 9 December, 1944. Heppner succeeded Col. John G. Coughlin, Inf., as OSS/China Commander. A copy of this order will be found in OSS Archives - Kunming.
Reg. OP.1.
OSS CT: GENERAL (to 1 Oct 1945) #6A.

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1. Headquarters, Office of Strategic Services, China Theatre, General Order Number 5, 2 March, 1945.
A copy of this order and an OSS organization chart will be found in OSS Archives - Kunming.
Reg. OP.1.
OSS CT: GENERAL (To 1 Oct 1945) #6A.

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In March, 1945, while planning for OG activities was still in its earlier stages, OSS Headquarters in the China Theater issued, over the signature of the Strategic Services Officer, General Order Number 5.¹ This order elaborated the organization envisaged in the earlier documents. It set up as a separate component of the organization an Operational Group Command. It was to organize and train such Operational Groups (not further defined or described) "as may be specified by the Chief, OSS, China Theatre." Decision concerning the employment of the OGs would, of course, lie with the Strategic Services Officer, depending on the needs and desires of the Theater Commander and, more remotely, the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Operational Planning Board would have considerable influence over OSS decisions and planning for OG activity, for it was given the responsibility for "integrating major operational projects and plans for strategic services with Army and Navy agencies," for "initiating" and "developing, in conjunction with all operating branches concerned, all plans, programs, and doctrines pertaining to strategic services activities originating from" OSS China Theater Headquarters. Final decision, insofar as OSS was concerned, would of course rest with the Strategic Services Officer in his capacity of holding "command of all OSS functions and operations in the China Theatre." Such was the rather brief description of OG functions and of the machinery for putting into operation OG activities. It will be noticed that within OSS the lines of command and responsibility concerning OG matters are clear-cut and simple. It was to prove otherwise concerning other aspects of the OG operation in China.

C. EARLY CONCEPTS AND PLANS: THEATER, OSS, AND THE CHINESE

On January 8, 1945, the commander of U. S. Forces in the China Theater, General A. C. Wedemeyer, wrote to Colonel Heppner that OSS/China would be under the direct control of himself and that OSS was to "follow the G-2, G-3 staff channel for information, recommendation, coordination, and cooperation."¹ This decision followed considerable discussion concerning the proper place for OSS in the Theater organizational structure. There had been a recommendation that the Office be placed under the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5. Others had felt that OSS should be under G-2, and still others that it be made a separate staff section.² The difficulty was, of course, caused by the variety and complexity of OSS operations. The final decision was in harmony with the principles laid down in earlier J.C.S. directives, since Wedemeyer could best control OSS operations if he were its immediate commander.

On January 24, 1945, Wedemeyer presided over an inter-allied conference on clandestine and quasi-military activities. In addition to five British representatives there were present General Cheng kai-Ming, Chinese Director of Military Intelligence, and four of his colleagues. Donovan, Heppner, and various others represented the United States. The purpose of the conference was to lay down principles for the conduct of clandestine and quasi-military activities against the Japanese in China.³ Wedemeyer spoke as Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek's Chief of Staff rather than in his capacity as Commander of the United States Forces in the China Theater. His position with regard to clandestine activities had been

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1. A copy of this letter will be found in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
OSS CT: GENERAL (to 1 Oct 1945) #6A.
2. On March 1, 1945, however, Theater Headquarters directed that
Theater G-5 assume the responsibility of coordinating all
clandestine operations in the China Theater. In this capacity
he was specifically ordered to:
 - "(1) Receive and disseminate the weekly reports of all
quasi-military and clandestine organizations of all
nationals operating in the China Theater.
 - (2) Deal directly with all agencies under the operational
control of the Commanding General, U. S. Forces,
China Theater, and in a liaison capacity with such
other organizations which are not directly under the
operational control of the Commanding General, U. S.
Forces, China Theater.
 - (3) Deal directly with General Cheng kai-Ming, the G-2
of the National Military Council, on all matters
relating to quasi-military or clandestine activities
of other nationals.
 - (4) Continue the present procedure which requires the
submission of all quasi-military and clandestine
projects.
 - (5) Maintain closest possible coordination with Assistant
Chief of Staff, G-2, because the greater proportion
of the activities concerned will be directly related
to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2."

G-5 was also directed to coordinate "actions pertaining more
particularly to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, and other staff
sections" in the normal military fashion.

Headquarters, United States Forces, China Theater,
APO 879, 1 March, 1945.

Memorandum Number 4: "Quasi-military and Clandestine Organizations."

A copy of this memorandum will be found in

RI/ARCHIVES

Chungking - Reg. OP.1.

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2. (Continued)

On June 13, 1945 Theater Headquarters charged the G-3 section with staff functions relating to OSS "training, operation plans, and combat operations" and provided for daily liaison visits between OSS and G-3.

Headquarters, United States Forces, China Theater
APO 879, 13 June, 1945
Memorandum Number 4, Change Number 1 "Quasi-military and Clandestine Organizations."
A copy of this change will be found in
OSS Archives - Kunning.
Reg. OP.1.
OSS CT: GENERAL (to 1 Oct 1945) #6A.

3. A transcript of this conference, for which the material for this part of this paper is taken, will be found in
OSS Archives - Kunning.
Reg. OP.1.
OSS CT: GENERAL (to 1 Oct 1945) #6A.

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determined the previous afternoon in a meeting with Chiang. Wedemeyer complained that on his arrival in the Theater he had found a complete lack of coordination in clandestine activities, a situation which both Chiang and he were determined to remedy. Consequently, while the Chinese were willing to allow continuation of activities already under way and to honor agreements already made, Wedemeyer stated that in the future the Generalissimo was going to insist on knowing specifically what activities were planned and on giving authorization for them. Chiang had designated General Cheng Kai-Ming, his Director of Military Intelligence, as his deputy for such matters. Anyone desiring to begin an activity, or to bring into China additional personnel or supplies, was to apply either to Wedemeyer or to Cheng. They in turn would coordinate the requests with each other. Any unauthorized activities would be expelled from the China Theater.

The factors upon which clandestine activities would be dependent reflected the complexity of the Chinese situation in its various aspects. Foremost was the necessity of being able to support such operations from the logistical point of view. The Japanese controlled all major Chinese ports, as well as French Indo-China. Owing to the consequent distances and transportation difficulties involved in China operations, such a consideration therefore loomed large in the thinking of both Chiang and Wedemeyer. Clandestine activities were, after all, in their view, but a part of the total military effort against the Japanese invaders. Of equal importance in the view of the high command was the way in which

unorthodox warfare operations were to be mounted. Here the primary point was that such operations must be used against the Japanese. Wedemeyer emphasized this several times. He asked that the organizations represented at the meeting not "permit your agencies to become involved in discussing Central Government policies or Communist policies" and that they not "make available to individuals, for example separate provincial governors or Chinese war lords or special political parties, any assistance or materiel." He warned that "such action would be dangerous to you and your organization. You must not become involved in politics and local matters. I emphasized at the beginning of our conference that the Generalissimo wants your activities to be employed against the common enemy, the Jap." Wedemeyer's final point was that he insisted that regular reports of activities be filed at Headquarters by all organizations. This was insisted on apparently for two reasons. First, was the requirement that all operations be conducted only against the Japanese. Allied to this was Wedemeyer's insistence on strictly controlling operations, such control extending to authorization for specific activities. For instance, the General stated that "before clandestine activities like guerrilla raids are undertaken against a certain bridge, for example, or operations against lines of communications and important enemy installations, all these must be cleared through us, through General Cheng kai-Ming and myself." His insistence on control was made clear at another point in the conference and reflected the basic concept of unorthodox warfare as strictly subordinated to regular military operations. Wedemeyer declared that until such time as definite military

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plans had been formulated, clandestine activities were to continue, subject to the foregoing limitations, much as they had been doing in the past. In other words, more positive action would have to await military decisions on the highest levels in the China Theater. This was indeed a far cry from the original concepts of guerrilla warfare. Wedemeyer expressed these thoughts in these words:

"There are no definite plans of operations for the next three months. There may not be. We are preparing for certain military action, consequently we cannot give you directives indicating at this time the contribution that you could make in coordination with military operations. We are trying to formulate overall plans that we will put into effect at times and places of our choosing not the enemy's. That has not been accomplished yet and it is going to require a little time. When we have a firm plan we will call you in and indicate what we propose to do. We would request your recommendations on the contribution that you could make. Until that happy situation arrives, (I don't know whether it will be a month or two months, before we can formulate plans and call you in for such integration), until that time comes I will ask each head of clandestine organizations operating in the China Theater to submit to me not later than Tuesday of each week a report of activities. What has been accomplished, where, what personnel and equipment were involved. That will enable me to point your effort toward more remunerative targets. You may get off the beam and if we know what you are doing we can better effect coordination at least until that time arrives when we can integrate the effort with a well qualified overall plan for the China Theater."

In sum, therefore, unorthodox warfare operations,¹ in terms of earlier concepts, were restricted from the beginning in China by two basic forces: the necessity of deferring, as a matter of policy, to the wishes of the Chinese government; and the concept of unorthodox warfare as subordinate to regular military operations and under the control of the Theater Commander.²

The duties of the OSS in the China Theater were made more precise by Wedemeyer in a directive dated February 6, 1945.³ This may be regarded

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as the OSS charter for operations in China. The first paragraph reaffirmed the now-familiar principle of control by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Theater Commander by reference to J.C.S. 155/11/d and any and all amendments thereto.¹ Wedemeyer directed that from the organizational point of view OSS was to be a separate command. For coordination purposes, OSS would work with both G-2 (Intelligence) and G-3 (Operations) and would "have the same status as a special staff section."

The directive defined the OSS mission in the China Theater precisely (and thus limited it), but left two familiar "escape clauses" which might permit the mounting of operations not specified elsewhere in the directive. The OSS was to coordinate with Wedemeyer's appropriate staff section "the conduct of all of its activities, the more important of which are..."² The second "escape clause" is contained in the final paragraph of the directive, which lists as a mission of the OSS "The performance of such special tasks, activities or operations as may be required for the accomplishment of the missions above described." Thus, while in the other paragraphs the OSS mission was spelled out in detail, here was authority for other operations as yet undefined.

The "more important" OSS activities were precisely defined in the other paragraphs and present at least one item of interest to the concept of unorthodox warfare. These activities were: to develop and expand the OSS communications network; to accumulate, evaluate, analyze information concerning the enemy and enemy-occupied territories and to prepare studies on those subjects; to lower enemy morale and raise the morale of friendly

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1. The term "unorthodox warfare operations" as used here should be considered as applying only to the Operational Group activities, since this paper is not concerned with other aspects of OSS operations in the general field of secret intelligence and psychological warfare.
2. See discussion above (Section "A" of this paper) concerning the great difference between the problem of dealing with Allied forces representing occupied areas in Europe and that of dealing with the Chinese Government.
3. Headquarters, United States Forces, China Theater, APO 879, Operational Directive No. 4 "OSS Operations," 6 February, 1945. A copy of this directive will be found in OSS Archives - Kunming.
Reg. OP.1.
OSS CT: GENERAL (to 1 Oct 1945) #6A.

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1. See Paper No. I of this series for discussion of this and earlier J.C.S. directives regarding the functions of OSS.
2. Emphasis supplied. The listing which follows cannot, in view of these words, be a definitive one.

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elements in occupied territory; to collect secret intelligence by means including both espionage and counterespionage. In addition, the following paragraphs are of interest:

- "a. The organization, supervision and direction of guerrilla activities or 'special operations' designed to effect the physical subversion of the enemy including sabotage, the organization, direction and conduct of guerrilla warfare, direct contact with and support of resistance groups both underground and open, and the equipping and training of such personnel as may be required to carry out such activities.
- b. The delay and harassment of the enemy, and the denial to him of the use of lines of supply and communications and strategic facilities wherever located."

These paragraphs are of particular importance, because of the use, in the first of them, of the following clause: "including ... the organization, direction and conduct of guerrilla warfare..." It will be recalled that J.C.S. directives in 1942 and 1943 had specified that the role of American guerrilla forces would be limited to support and training, and the furnishing of "operational nuclei." Here, however, the way is left open for American forces actually to conduct guerrilla warfare as units. Regardless of the direct role which the OGs played in the European operations of World War II, wherein, it will be recalled, whole units were sent in in seeming contravention of the "operational nuclei" doctrine, here is implicit authorization for a departure from that former limited authority for the conduct of guerrilla warfare. Furthermore, the second of the paragraphs quoted above includes no limitation at all on the use of American personnel. In short, therefore, the way is left open for the conduct of guerrilla warfare, insofar as this particular document is concerned,

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either by purely American units or by Chinese and American personnel in some sort of cooperation. With the issuance of Operational Directive No. 4, OSS had a firm basis of authority for the planning of operations.

While the events discussed above were taking place the OSS was drawing up plans for the CGs, or Chinese Commandos. Donovan addressed on February 2, 1945, a memorandum to the OSS commander in the China Theater, in which he discussed what in his view were the nature and possibilities of unorthodox warfare.¹ This document is a re-statement of Donovan's doctrine of guerrilla warfare. He did not mention the question of control of such forces, but confined his statements to matters of substance. He stated that in his opinion the chief weakness of the Japanese in China was their dependence on long railroad lines and described this dependence as their "weakest resistance link." Proper use of the commandos would enable them to combine "dispersal along the line of track and concentration at selected points." Thus, the Allies would be able to "impose upon the enemy a passive defense confined to that railway. This will give him flanks but no front." One advantage, among others, of operations of that type, would, in Donovan's opinion, be "to condition the enemy psychologically for the larger operations to come." Above all, stated the OSS Director, "unnecessary battles with resultant casualties" must be avoided. The "essence of irregular warfare" was summed up under three headings:

- "a. To avoid attacking places because of their inability to force a decision.
- b. To avoid the defense of a line or point for the same reason.

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1. Memorandum, Director, OSS, to Chief of OSS, China Theater, 2 February, 1945. A copy of this memorandum will be found in OSS Archives - Kunming.
Reg. OP.3.
Projects: BOSTON, Administration, etc. 149a.

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1. Outline Plan for the Formation, Training and Use of Chinese Army Commando Units, (Revised) 3 February 1945.
A copy of this document will be found in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
OSS.OP.2.

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- c. Their value lies in their depth, in their ability to hit and get away, to sting and run."

Such were Donovan's ideas on irregular warfare as restated in February, 1945, to which the CC commander in China subscribed. These are of interest in view of other contemporary concepts of such operations and in view of the use actually made of the Chinese commandos.

On February 3, 1945, the OSS addressed to Wedemeyer an outline plan for the use of "Chinese Army Commando Units."¹ In its memorandum OSS proposed the creation of commando units from within the regular Chinese Army. These would number twenty in all, with two hundred men per unit, not including American personnel. Only volunteers of "the highest possible type of officers and men, both physically and mentally that are available" would be accepted. The document stated that "this personnel should be of a calibre that the Generalissimo would be proud to have known as the 'Generalissimo's Own Commandos.'" Each unit would be divided into four sections, of fifty men each. Chinese sources would provide uniforms, preferably with a special insignia, while OSS would provide uniforms for the training period. The Chinese would provide rations, while OSS would supply the following equipment (pending submission of a definitive Table of Equipment):

| | |
|-----------|-------------------------------------|
| "Per man | - 1 rifle, Springfield - with sling |
| " " | - 1 belt, web |
| " " | - 1 first aid packet |
| " section | - 2 launchers, rocket |
| " " | - 2 mortars, 60 mm. |
| " " | - 2 BAR's |
| " " | - 4 BAR ammunition clips" |

In addition, OSS undertook to provide ammunition for the above weapons, demolition, engineering, and Signal Corps supplies plus any required

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vehicles. These would be drawn "either from OSS stocks in Calcutta or theater stocks in Calcutta or China." A headquarters staff would handle planning, administration, and supply. All operations would be directed by the Theater Commander. Detailed plans of field operations "pursuant to these directives" would be submitted to G-3/USFCT for approval.

OSS would undertake to provide experienced American personnel to administer training to the Chinese, to "assist Commando Units in conducting their operations in the field," and to assist with combat intelligence and medical aid in the field. This American personnel would be under the command of Lt. Colonel Alfred T. Cox, who will be remembered as the commander of one of the "French" OGs already discussed.¹ His duties would be to conduct the training program "and provide personnel to assist the Commandos in conducting their operations." OSS declared itself ready to make every effort to begin training within thirty days of Theater's approval of the above plan. This plan was approved by Wedemeyer on 16 February 1945, in a letter to Hoppner, thus removing the last obstacles to the establishment of the OG program in China.²

Each of the four sections of each of the twenty commandos (or eighty sections in all) would have assigned to it one American officer and two enlisted men, or a total of eighty officers and one hundred sixty enlisted men. In addition, each of the twenty commandos would have assigned to it one American officer, who would act as the commander of all American personnel in the commando, a minimum of one intelligence officer, one medical technician, and one radio operator. These would total forty

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1. See Paper No. I of this series.
2. Letter, Wademyer to Heppner, 16 February 1945,
Subject: Commando Units.
A copy of this letter will be found in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
OSS.OP.2.

19

1. Outline Plan for the Formation, Training and Use of Chinese
Army Commando Units, (Revised) 3 February 1945.
A copy of this document will be found in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
OSS.OP.2.
2. Memorandum No. 421, Wademyer to Chiang, Chungking, 10 February 1945.
A copy of this document will be found in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.4.
CG, USF, CT - Letters.
Folder #15.

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officers and forty enlisted men. The total of American personnel assigned to commando operations would amount to one hundred twenty officers and two hundred enlisted men. The total strength of the twenty commando units would therefore be four thousand Chinese officers and enlisted men and three hundred twenty American officers and enlisted men. This memorandum did not touch on the problems of command, other than to say that the function of the American personnel would be to train the Chinese and assist them in their operations. The inference is, of course, that command would be exclusively in Chinese hands.¹

On February 10, 1945, Wedemeyer addressed a memorandum to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek, in which he outlined briefly the commando plan described in the OSS memorandum and approved by him. He then asked Chiang four questions bearing on commando affairs, answers to which were necessary "prior to any action leading to actual organization and training."² The first two queries concerned Chiang's wishes regarding the possibility of giving the commandos a special name and special uniform. These rather secondary questions were followed by two others of considerable importance. First was the question of Chinese personnel. Wedemeyer asked whether Chiang would "authorize the very highest type of soldiers and officers to be selected from the regular Chinese Army, including those now belonging to any special corps - such as parachutists?" These should be volunteers and, since "in this type of operation the individual must be capable of acting independently at times," of the highest type of soldier. Second was the question of command. Wedemeyer asked whether

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Chiang would authorize the commandos to "operate under the command of the Commander-in-Chief Chinese Ground Forces, General Ho Ying-chin." Although the question of command within the commando had not yet been specifically answered, the foregoing question eliminated all doubt as to who, Chinese or Americans, would hold overall command of the commando operations.

A little more than one month later, Minister Chen Cheng, of the Executive Yuan of the Chinese Ministry of War, transmitted to the Americans the Generalissimo's answers to Wedemeyer's questions.¹ Chiang agreed in principle to the American proposals regarding commando organization and duties. In answer to the four specific questions, the Chinese provided a special Chinese name for each of the twenty units, but specified that the commandos should wear the ordinary Chinese uniform with special collar badges.² In answer to Wedemeyer's other two questions, Chiang acceded to the American request for particularly high-type personnel and suggested that when organized the commandos should "be placed under the sole command of General Ho Ying-chin." The Generalissimo stated that Chinese personnel, who would be selected from the Chinese Alpha Army and from a paratroop regiment in Kunming, would be available on April 10 and April 20 respectively.

By the end of February, 1945, therefore, the basic questions of whether or not there would be any commando operations had been settled by the Americans and the Chinese. Their role in forthcoming operations had been generally determined and their basic organization and equipment tentatively decided.

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1. (Translation) Ministry of War, Executive Yuan, Memorandum Chen Cheng, Minister, to Wedemeyer, Chungking, March 15, 1945. A copy of this document will be found in OSS Archives - Kunming.
Reg. Op. 3.
Projects: BOSTON, Administration, etc. 149a.
2. The collar badge was described (in an annex to the memorandum) as follows:
 1. Red sun stands for Japan,
Blue back ground stands for China,
White arrow stands for Commando Units.
 2. Arrow shot through the sun may be interpreted as meaning 'Piercing into the heart of Japan by Commando Units' and indicates that the Japanese Empire is sure to be crushed.
 3. Collar badges of officers will bear a yellow colored rim.
 4. The collar badges as suggested is as bright in color as it is clear in meaning."

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1. "A MEMORANDUM OF THE AGREEMENT WITH COL. WILLIAM P. DAVIS AND ALFRED T. COX CONCERNING THE EQUIPMENT, THE TRAINING AND THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE CHINESE PARATROOPS," signed "Maj. Gen. H. P. Lee Commander of the 1st Para. Regiment." No date.

and

Headquarters, Office of Strategic Services, China Theater, Operations Office, A.P.O. 627, 12 March 1945, Subject: Approval of Agreement, as Revised. Addressed to General Lee.

Copies of these documents will be found in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
Reg. OP.3
Projects: BOSTON, Administration, etc. 149a.

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21 (continued)

2. The American comment on this passage was: "This may well be correct, but General Ho has indicated that he will decide questions of command."
It will be recalled (see above) that a few days later Chiang decided that Ho would exercise command over the units.

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A series of planning meetings between Cox and the Chinese culminated in a "memorandum of the agreement" in March between OSS and the Chinese military authorities. This document was drawn up by General H. P. Lee (also "Li"), the Commanding General of the First Chinese Parachute Regiment, and on March 12 was approved with revisions by Colonel William P. Davis, the OSS Operations Officer.¹ Just as Operational Directive No. 4 may be regarded as the "charter" for OSS operations in China generally, so can this agreement be considered as the "charter" for the OGS, since it sets forth the basic principles regarding administration, supply, training, and command.

Agreement was reached that a parachute school, to be commanded by Lt. Col. Lucius G. Rucker, Jr., would be established, probably near Kunming. Demolition training, driving practice, tactical operational training, and so on were to be handled by the Americans. The Chinese First Parachute Regiment was selected as the recruiting-ground for commando personnel. In the words of the Chinese memorandum, these recruits would be "chosen from among the soldiers who have the experience in operations, or the students who are well-educated. But they must be good in health and the volunteers. Among them, the medical technicians and the radio operators will be chosen also."

The problem of command, which was to cause great controversy later on, was discussed in the following terms:

"As the U.S. officers and personnel come to join the unit for training and operation, they will have a H.Q. for commanding their own men. But their organization is somewhat like an advisory group to the Chinese commando, and attached to it also. They can intervene neither the Chinese executive nor the Chinese personnel."²

Thus, in accordance with Theater policy, was definitively settled the basic question of who should command the units in training and in the field. Another thorny question was that of supplies and equipment. It will be recalled that OSS had originally proposed to Theater to supply weapons, ammunition, demolition equipment, and vehicles. The Chinese memorandum had this to say on the question of supply:

"As to the problem of subsistence, Lt. Col. A. T. Cox says that he will like to solve it for us. At least U. S. Gov. can furnish vitamins, carpets, etc. to us."

The American reply to this statement became the official decision, although the Chinese continued to feel that their position was the correct one.

The Davis letter stated:

"The U.S. will furnish arms, ammunition, demolition, certain items of field equipment, and vitamins. It cannot undertake to furnish rations, uniforms, etc., which must be supplied by the Chinese government."

Davis reiterated that the United States would arm the commandos, but that it could not "undertake to arm and equip the Chinese headquarters which will be charged with the administration of the commandos."

The final document in this series concerned with basic plans is Operational Directive No. 10, addressed to Heppner by Wedemeyer.¹ This directive is dated April 27 and indicates, just about three months after the January, 1945, "clandestine conference," that Theater planning for the OOs against the Japanese was advancing.

Wedemeyer directed that all twenty Commando units must be ready for operations by August 1, 1945, and ordered OSS to submit by May 1, 1945,

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1. Headquarters, United States Forces, China Theater,
A.P.O. 879, 27 April 45. Operational Directive No. 10,
to Commanding Officer, OSS, Headquarters, U.S. Forces,
China Theater, APO 879.
A copy of this document will be found in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
Reg. OP.3
Projects: BOSTON, Administration, etc. 149a.

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a schedule showing in what way it was going to conduct the training program so as to meet the required deadline. OSS, furthermore, was to adhere to the stipulations contained in Chiang's letter of March 15 relative to the OGs (see above for discussion of this letter). The key paragraphs of this directive deal with the problems of supply and command and are as follows:

- "4. You will be in direct control of the training of these units and will supervise and assist in their organization and in the supply of equipment to them. Upon their readiness for combat they will be assigned to the Alpha Force and come under the operational control of that Force, General Ho Ying-chin.
5. After these units have been assigned to the Alpha Force all of your dealings with these units will be forwarded through the Commanding General, Chinese Combat Command. You will establish liaison with that officer in order to facilitate administrative and supply procedures.
6. When each Command Unit has completed its organization and training and is ready for operations you will so notify, in writing, the Commander, Alpha Force through the Commanding General, Chinese Combat Command, with information copies to this Headquarters."

It will be noted, in concluding this discussion of general plans for OG operations, that OSS was removed from any control over them, beyond supply matters, once they had been trained, for they were to come under the operational control of General Ho Ying-chin and his Alpha Force.

By the end of April both Theater and OSS plans for OG operations were well under way, with the commandos being looked upon as adjuncts to the activities of the Chinese armies and their American military advisers.

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D. CHINESE-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIPS AND THE CHINESE COMBAT COMMAND

It is necessary, before discussing actual CG organization, training, and operations, to touch upon the matter of relations between Americans and Chinese, for they ultimately proved to be a source of difficulty in the conduct of field operations. It will be recalled that in China, owing to the control of large parts of the country by the duly constituted Chinese government and owing to that government's ability to maintain a force in being against the invaders, the Allied military problem had far more significant diplomatic aspects than was the case in dealings with exiled regimes in the European Theater.

The organization created to handle the military relationship between Americans and Chinese was the Chinese Combat Command.¹ Although the OSS was not directly responsible to it, the principles under which it operated and the OSS obligation to it concerning the CG operations (see above) make it necessary to discuss it at least briefly.

The CCC was organized to serve as the medium through which American technical advice regarding operations, training, and other matters was to be transmitted to the Chinese. The organization and its role were discussed at some length by Wedemeyer in a letter to all United States officers concerned.² This letter began by defining the CCC as follows: "The Chinese Combat Command (translated by Chinese as 'Chinese-American Liaison Command') includes all U. S. personnel assigned to Chinese Combat forces in the field." There were a headquarters at Chinese Supreme Command Headquarters and complements of American officers and men assigned to Chinese army groups, armies, and divisions. The individual cadres

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1. For the sake of convenience, the abbreviation "CCC" will henceforth be used.
2. Headquarters, United States Forces, China Theater, APO 879, 18 February 1945, AG 353.02. Subject: Letter of Instruction to All U.S. Officers Serving with the Chinese Combat Command. To: All U.S. Officers Concerned.
A copy of this document will be found in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
USF/CT CCC (Chinese Combat Command) #122.

The text of the foregoing document will be used for purposes of this discussion. Other versions of the same letter will be found in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
OSS.OP.1.
Theater Directives.

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were known as "U. S. Combat Sections (translated by Chinese as 'American Liaison Section or Group')." Air-Ground Liaison Sections rounded out the CCC organization.

The CCC mission was defined in these terms: "to assist and advise Chinese Commanders of each echelon to which assigned, and to guide Chinese training." American officers, consequently, were specifically forbidden to "exercise command over Chinese forces. The degree of influence that they may attain over the Chinese to whom they are associated is entirely dependent upon each individual's tact, patience and professional knowledge." American officers were consequently adjured to make suggestions which "will be constructive in nature and will be made in a spirit of helpfulness and cooperation."

Since the Americans could under no conditions exercise command over Chinese forces and since, on the other hand, they had a definite responsibility to advise and guide in training and operations and to ensure that United States resources were being utilized "against the enemy in the most effective manner," there were bound to be problems of disagreement over policy. These were foreseen in this letter and the following solution provided.

"U.S. Officers will make specific recommendations to their respective Chinese Commanders in important matters such as those requiring definite decision on the part of the Chinese Commander which will effect the ultimate combat efficiency of the Chinese forces. If these recommendations are disregarded the U.S. officer concerned will submit within 24 hours a complete and detailed report to his next senior U.S. officer. In the same manner the Chinese Commander is required by

directive from the Generalissimo to submit a detailed report to his next senior Chinese Commander. The two individuals, that is, the next senior U.S. officer and the next senior Chinese Commander, will attempt to resolve the matter. If no agreement is reached, it will be referred to the next U.S. and Chinese command level and so on, if necessary, until it reaches the Commanding General, China Theater and the Generalissimo. It is of the utmost importance that this procedure be strictly adhered to by all personnel both U.S. and Chinese."

A Chinese document accompanying the Wedemeyer letter spelled out the mission and position of the CCC in more detail. The Chinese version of the CCC mission gave to the Americans a considerable number of duties to perform. They were to advise the various Chinese commanders to whose units they were to be assigned. More specifically, the CCC members were charged with the following mission:

"(b) Guide, and make recommendations regarding, the work of equipment, training, communication, correspondence, transportation, supplies, medical service, ordnance, engineering, and all matters pertaining thereto. Approval of the commanding officer of the headquarters concerned must be obtained beforehand relative to the allocation and distribution of supplies."

They might "suggest" plans for operations, but in each case the final decision was reserved for the Chinese. In case of disagreement, the Chinese document provided for the same system for resolving differences as quoted above from the Wedemeyer letter. Although the American elements in the commandos were not specifically under the direct command of the CCC, they nevertheless, as shown above,¹ had a responsibility to it. They were therefore governed by the general principles according to which the CCC was bound to operate, since they, too, were American personnel operating in the China Theater and with the Chinese.

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1. See Section C. of this paper.

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The conduct of warfare by coalition is, as has been remarked before, a difficult art at best, for the military and diplomatic interests of the parts are often as strong as, or at times stronger than, the interests of the coalition as a whole. The situation in China was extremely complex, owing to four factors. First was the military situation in China, in which the Japanese invaders and Chinese defenders were about evenly balanced as far as the question of a definitive military decision was concerned. This made it necessary for the Chinese to call for outside assistance. Second was the military situation in the world, which had led to the Allied decision to concentrate the major effort in Europe pending the defeat of the European end of the Axis. This in turn had led to the Allied decision to confine Allied (particularly American) assistance to the Chinese to a minimum of personnel, a maximum of modern weapons of war, and the teaching of modern tactical principles. Third was the internal political situation in China. While the central government of Chiang Kai-Shek maintained nominal control over the whole of China, there were large parts of the country under the control of either the Communists or the quasi-independent war lords. These factions were either covertly or openly resisting control by the central government. Fourth was the force of Chinese nationalism, which had been increased by the long years of war against the invaders. While it may be argued that the mass of the Chinese remained lukewarm in this respect, owing to central government weaknesses, there is little doubt that this force was very strong in governmental circles, with whom the western

allies were dealing. Consequently, insofar as the Westerners and Western policy were concerned, this force of national feeling was of considerable importance.

These factors, taken together with the single-minded Allied determination to subordinate everything to the purely military aim of defeating the Japanese both in China and elsewhere in the Orient, led to what some people called an undue deference to the wishes of Chiang Kai-Shek. Since this is so, the liaison agreement discussed above was a natural result. While such an arrangement might have proven workable in political or diplomatic matters, it was to prove absolutely unrealistic and unworkable insofar as the OC operations were concerned. Problems of command require clearcut lines of authority.

The principles of the Chinese-American liaison agreement and the organization of the CCC are logical on the surface. One party to the arrangement provides the manpower, the other supplies weapons, training, advice, and assistance in operations. There were, however, serious defects in the arrangement from the point of view of the human factor. By agreeing to the pact the Chinese admitted implicitly, if not explicitly, their own weakness and the superiority of American methods. This was negated, however, by the explicit statement that under no circumstances could the Americans exercise command functions, either in training or in operations. This negation was clearly illustrated in the history of the OC operations, as was almost bound to happen. In practice, either the Chinese abdicated their command function or else there was unending friction, stemming from the Chinese willingness to accept in principle advice from a better-informed party but their unwillingness in many

instances to follow the advice. Thus, operations tended to result in at best a qualified success or else command passed and by default into American hands, with resulting dissatisfaction on both sides. OG operations therefore had indeed a rocky road to travel, as will be shown in the discussion of their actual deeds.

E. OPERATION "CARBONADO" AND THE PROJECTED OSS ROLE THEREIN

During the late winter and early spring of 1945 the Allied high command elaborated its military plan for expelling the Japanese from South China. This campaign was considered a necessary preliminary to later operations against them. The operational plan, known by the code name CARBONADO, proposed to drive the Japanese eastward from the Nanning region and capture the strongly-defended Canton - Hong Kong area. In so doing the high command proposed to use the OGs to assist and supplement the efforts of the regular Chinese armies and their American advisers. Before anything could be done, however, the Japanese voluntarily evacuated Nanning and began a slow withdrawal eastward towards Canton and Hong Kong and northward from Kweilin. Consequently, CARBONADO underwent various modifications, without, however, losing its essence.¹

On June 10, 1945, Headquarters, United States Forces, China Theater, issued, over Wedemeyer's signature, an operational directive governing modified operation CARBONADO.² This stated that modifications were now necessary in CARBONADO, because the Japanese withdrawal from Nanning

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1. Since this paper is concerned not so much with the regular military campaign as with CG activities in support of it, it will suffice here to indicate the general features of the CARBONADO plan and what the high command felt it required of the CGs. This discussion will not, therefore, undertake to analyze the various modifications in some features of CARBONADO which the march of events forced upon the Allied high command.
2. Headquarters, United States Forces, China Theater, APO 879, 10 June 1945: MODIFIED OPERATION CARBONADO. This was addressed to: Commanding General, Tactical Headquarters; Commanding General, Services of Supply; Commanding General, Chinese Combat Command; Commanding General, Fourteenth Air Force.

A copy of this document will be found in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
Folder #84 - CARBONADO.
TOP SECRET. A. Reg. Op. 6.

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1. See Tab "A" for four maps:

The first of these maps is a situation map as indicated, with the Japanese-held areas shown in yellow. This map will also be helpful for locating place-names mentioned in the text, for following the general lines of action envisaged in Operation CARBONADO, and for obtaining a broad picture of the areas in which the CG teams were to operate.

The other three maps will be helpful in obtaining an appreciation of the strength and disposition of the Japanese forces in China in early 1945.

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"combined with the indication of an early abandonment of the entire enemy-held corridor North from NANNING to HENGYANG and East via WEST RIVER to CANTON has virtually eliminated Phase I of Operation CARBONADO." Consequently, it was directed that a build-up of Allied forces in the Nanning base area be pursued quickly "to facilitate the earliest possible initiation of the assault on CANTON/HONGKONG," the capture and consolidation of which, "as a base for subsequent operations against the Japanese," remained the final objective.¹

Enemy capabilities were estimated as limited. He could put up a "limited defense in the NANNING-LIUCHOW-KWEILIN area by a maximum force equivalent to 1½ Combat Divisions." He could launch a limited objective attack against the south flank of an eastward Allied drive. He could undertake offensive action "with the equivalent of 2 Combat Divisions" against an Allied effort to seize Fort Bayard (on the Liuchow Peninsula). He could, "at great effort and expense to current plans," concentrate forces "for the purpose of reopening Corridor south of HENGYANG and/or an offensive against CHICHIANG." And, finally, he was judged capable of a "determined and effective" defense of the Canton-Hong Kong area.

The Allied plan developed with these enemy capabilities in mind. The Operational Directive for the modified CARBONADO operation provided for "preliminary steps" to be taken "at once." Chief among these was to be the securing and consolidation of the Liuchow, Kweilin, and Tanchuk areas "as bases for operations" against Canton and to render airfields

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in that general area "operational for air defense and for maximum air supply." Next in importance was the necessity for maintaining pressure against the Japanese withdrawing towards Canton and the effective continuation of the American training and equipment program for the Chinese.

The first phase of the main effort had assigned to it the target date of September 1 and was to comprise an advance on Canton along the West River and an effort to "soften-up principal enemy strongpoints" in the Canton area by air, and possibly sea, bombardment. Phase II had as its target date November 1 and was to capture and consolidate the Canton - Hong Kong area. At the same time, a "defensive and diversionary" effort was to be to "remain on the active defense in the PAOCHING-CHANGTE-KWEILIN area by blocking approaches from CHANGSHA-HENG YANG area." Coupled with these was to be a "contributory effort," to consist of "intensified guerrilla and aggressive commando operations." These last were not further described at this time.

Air and logistical operations were tied to the above principles of the forthcoming campaign. The former were to give tactical support to the ground troops, maintain air superiority over the zone of operations, and to interdict the enemy's communications and destroy his installations. The latter were to include the "rapid development of the available airfields in the NANNING, LIUCHOW, KWEILIN and TANCHUCK areas, as they become available, to receive shipment of troops, equipment and supplies." Tanchuk¹ in particular was regarded as important, since it

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1. The Anglicized spelling of Chinese names varies considerably. No effort will be made here to standardize them, since the reference is invariably clear.

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1. This document will be found in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
Folder #84 - CARBONADO.
TOP SECRET. A. Reg. Op. 6.

There were several of these plans. Since this paper is concerned primarily with CG operations and only secondarily with plans, detailed discussion of changes in operational plans will be omitted.

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was specifically named for development "as soon as possible to afford maximum air support and air supply to this operation."

Such were the chief elements of the plan for clearing South China of the Japanese. The OG role was contributory in character and was to be in direct support of regular military operations. Of the twenty commandos organized in China, three were eventually used in the capture of Tanchuk, a fourth to disrupt the enemy in the Changsha area, and a fifth for the same purposes in the West River valley. The relationship between their eventual use and the requirements of modified CARBONADO is clear.

It will be recalled that one of the major themes of this series of papers is the question of how the OGs were to be used. There was a feeling that in Europe they had perhaps not been used to best advantage, because their original purpose had been changed, and not for the better. Consequently, it will be of interest to see in what way they were used in the 1945 campaign in China.

OSS had received notification that Theater expected to employ the OGs. Consequently, concurrently with the development of Theater plans for the forthcoming China campaign, OSS began in the early spring to formulate its own plans for submission to Theater and particularly the CCC. On April 10 appeared an "Outline Plan" drawn up by the OSS Operations Office to show in what way OSS proposed to use its facilities to contribute to CARBONADO. Part of this plan was devoted to the OGs.¹ The first point of interest is that there is envisaged an abandonment

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of the concept of the "strategic" use of OG operations in favor of the "tactical" use. While the mission of the OGs was stated about as it had been earlier,¹ there was an important change foreshadowed in this document. It was stated that while no "radical change" was contemplated in the OSS field teams' methods of operation, "emphasis will be switched from present strategic objectives to operations which will be of immediate tactical advantage to the advancing armies." This represented in one sense a fundamental change in the concept of the use of the OGs, despite the statement that no "radical change" was contemplated, because of the enormous difference between "strategic objectives" and "immediate tactical advantage to the advancing armies." It will be remembered that Donovan and the other early planners had never envisaged guerrilla warfare as anything but "strategic" in objective,² since its very essence was to attack with lightning rapidity lightly-defended strategic installations such as rail lines and power stations and then get away with equal rapidity. It had not been thought of, and, given the basic premises, could not be thought of, as a tactical weapon, which carries with it the necessity for assaults against regular enemy troops and for defense of prepared positions.³

On the other hand, however, it is clear that the original concept of OG guerrilla warfare had never really been put into practice by the Americans. It had long since been changed in theory by the J.C.S. directives already discussed and in practice by the use actually made of the OGs in the European Theater in 1943 and 1944.⁴ In addition, China

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1. "Operations by demolition teams and guerrillas on the road and rail lines from North and South to harass and delay the movement of enemy reserves and to interdict enemy lines of communication."
2. See the discussion of Donovan's ideas in Paper Number I of this series.
3. That the situation in Europe prior to the successful Allied landings was strategically different from that in China at this time made no difference insofar as the manner of employment of guerrilla warfare was concerned. On this point compare Donovan's ideas in 1940-1941 (See Paper Number I of this series) and his memorandum to Heppner of February 2, 1945 (See above).
4. See the discussion in Paper Number I of this series.

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1. Headquarters, Office of Strategic Services, China Theater, APO 879, 21 April 1945. Subject: Tactical Employment of Chinese Commandos. To: Theater Planning Staff, Hq., USF, China Theater. Signed: For the Strategic Services Officer, (by) William F. Davis, Colonel FA, Operations Officer.
A copy of this memorandum will be found in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.h. OPSO. Folder #17.

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Theater directives had made clear that OG operations would be directly subordinate to and controlled by the tactical situation and the regular military forces. From this point of view, therefore, the "radical change" had already been made and the issue settled. There could be no possibility of employing the OGs as Donovan had originally conceived of them.

A short time later the subject was discussed again in a memorandum from the OSS Operations Officer to the Theater Planning Staff, in which OSS submitted notes, among other subjects, on the "tactical employment" of the OGs.¹ It was pointed out that in view of the specialized training to be received by the OGs there should be established a set of principles "covering their tactical employment, in order that they may not be dissipated on missions which could be accomplished by other, less specialized, troops." The OSS then advanced as its operating principles its recommendation that the OGs be in the field "prior to the jump-off date of any offensive," with the "initial mission" of "isolating the battlefield by means of demolitions, road blocks, ambushes and general harassing action against enemy routes of approach." Following this they would employ guerrilla tactics "against enemy L of C, supply dumps, command posts, and exposed flanks." While it was admitted that such activities would be similar to those carried on by SO teams, it was pointed out that the OGs would be "better organized and equipped and far more highly trained than the normal group of guerrillas with which SO teams operate, and will have a much larger cadre of experienced American soldiers." The final,

and urgent, recommendation was that "these units not be used in mass as shock troops to spearhead an advance, or to seize and hold areas for any protracted period of time."

Thus far the OG "doctrine" is not too different in concept from Donovan's original one. However, the memorandum contains a most significant change from earlier ideas. While urging that the OGs not be used as ordinary troops of the line or as mass shock troops, the memorandum partially contradicted itself and departed from Donovan in a highly important aspect. It will be recalled that the "orthodox" doctrine of unorthodox warfare emphasized continually that guerrillas must never attempt defense of a position they might have attacked and seized. Furthermore, it had been found in Europe that the Germans, in Cox's words, had "held what they wanted to" against guerrillas. This memorandum, however, despite its recommendations against the use of OGs to "seize and hold areas for any protracted period of time," negated one of the basic guerrilla principles in the following words:

"Some OGs may be employed to seize and hold, for a short period, critical terrain features such as bridges or defiles. The same considerations governing the employment of regular air-borne troops would of course apply in this case - the Commandos would have to be relieved in a matter of days by regular forces. Their light armament, and lack of artillery, would preclude a prolonged defense of any position against attack by superior forces."

It seems evident that by the end of April the thinking on all levels on the subject of the OGs had evolved from the original concept of a purely guerrilla, "hit-and-run," force to that of a combination of guerrilla and specialized force, a force which was at times to rove

behind enemy lines and spread destruction, but which at other times was to operate in much the same fashion as air-borne or other regular forces. In other words, to the original principles of mobility, speed, and constant attack with no defense, had been added some of those governing the use of regular line troops: less mobility and more emphasis on the defense. At the same time, however, there seemed to be no thought of seriously modifying armament to cope with new responsibilities.

An examination of the OSS "Draft Plan for OSS Operations" confirms in more detail the foregoing general points.¹ Under the heading "Commando Operations" a set of detailed CG missions was outlined. Six commandos were to be assigned to the columns of the Chinese main attack and were to be both infiltrated and re-supplied by ground. Five were to be initially held in reserve. Two were to be assigned the task of "disrupting" road and/or river traffic in various areas and were to be both infiltrated and re-supplied by air. Two were not only to disrupt traffic, but were also to be prepared on call from the Supreme Commander to occupy and hold towns and other fixed points. One of these was to hold the town in question for twenty-four hours, the other to hold it indefinitely.² Both of these units were to be infiltrated by ground and re-supplied by air. Three others were to disrupt traffic and occupy and hold various towns.³ These were to be both infiltrated and re-supplied by air. One, to be both infiltrated and re-supplied by ground, was to operate against highways and to hold a road junction for twenty-four hours. One, also to be both infiltrated and re-supplied by ground, was to "provide active

patrols between the forces of the south blocking attack and the NANNING main effort."

The initial detailed plan thus called for the employment in the field of fifteen commandos immediately operations should have been begun, with five to be held in reserve. Of these fifteen, given the concept of unorthodox warfare and control of the OGs already discussed in considerable detail, only two might be considered as true guerrillas or commandos. These two were to be both infiltrated and re-supplied by air, thus giving them somewhat more mobility. In addition, their mission was confined to that of disrupting road and/or river traffic. The mobility of the rest was distinctly restricted by the prescribed methods of infiltration and re-supply, one or both of which was to be by ground. It is difficult to believe that they could operate at any great distance from the regular forces and therefore that they could avoid being tied closely to regular military operations. This impression is strengthened when it is realized that the mission of these thirteen commandos was to include the capture and retention of towns and road junctions either for twenty-four hours, or until relieved, or with no limiting factor stated at all. Thus, it is clear that all now fundamentally considered the OGs to be mainly auxiliary troops with primarily an immediately tactical mission to perform in support of the regular Chinese forces and under the orders of the Supreme Commander.

There exist two later OSS plans for operations in support of CARBONADO,¹ which resulted from a request for such plans from the CCC.

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1. Headquarters, Office of Strategic Services, China Theater, APO 627, Operations Office, 30 April 1945. Draft Plan for OSS Operations.
A copy of this document will be found in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
OSS, OP. 2. RASHNESS, OPSO.
2. At least no time-limit or other limiting factor, such as "until relieved," was mentioned.
3. The time they were to hold the towns varied from twenty-four hours to an indefinite period.

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1. One of these, dated 26 June 1945, will be found in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.3. - Folder #1.

The other, dated 4 July 1945, will be found in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
Folder #84 - CARBONADO.
TOP SECRET. A. Reg. OP.6.

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While these later plans contain certain modifications in proposed assignments from those discussed above, there are no changes in concept. The chief points of interest in connection with these documents lie in two subsequent efforts by Cox to impress upon both the CCC and the Chinese Army Headquarters what the OGs were and what they were intended to accomplish. The first of these was contained in a letter of July 5 from Cox to the Commanding General, Second Command, CCC.¹ After discussing the projected assignment of three of the OGs to the Second Command Cox discussed the question of their employment in the following terms. These are of interest in view of the eventual use made in the Tanchuk operation of the three units here under discussion.

"The most advantageous employment of these units lies in long-range penetration, the harassing and cutting of enemy communication lines, the furnishing of intelligence, and in being prepared on call out [sic] carry out such additional missions as the Commanding General may direct."

On July 12 Cox addressed another communication to CCC, this time to the G-3.² Speaking of the same three commandos as in his earlier letter, he adopts the ambivalent attitude towards commando operations found in the various OSS draft plans already discussed. He states that the proposed directive should, when speaking of the use to be made of the three units, state that they should operate in advance of the division.³ The primary mission should include the furnishing of tactical intelligence, enemy order of battle, dispositions, and movements, condition of roads and bridges, extent of river traffic, the food situation, and the attitude of the local population. In addition, were included the usual "harassing

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1. Operational Groups, Office of Strategic Services, APO 627, 5 July 1945. Subject: Chinese Commandos. Addressed to Commanding General, 2nd Command, CCC. In this letter Cox summarizes the points agreed upon concerning the assignments of the Chinese Commandos. A copy of this document will be found in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.4. Chinese Combat Command.
Folder #12.
2. Headquarters, Office of Strategic Services, China Theater, APO 627; Operational Groups, 12 July 1945. Subject: Directive for Operations of Three Commandos with _____ Division.
To: G-3, CCG, USF, CT.
This document elaborates some of the organizational points made by Cox in his letter of July 5 and also discusses briefly the question of the tactical employment of the OGs.
3. Since this is a proposed directive and since final plans had not yet been adopted, the number of the division is left blank. In the actual Tanchuk operation the Chinese division was the 89th.

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and ambush of enemy lines of communications" and the "wiping up of small enemy installations." Finally, in accordance with the newer interpretation of guerrilla functions, the units were to set up "road and river blocks to prevent reinforcement or withdrawal." Obviously, the last item would involve defense for unstated periods of fixed positions in opposition to regular enemy troops. On the other hand, Cox stated in the same document that "the Commandos are especially trained in the hit-and-run tactics of guerilla [sic] warfare, and their strength should not be dissipated by use as shock troops leading an assault. No heavy supporting weapons are included in their T/O or training."

It was patently clear by the late spring of 1945 that while the OSS OGs would be used in the campaign there was little or no possibility that they would be employed primarily for the purposes of guerrilla warfare as originally conceived by Donovan and the early OSS planners. The J.C.S. directives had placed all such operations under the control of the Theater Commander. It was, furthermore, clear that the prevailing concept of guerrilla warfare was productive only of a contradiction, since the same groups were to act simultaneously as guerrillas and as regular troops of the line. In view of these facts, therefore, there was left for OSS only the possibility of pointing out the inadvisability of utilizing the OGs as shock troops and attempting to emphasize their true nature and consequently the way in which they could best be used. This attempt met with only limited success. Of the five commandos actually in combat, one attempted to perform guerrilla harassing operations, a second was saddled

with the task of attacking and holding fixed positions in addition to its mission of harassment, and the three others were used exclusively as shock troops of the line.

F. OPERATIONAL GROUP ORGANIZATION

By March, 1945, the actual organization of the OGs was well under way. During that month tables of organization and equipment were drawn up and approved.¹ American personnel had begun to arrive in the Theater and included mostly officers and men who had had previous OG experience in the field in the European Theater. They were to help train the Chinese volunteers and then to accompany them on their operations in the field.²

The Commando unit had at the top a headquarters, with six Branches, or Sections, below. Three of these were Rifle Branches, one a 60 m/m Mortar Branch, one an LMG Branch, and the sixth a Demolition Branch. The Branches were in turn divided into Squads. Each Rifle Branch contained two Squads. The Mortar Branch had three Squads, the LMG Branch two, and the Demolition Branch was a single Squad in itself. The general commando unit organization was not too different in structure from a regular line company.

Each commando was composed of 14 Chinese officers, 137 Chinese enlisted men, 8 Chinese interpreters, 8 American officers, and 11 American enlisted men, a total of 178. Two American officers and five American

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1. See Tab "B" for copies of Tables of Organization and Tables of Equipment for the Chinese Commandos, March, 1945, Exhibits I through V.
2. See the following source for the OSS/Washington Special Orders, February 8, 1945, appointing Lt. Colonel Alfred T. Cox the Commanding Officer of the CG establishment in China and designating the officers and men assigned to his command:

OSS Archives - Kunming.
CG, OP. 4, - Personnel.
Folder #21.

See the same source for the OSS/Washington General Order, also February 8, 1945, activating the Operational Group Command and allotting to it a total of 140 officers and 535 enlisted men. It was stated that this allotment was "inclusive of all grades heretofore sub-allotted to Operational Groups within the United States or in Theaters of Operations." Thus, Cox could not dispose of this total in China.

Those interested may consult this source for personnel rosters and other such material covering the period up to the cessation of hostilities.

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enlisted men were assigned to commando headquarters. Each Branch contained one American officer and one American enlisted man. The Chinese personnel were assigned as follows: two officers and four enlisted men to commando headquarters; one officer and eleven enlisted men to each Rifle Squad (or six officers and sixty-six enlisted men to the six Rifle Squads); one officer and six enlisted men to the headquarters of each Rifle Branch (a total of three officers and eighteen enlisted men to the three Rifle Branch headquarters); five enlisted men to each Mortar Squad (a total of fifteen to the three Squads); one officer and three enlisted men to Mortar Branch headquarters; six enlisted men to each LMG Squad (a total of twelve to the two Squads); one officer and three enlisted men to LMG headquarters; and one officer and sixteen enlisted men to the Demolition Branch. Two of the eight interpreters were assigned to commando headquarters, and one to each of the six Branch headquarters.

Examination of the armament for the commando suggests several things about its mission. First to be noticed is the principle of heavy firepower. A total of 275 weapons (excluding demolition equipment) was issued to the 178 officers and men. Of these, 179, or between three-fifths and two-thirds, were automatic weapons and included 64 carbines, 97 automatic pistols (cal. .45), 2 LMGs, 3 BARs, and 13 Thompson SMGs. There were only 87 Springfield rifles (cal. .03). Second is the provision for at least some heavier supporting weapons, which was provided by the inclusion of 3 bazookas, and 3 60 m/m mortars. Third is the addition of a separate Demolition Branch.

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It will be seen that while the commando possessed considerable firepower and was thus a potentially powerful and destructive instrument it shows several differences from the original ideas on the subject. In comparison with the organization set up by the British and contemplated by Donovan, the 1945 organizational chart shows that some degree of flexibility has been sacrificed to a more elaborate structure. Whereas the original concept had been to stress mobility and to have each man bring merely his own weapon, this later version of the commando unit has an infinitely more formidable collection of weapons. The problem of ammunition supply was thereby unquestionably increased. The command structure was of course immeasurably complicated by the inclusion of both American and Chinese personnel. It will be recalled that under no circumstances were the Americans to exercise command, but were directed to confine their activities, both during training and operations, to that of instructing and advising. As has been remarked earlier, however, the very presence of the Americans and their unquestioned superiority in matters of training and tactics was bound to, and did, create problems of command strictly in terms of the factor of human relationships.

In short, therefore, the commando organization seems to reflect the changed concept of the commando role and the very complex and difficult question of Chinese-American relations. Concerning the former, the inclusion of many more automatic and support weapons points to the dual role envisaged for the units: that of guerrillas and that of line troops operating to serve directly the tactical needs of the regular military forces.

G. OPERATIONAL GROUP TRAINING

The earlier types of OG training have been briefly discussed above.¹ The training of the Chinese commandos reflected previous experience and the necessity for preparing them for the particular type of operations envisaged by OSS and Theater planners. One earlier experience upon which to draw was that of the United States Naval Group, China (USNOC), which had been in the field for some time. It had trained the Loyal Patriotic Army (LPA), which was composed of about 15,000 Chinese and carried on guerrilla operations in central China under Chinese and Navy auspices.

On February 15, 1945, Col. Heppner, the OSS Chief in China, received from Major C. M. Parkin, Jr., the Commanding Officer of Unit 1, USNOC, a report detailing his activities from April 6, 1944, to February 5, 1945, inclusive. Appended to this report are statements by Parkin concerning the way in which various problems were handled by USNOC and the LPA, among which was a short discussion of training.²

The Chinese students were taught the following subjects by American instructors:

- "Carbine - 40 hrs.
- TSMG - 30 hrs.
- Pistol, cal. .38 - 16 hrs.
- MG, cal. .30, Lewis - 15 hrs.*
- MG, cal. .50 - 15 hrs.*
- Bazooka - 15 hrs.*
- Rockets, 4.2 cal. - 15 hrs.*
- Demolitions - 40 hrs.
- Field craft with problems - 40 hrs.
- First aid and personal hygiene - 4 hrs.
- Grenades, hand and incendiary - 30 hrs.
- Political Science - 96 hrs.*

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1. See Paper Number I of this series.

2. A copy of this report will be found in
OSS Archives - Kumsing.
OG.OP.6. Training.
Folder #17.

Parkin was evidently questioned by OSS on these subjects,
since the following penciled notation will be found at the
head of the report on training: "Answers to questions by
Maj. Parkins [sic]."

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*Taught only to special students who proved themselves in other weapons." The Chinese had the most difficulty absorbing field craft. The shortage of ammunition and explosives, at least for training purposes, was reflected in the statement that one pound of explosive was expended per student, "a total of 50 rds. of ammunition per student, and one grenade per 10 students." Considering the nature of the operations on which these students were to embark, those figures were not very high.

The time devoted to this training program was 356 hours. Of this total, 176 hours, or just under fifty per cent, was given over to training in automatic weapons and the use of grenades. When one recalls the relative lack of such weapons in the Chinese Army this is not surprising, nor, consequently, in view of limitations on time, to find only 80 hours devoted to demolitions and fieldcraft with problems. The 96 hours for study of political science is not further identified in this document, nor is it easy to surmise why such a large portion of the available time was allotted to it, assuming that the title carries here its common meaning.

The type of training to be given to the OOs was an object of concern to OSS from the beginning. On February 24 Lt. Colonel Willie H. Bird, Deputy Chief of OSS/China, wrote to a Lt. (jg) Gunner Mykland, OSS-SU Detachment 202, about the problem. Bird expressed himself as concerned with the type of training which Cox and Davis (Operations Officer) were going to set up. He stated that he wanted to be "very sure we don't devote too much time to regular military tactics or close order drill.

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The only reason OSS has been selected to do this job is simply due to the fact that we are supposed to have knowledge of methods of sabotage, personal combat and raiding techniques that the average Army officer or unit does not have." Should OSS not follow this idea Bird considered that they would be "defeating the purpose of the entire project and wasting unnecessary time." In short, he did not wish the program to "get off into 'squads right' and 'squads left' instead of the proper way of sticking a knife into a man's belly [sic]." ¹

By the end of March Cox and his associates had drawn up a tentative eight-week training schedule. Following completion of it by the Chinese they planned to have each commando receive its assigned quota of American instructors and advisers, who were then to continue to field-train it and eventually accompany it into combat. The schedule stressed automatic weapons training and field tactics. The first week was to be devoted by all personnel to the cal. .03 rifle. During the second week the men would be divided up for weapons training, according to the weapon with which they were to be armed. The third week was to be spent in combat firing. During the fourth week the commando was to study the school of the individual soldier. The fifth week was assigned to squad training, the sixth to Section Tactics, and the seventh and eighth weeks were to be spent in a study of Commando Tactics. ²

By April 16 OSS had received the unofficial word that Theater expected all twenty commandos to be fully trained and ready for field operations on August 1. ³ Cox so informed the Commanding General of the Chinese First

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1. Letter, Willis H. Bird, Lt. Col., Ord., Deputy Chief, OSS/CT, to Lt. (jg) Gunnar Mykland, OSS-SU Det. 202, dated 24 February 1945, in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.6 - Training. Folder #17.
2. See Cox's report to the Operations Officer, March 30, 1945. A copy of this document will be found in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.4. OPSO, Folder #17.
3. See discussion of modified operation CARBONADO above.

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1. Letter, Cox to Commanding General, 1st Parachute Regiment, Chinese Army, 16 April 45. A copy of this letter will be found in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.4. Commanding General, 1st Parachute Regiment. Folder #13.
2. See "Progress Report of Chinese Commandos" signed by Cox, dated 18 May 1945. A copy of this document will be found in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.4. - CG, USF, CT - LETTERS.
Folder #15.

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Parachute Regiment, whose men were to form the bulk of the commando units. He enclosed the training schedule and urged the General to make recruits available. He was most anxious that they arrive at Kunming as early as possible, "so they may take preliminary physical training as soon as possible."¹ The training schedule was outlined in the same letter as follows:

| | <u>COMMENCE TRAINING</u> | <u>FINISH TRAINING</u> |
|----------------------|--------------------------|------------------------|
| "COMMANDO #1 | 16 April 45 | 9 June 45 |
| COMMANDO #2, 3 | 23 April 45 | 16 June 45 |
| COMMANDO #4, 5 | 30 April 45 | 23 June 45 |
| COMMANDO #6, 7, 8 | 7 May 45 | 30 June 45 |
| COMMANDO #9, 10, 11 | 14 May 45 | 7 July 45 |
| COMMANDO #12, 13, 14 | 21 May 45 | 14 July 45 |
| COMMANDO #15, 16, 17 | 28 May 45 | 21 July 45 |
| COMMANDO #18, 19, 20 | 4 June 45 | 28 July 45" |

It proved impossible, however, to adhere strictly to this schedule, owing to the difficulty of obtaining sufficiently well-qualified personnel from the Chinese authorities. As early as May 18 it was evident that the program was running into serious difficulties, for on that day Cox wrote in his progress report on the commando program that the schedule had fallen behind by one commando. On May 7, he wrote, only two commandos (instead of three) had begun their training, "due to the lack of personnel."² The responsibility for this state of affairs belonged, of course, to the Chinese, who had not lived up to their agreement to provide the men. On May 22 Heppner wrote to Wedemeyer that owing to continuing Chinese failure to live up to their personnel commitments, it had proved necessary "to postpone, for one week, training of Commandos #11, 12, and 13. During this week an attempt will be made to screen an additional 500 troops and to obtain, from the total of 1,000,

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sufficient personnel for these three Commandos." He appended the following revised schedule to this letter:¹

| <u>"Commandos"</u> | <u>Start</u> | <u>Finish</u> |
|--------------------|--------------|---------------|
| #11,12,13 | 28 May | 21 July |
| #14,15,16 | 4 June | 28 July |
| #17,18,19,20 | 11 June | 5 August" |

On May 31, however, Cox informed the Operations Officer that "it is hoped that Commandos #13, 14, and 15 will commence training next Monday, 4 June." Even the revised schedule could not be met, always owing to the difficulty of obtaining personnel.² In his weekly report of June 7 Cox informed the Operations Officer that the OG command had been forced to break up Commando #5 and use its best men as replacements. The reasons for this were that the incompetence of its Chinese officers had caused the group to fall behind in training and that the first ten commandos generally were in need of replacements. It was therefore decided to form an entirely new Commando #5, which would begin training simultaneously with #19 and 20.³ Although the commitments to Theater were generally met despite continual difficulties and postponements, only five commandos actually saw service. These were #1, 2, 8, 9, and 10. Two of the others played a role in the surrender ceremonies in China. The remainder were not used.

Enough has been said here of the personnel procurement problem to indicate its seriousness.⁴ The training program itself was therefore conditioned by the consequent continual need for postponement and schedule changes. Furthermore, the type of training was itself influenced by the quality of the personnel actually obtained. The original idea had been

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1. Letter from Heppner to Wadeneyer, 22 May 1945.
A copy of this document will be found in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
CG.OP.4. - CG, USP, CT - LETTERS.
Folder #15.
2. Cox to OPSO, Weekly Operational Report, 31 May 1945.
A copy of this document will be found in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
CG.AD 1 - Operational report.
3. Cox to OPSO, Weekly Operational Report, 7 June 1945.
A copy of this document will be found in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
CG.AD 1 - Operational report.
4. See Section "H: Personnel Problems" for a full discussion
of the personnel situation.

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1. Letter, Deputy Strategic Services Officer to the Commanding
General, United States Forces, China Theater (Attention AG of 8,
G-5), 13 July 1945, in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
Reg. OP.3 - Projects: BOSTON
Administration, etc. 149a.
2. Letter, Cox to CG/Supreme Command/Chinese Armies, 17 July 45, in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
CG.OP.4. Chinese Combat Command.
Folder #12.
3. Report, Cox to OPSO, dated 30 March 1945, in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
CG.OP.4. OPSO. Folder #17.

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to give commando training only on an advanced level, under the assumption that the recruits would have had either basic training or actual combat experience. The Americans were quickly disabused of this idea, however, since the personnel received was not of that quality which had been originally expected. A letter from Bird, the Deputy Strategic Services Officer, to Wedemayer makes this clear.¹ Bird stated that "an understandable reluctance of individual Chinese Commanders to release their own best troops to the Commandos has caused the slight delay in training to date and now confronts us with a serious problem. Elite personnel is not yet forthcoming" for the program. He went on to state as his opinion that the "Generalissimo or his War Minister might send down to all Chinese units concerned a general directive which would assure prompt completion of the Commando program." A few days later Cox wrote to the Chinese Commanding General, describing the material made available as being "in very poor physical condition," and stated that some months would be necessary to bring them up to the requisite standards.²

Cox's original training plan called for an eight-week course, followed by "advanced field training."³ This plan proposed to utilize the eight weeks as follows. The entire first week would be spent by the whole commando on the cal. .03 rifle, the basic weapon. During the second week the sections within the commando would train with the particular weapon with which they were armed according to the table of organization. The third week would be spent on combat firing by all but the Demolition Section, which would devote itself to its specialty. The

entire commando would spend the fourth week mastering the school of the individual soldier. Squad training, with emphasis on scouting and patrolling, would occupy the fifth week. The sixth week would be spent on section tactics. And the final two weeks would be devoted to commando tactics.

On April 17 Cox reported to the commander of the Operational Group Command in Washington on OG affairs in China. He included in the report the training schedule, which differs in no important particular from the one just summarized. The chief difference is that demolitions work is not specifically mentioned in the schedule of the third week. It is reasonable to assume, however, that as in the earlier program that week was so spent by the Demolition Section.¹ The author radiated optimism over the chances for a successful program:

"The hurdy-gurdy began to spin on Monday. Commando #1, 151 strong, started in on rifle training. Next Monday, 23 April, we start #2 and #3 and from there on it just gets worse. ... Despite all the difficulties we will get the job done somehow, although it is really going to be a man-killer. The acceleration of the program presents just as big a problem to Services here, but they are not complaining and somehow or other the stuff gets here. ... Training these commandos is going to be tough but chances for operations and a good show look pretty good. If we haven't been killed off by 1 August [the date when Theater had ordered all commandos to be ready for operations in the field], we'll be too damn tough for the Japs to handle."

An examination of this training schedule reveals the basic nature of the entire program. Basic and table of organization weapons training occupied three full weeks, which obviously made it more than a refresher course on basic subjects. Two more weeks were occupied with individual

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1. Report, Cox to CO/OGC/OSS/Washington, dated 17 April 1945, in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.7. OGC - Letters.
Folder #8.

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1. "Progress Report of Chinese Commandos," signed by Alfred T.
Cox, and dated 18 May 1945, in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.4. - CO, USF, CT - Letters.
Folder #15.

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and squad training. Only three weeks out of the total of eight, therefore, can be considered as really advanced training; and even one of these (the week spent on section tactics) might be termed intermediate training. However regrettable this might have been in terms of the original training concept, it was inevitable in view of the personnel problem which Cox and his associates were compelled to face.

By the middle of May the program was well under way. It had been found necessary, however, to modify further the earlier plans. At this time Cox wrote a rather detailed progress report, more formal in tone than the report to Washington from which excerpts have just been quoted. He remained optimistic, although his optimism by this time was tempered by doubts resulting from his experiences during the preceding month.¹

In contrast with his earlier statements he now said:

"In summation, the project, although beset by many difficult problems, is making quite satisfactory progress. The American end of the original agreement is being met on all counts. On the Chinese side, the Chinese Command is not producing the personnel nor equipment on schedule. It is vitally necessary that the Ministry of War implement this project by speedily authorizing the funds for feeding and equipping these troops."

Appended to this progress report is a more detailed schedule of the OG training program than the ones included in the earlier correspondence. Although it is not complete, in that the daily schedule for final four weeks' activities is not included, the complete schedule for the first four weeks provides much information concerning the type of training given the OGs. It should be borne in mind that the role of the American

OO cadres during the training period was that of instructors and demonstrators, while that of the Chinese personnel was that of students.

During the first week of training each commando was divided into three groups, all of which spent all of their time studying the cal. .03 rifle. For the first three days each group studied and practiced the cal. .03's nomenclature, stripping, care, and cleaning; one day on positions and dry firing; and one day on sighting and aiming, triangulation, windage and elevation. The remaining three days of the first week were spent on range firing. Those officers and soldiers who were armed with the carbines only had in addition to spend one evening of the first week on carbine nomenclature, stripping and functioning, and half of Sunday on range firing. As mentioned earlier, the cal. .03 rifle was the basic commando weapon. The amount of time spent on mastering it reflects both its importance as the basic weapon and also the unfamiliarity of the Chinese with it.

During the second, third, and fourth weeks each commando was divided into its functional groups, each of which began to concentrate on their specialties. Thus, the rifle squads began to practice combat firing of the cal. .03 rifle, the IMG section to work on the light machine gun, the automatic rifle teams on the Bren gun, and so on.¹ During this week the officers had to devote six evening hours to a study of fire control and distribution. During this week, too, the rifle squads began grenades and bayonet drills, from which the other sections were in the main excused, in order to devote themselves to their particular weapons. The Demolition

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1. During the period since the approval of the commando tables of organization and equipment the Bren gun had been substituted for the Browning Automatic Rifle (BAR).

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1. Although this topic is nowhere identified beyond the title "General Subjects," a total of 22½ hours was spent on it.

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Section had to spend nine hours in close order drill. During the third week the study of the compass and its use was begun, with three hours spent on the use of the compass and $13\frac{1}{2}$ hours on day compass runs. The chief exception to this program was the mortar section, which spent extra time on its weapon. Mines and booby traps, evening compass runs, close combat, camouflage, observation, and general review were also included in the fourth week's activities.

During these first four weeks the subjects studied may be roughly divided as follows:

| | |
|---------------------------|--|
| <u>Basic Subjects:</u> | Introductory lecture; Close Order Drill; General Subjects; Review. Total, $31\frac{1}{2}$ hours. |
| <u>Basic Weapons:</u> | Cal. .03 rifle; Rifle Grenades; Bayonet drill; Grenades. Total, $80\frac{1}{2}$ hours. |
| <u>Automatic Weapons:</u> | LMG; SMG; Bren gun; Carbine; Pistol. Total, 103 hours. |
| <u>Support Weapons:</u> | Bazooka; 60 m/m Mortar. Total, $133\frac{1}{2}$ hours. |
| <u>Demolitions:</u> | Total, $35\frac{1}{2}$ hours. |
| <u>Fieldcraft:</u> | Known Distance; Map Reading; Mines and Booby Traps; Observation; Pacing Course; Technique of the Individual Soldier; Use of the Compass; Compass Runs (Day and Night); Camouflage; Close Combat; Fire Control and Distribution. Total, 74 hours. |

The fifth and sixth weeks were devoted to the movements of the squad, the seventh week to section tactics, and the eighth and final week to commando tactics.

Considering "Basic Subjects," "Basic Weapons," and "Fieldcraft" as so-called "Basic" subjects in any military training program, the study

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of these occupied about 40 per cent (rough calculation) of the OGs' time during these first four weeks. The rest - "Automatic Weapons," "Support Weapons," and "Demolitions" - may be considered as "Intermediate" subjects and took up about 60 per cent of the working time during the first four weeks of training.

Several things are clear from this brief resume of the OG training program. First, as a result of the difficulties in obtaining recruits, the schedule had to be changed constantly. Second, the amount of time which the instructors were forced by circumstances to spend on so-called "Basic" subjects was unduly large because it was discovered that, contrary to expectations and contrary to the original principle that commando training should be exclusively on the advanced level, the Chinese lacked the basic training essential to immediate beginning of advanced training. The reason for this change was, of course, the lack of truly trained Chinese personnel. Since the recruits obtained did not measure up to what were considered to be proper OG standards, virtually all of them had to undergo a period of physical conditioning before embarking on the program proper. This added to the delays. Thus, in addition to the preliminary physical conditioning, the Americans had to cram into eight weeks a great deal of basic training and also make some gestures towards advanced commando training.

Of the eight-week total, all but the final week was training of either a basic or at the most an intermediate nature. It should be noted that only in the final week did the commando train at all as an integrated

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unit, all previous unit exercises being on the squad and section level. This may also be taken as an illustration of one of the military difficulties of waging warfare by coalition. It is impossible always to assume that one's allies and associates will have matched one's own level of attainment in preliminary training preparation. It was a matter of infinite regret to Cox and his associates to discover that the Chinese simply could not begin advanced training at once or absorb training at the rate necessary to meet the Theater requirement of having twenty commandos ready for the field by August 1, 1945, and that they were therefore compelled to do too much in a very limited time.

Third, to belabor once more a point already made several times, the type of training given reflects clearly the changed concept under which the OGs were compelled to operate. The "orthodox" doctrine of guerrilla warfare operations was to stress the attack and never the defense. This idea was rejected in planning and another one substituted, one which attempted to combine into one force the characteristics of a guerrilla force and those of regular troops of the line. This change was shown in the training program. Subjects such as bayonet drill, the 60 m/m mortar, the LMG, and the bazooka, with their implications of attack and defense of fixed positions against regular enemy troops received what would have been an inordinate amount of attention if the force had not been designed for uses other than strictly those of guerrilla warfare. On the other hand, subjects such as close combat, map reading, observation, the use of the compass, and camouflage received far less attention than

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1. The purpose of close order drill was, of course, that of instilling the ideas of discipline and the habit of quick response to commands.

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they would have received had not the above basic decision been reached by higher headquarters. Fourth, weapons training was intense, each component receiving as much time as possible with the weapons with which they were armed: the cal. .03 rifle, the LMG, the bazooka, the 60 m/m mortar, and the demolitions weapons. This reflected the lack of previous training.

In summary, the OG authorities were forced to operate under unfavorable conditions. They were given a most difficult tactical mission to fulfil: to combine into the same force capabilities for both guerrilla and regular infantry operations. They were compelled to utilize human material which, although willing in most cases, was inferior in capacity and in preliminary training. And they had to turn out the finished product in an impossibly short time, given the first two problems with which they had to deal.

They were obliged, therefore, to construct their training program so as to meet as many of the above conditions and problems as possible. It became a question of balancing requirements against time and adjusting the schedule accordingly. Under these circumstances, which were not of their own choosing, they worked out the best possible program, in terms of the units' mission, capabilities, and vulnerabilities.

H. PERSONNEL PROBLEMS

It has been demonstrated in the foregoing sections that from the outset the OG program in China had to face two major complications. First was the problem of determining just how these units were to be employed. Theater's decree that they be used both as guerrillas and in direct support of regular military operations made difficult the organization of a training program. Second was the problem of the command of the OG units in training and in field operations. The solution to this difficulty was found in the order to the Americans to confine their role to advice and to the Chinese to exercise actual command. Disagreements between Americans and Chinese were to be resolved by the use of formal reports and appeals to higher authorities. The nature of these problems and their solutions placed a premium upon the procurement of skilled and intelligent recruits. The assignment to OSS of responsibility without authority made any undertaking or operation as much a diplomatic as a military one.

The American personnel proved less of a problem to Cox and his associates than did the Chinese. The great majority of them had had previous combat experience in the OG field. It is of interest to note, however, what qualities were deemed essential for Americans to possess, in view of the situation in China, where everything had to be done by persuasion, where the legal relationship between Americans and Chinese was complicated by the Oriental problem of "face," and where so much was to be done in such a short time. In a letter to Washington Cox listed

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and elaborated on the qualities which he thought essential for his American personnel to possess.¹ The question of temperament loomed large in Cox's thinking. He said that American OOs coming to China should possess:

- a. Tact. Americans hold no command and they can enforce their will upon the Chinese only through a proper mixture of tact and firmness. The bull-headed martinet who rants and raves loses ground as soon as he opens his mouth.
- b. Patience. These troops are under-nourished and under-clothed - and often, not paid. It takes a hell of a lot of patience and work to get results. We are getting very fine results but it comes only from continuous working and sweating with them. Too many Americans here take one look at these soldiers as they arrive here and then state that they do not want to fight with Chinese troops.
- c. A sense of humor. With it, life here is O.K. - without it, a man will be a psycho case in no time.
- d. Guts. Not only on the fighting end but the guts to sail into a damn tough job, to be handicapped by lack of equipment, recreational facilities and to endure a lot of hardships, so as to do a real job for the war.
- e. Have men coming out here review their infantry weapons and tactics and methods of instruction. Give them as much orientation on China as possible. Build up their faith in the Chinese soldier to fight bravely - which he will. And above all prepare them for a tough job in which they can achieve truly tremendous results."

Concerning the Chinese recruits, the situation was difficult almost from the beginning.² In February the picture appeared fairly bright. This was at a time when things were just getting under way and when the Americans were still in the stage of making preliminary inquiries concerning the types of recruits they might expect to obtain. Since the Chinese First Parachute Regiment had been designated as the chief recruiting-ground for the OOs, OSS undertook to make at this time some investigation of its men. Col. Nicholas W. Willis, the Acting Chief of Special Operations, addressed early in February a report to the Operations Officer on this subject.³ He stated first that "the questions that are answered below have been obtained unofficially through observation and casual questioning

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1. Cox to CO/OGC/OSS/Washington, 30 May 1945, in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.7. OGC - Letters.
Folder #8.
2. The reliability of the material to be used in the ensuing discussion is unquestioned and should not be considered as merely a series of attempts to get more and better personnel. One reason for this statement is a directive from the OSS Operations Officer to all Branch Chiefs, dated 30 May 1945. Its subject is the composition and content of the weekly progress reports. The directive states in part: "The Weekly Progress Reports which this office sends to Theater must be made more comprehensive and specific. ... The report must emphasize accomplishments not difficulties. ..." That despite this injunction there are continual complaints from OG officials concerning the personnel problem shows that it was indeed serious.
A copy of this directive will be found in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.AD.1 - Operational Report.
3. Memorandum, Nicholas W. Willis, Lt. Col., Inf., Acting Chief, SO/OSS/CT/Det 202 to OPSO/CT/AFO 627, dated February 5, 1945, in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.4 - Personnel.
Folder #21.

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of individual Chinese Soldiers in the course of training and conversation." Having answered the queries regarding the regiment's strength and table of organization, Willis then dealt with two very important personnel questions. To the question "What is the caliber of officers?" he replied as follows:

"The best officers are the Majors commanding the companies. ... Most of them have attended the Central Military Academy. Most of the Lieutenants are young and somewhat inexperienced in leading men. However, they are intelligent and in many cases have had middle (high school) school or even college education. ... Both Officers and EM are superior to men in other Chinese regiments. The physical size of the men, their food ..., their pay, and their uniforms exceed that of men in other units."

To the question "What about intelligence and capacity to learn, of the EM in the regiment?" he replied as follows:

"Their intelligence is very high and their capability to learn is excellent. We have trained some of them in weapons and physical training and have found them quick to learn. While speaking of physical training we wish to add that they are in excellent physical condition.

Schooling:

10% post college or special training
50% 3 years middle school
25% finished 6 years middle school
15% grade school education"

"Most of the EM have been in the Army from (2) two to four (4) years. Some have had combat experience with Japs in East China fairly recently."

At the outset, therefore, there seemed to be every prospect for recruiting an OG force which would fulfil the requirements for experienced and intelligent men who were able to learn quickly. The event, however, was to prove otherwise.

A month later the first doubts began to appear. In one of his periodic letter reports to Washington, Cox, writing on March 12, stated

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that as a result of his soliciting "informed opinion" concerning the OG project he found that although many people felt that the Chinese personnel would be good, "some persons express doubt the Chinese will ever allow them to be used. Will battle that when the time comes." Summing up his impressions shortly after his own arrival in the Theater Cox stated that he felt that personnel was the "only real problem against what I feel can turn out to be a very fine program."¹ Interestingly enough, this foreboding concerning the use of the OGs turned out to be unwarranted, although almost every other conceivable personnel problem did arise to plague the OG authorities.

Cox's next letter to Washington spoke of the shortage of American personnel² and described a demonstration by the Chinese First Parachute Regiment which he and other OSS officials attended. He stated then that "the men are in very fine physical condition and they showed good discipline."³ It is to be noted that the foregoing comments date from the period before the Americans actually started working with the Chinese recruits and before they actually had worked out in any great detail the qualifications which they wanted recruits to have.

In early April, about two weeks before the first commando was to begin its training, Cox wrote to the Commanding General of the Chinese First Parachute Regiment, outlining his needs in terms of recruits to be provided. While the requests he made at this time may, in view of later developments, be regarded as a Utopian dream, it should be remembered that this was about one month after Cox's own arrival in the Theater and

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1. Cox to CO/OGC/OSS/Washington, 12 March 1945, in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.7. OGC - Letters.
Folder #8.
2. A shortage which never became serious, since there were always
sufficient Americans on hand to provide instruction and to
accompany the OGs in the field. Although additional American
personnel was sometimes slow in arriving, owing to priorities
difficulties, they did reach China in time.
3. Cox to CO/OGC/OSS/Washington, 21 March 1945, in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.7. OGC - Letters.
Folder #8.

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before actual training had got under way. Furthermore, both Theater and the Chinese high command had promised both the best possible personnel and the fullest support for the OG operations. In general, the following qualities were deemed necessary for OG recruits: intelligence, leadership qualities, ability to assume responsibility, physical strength, field experience, steadiness, ability to learn, accuracy, skill with weapons, aggressiveness, and courage. In view of OG doctrine and the promises made to OSS, it did not seem impossible to expect that recruits would possess these qualities.¹

OSS was able to begin its OG training on April 16, as scheduled, but the personnel problem soon began to assume serious proportions. Its first aspect was that of procurement, for which absolute reliance had to be placed upon the Chinese authorities. The second aspect of this problem soon became that of quality, since from almost the very beginning the Chinese did not furnish recruits of the caliber which OSS felt necessary for OG training. Beginning with mid-April, therefore, correspondence on these two subjects became a continuous cry for more and better Chinese recruits. These pleas were addressed by OSS and by Cox in turn to the Chinese First Parachute Regiment, to Chinese Combat Command, to Theater Headquarters, and to the Chinese authorities. There is little evidence to indicate that any serious attention was paid in higher headquarters to the increasingly frantic requests from OSS to solve the personnel problem. Their frequency and their sameness, as well as the lack of responses, shows that they fell upon ears which were deaf most of the time. Meanwhile, the OG Command did what it could with the personnel actually supplied.

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1. Cox to CG/1st Parachute Regiment, Chinese Army, Appendix, 4 April 1945, in OSS Archives - Kunming. CG.OP.4. Commanding General, 1st Parachute Regiment. Folder #13.

In order to give a complete picture of what Cox desired at this time, the full set of requirements is herewith reproduced from this document.

"The following list of job-qualifications is submitted to aid in the selection of certain personnel for key positions in the Commando.

1. Commando Headquarters

- a. C.O. An officer of superior physical, mental and leadership ability, capable of handling a normal Infantry Battalion. He must be aggressive and extremely co-operative with American personnel with whom he will be working.
- b. Executive Officer. An officer of superior quality, capable of assuming command in the absence of the C.O. and capable of carrying out the plans of the C.O.
- c. First Sergeant. An enlisted man with excellent field experience and leadership ability.
- d. Medical Technician. An intelligent NCO capable of learning and administering elementary medical care. (Same applies for Medical Technicians in rifle section).
- e. Radio Operator. An enlisted man with some previous radio experience who must indicate ability to handle field communications.
- f. Runner. A man very good physically who has the intelligence to accurately transmit verbal messages.

2. Rifle Section

- a. Section Leader. A good field officer with good, tactical reasoning.
- b. Bazooka Man. This soldier, in the Section HQ, must be fearless and steady.
- c. BAR Man. This man (one in each rifle squad) must have shown ability with weapons and must be above average in strength and size, capable of carrying the BAR.
- d. Intelligence NCO. A soldier above average in intelligence, with sketching ability and who has displayed accuracy of detail.

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60 1. (contd.)

3. Mortar Section. Squad leaders are to be intelligent and capable of controlling the fire of the mortar. Gunners and assistant gunners should have mechanical ability for the proper manipulation of the sighting and aiming mechanism.
4. LMG Section. Squad leaders, gunners and assistant gunners must all have ability in firing of automatic weapons.
5. Demolition Section. All personnel must have the intelligence necessary for handling all types of demolitions, booby traps and mines, and be able to understand and apply demolition formulas."

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1. Letter, Heppner to Wedemeyer, 24 April 1945, in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.4. CG, USF, CT - Letters.
Folder #15.
2. Cox to OPSO, 26 April 1945, Weekly Operational Report, in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.AD 1 - Operational Report.
3. Chen Ch'eng to Wedemeyer, 2 May 1945, in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
Reg. OP.7. - USF/CT CCC (Chinese Combat Command)
#122.

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On April 24 Heppner wrote to Wedemeyer as follows:¹

- "2. The 1st Parachute Regiment, which is providing the initial Chinese component, can provide only enough soldiers for five (5) Commando units. Thus the above schedule for beginning and finishing OG training cannot be accomplished unless additional troops are ready for training prior to 7 May 1945.
3. Although additional Chinese soldiers were to have been made available for screening on 10 and 20 April, none have, in fact, been provided.
4. The full authorized number, twenty (20) Commandos, must be completely trained and equipped prior to 1 August 1945. If this is to be done, it is absolutely essential that Chinese soldiers be made available in the Kunming area at once, in sufficient numbers to fill fifteen (15) Commando units after thorough screening. It is estimated that 4,000 soldiers should be made available for screening, in order to allow adequate margin for rejections.
5. It is requested that immediate steps be taken to provide these 4,000 soldiers at the earliest possible date. Of these, 500 should be officers and 3500, enlisted men."

Two days later Cox reported to Davis that the Chinese had still not put in an appearance.² On May 2 the Chinese Minister of War, Chen Ch'eng, wrote to Wedemeyer, acknowledging the latter's memorandum of April 28 and stating that "it had been decided that the 1st paratrooper regiment is to be assigned for these units and the remainder is to be selected from the regular army of the Chinese Army Headquarters." The minister stated that he was so informing General Ho Yingchin, the Chinese Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces.³ This decision had of course been made weeks before. Such was the result of the "immediate steps" requested by Heppner in his letter of April 24.

By May 7 little improvement was visible in the personnel procurement situation. On that date Davis sent an urgent radiogram to the Deputy Strategic Services Officer, complaining about the lack of Chinese personnel

and about the caliber of those who did make their appearance.¹ Davis informed Bird that owing once again to Chinese failures to live up to their commitments the OG training program had fallen behind schedule. Commandos #6, 7, and 8 had been scheduled to begin their work that day, but only enough recruits had arrived to enable the first two to begin. Even they had lost a day, owing to their extremely late arrival in camp. For the first time criticism of the men themselves appears: "Calibre of new personnel is poor. They do not measure up to necessary standards either physically or mentally." This complaint appears subsequently with increasing frequency and urgency. The communication concludes with the following plea:

"Cox and his men are doing a magnificent job but the Chinese are simply failing to live up to their part. We cannot accomplish the impossible. [i.e., to meet Theater's requirement that all twenty Commandos be ready for full field operations by August 1, 1945] This should be brought to the personal attention of General Wedemeyer with the request that he take the whole matter up forcibly with the Gimo to get immediate and positive action. Time does not permit the usual delays and red tape. The Chinese high command must immediately authorize full implementation of this plan or we cannot possibly comply with Theater's demands."

On May 8 Cox approached the personnel problem again in a communication addressed to the Commander of the Chinese First Parachute Regiment. Noting that the current table of organization for the commandos made no provision for replacements and that the acceleration of the whole program "has precluded adequate preliminary screening of volunteers," he requested immediate authorization for the establishment of a replacement pool of 56 officers and 548 soldiers. Its purpose was to replace those men weeded

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1. Radiogram, OPSO to Bird; information: McClure, Weart, URGENT, dated 7 May 1945. (Major General R. B. McClure was the Commanding General of the Chinese Combat Command; Brigadier General D. L. Weart was Widemeyer's Deputy Chief of Staff.) A copy of this document will be found in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
Reg. OP.7. - USF/CT CCC (Chinese Combat Command) #122.

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1. Cox to CG/1st Parachute Regiment, Chinese Army, 8 May 1945, in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
CG.OP.4. Commanding General,
1st Parachute Regiment. Folder #13.
2. Heppner to CG/CCC, 8 May 1945, in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
Reg. OP.4. - USF/CT CCC (Chinese Combat Command) #122.
3. Cox to OPSO, Weekly operational report, 10 May 1945, in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
CG.AD 1 - Operational Report.
4. Cox to CG/OGC/OSS/Washington, 11 May 1945, in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
CG.OP.7. OGC - Letters.
Folder #8.
5. Progress Report on Commandos, dated 18 May 1945, in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
CG.OP.4. CG, USF, CT - Letters.
Folder #15.

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out during training and to provide immediately fully-trained replacements for the expected combat casualties.¹ On the same day Heppner was forwarding Davis's urgent request to the Chinese Combat Command authorities, emphasizing both the tardy arrival of the Chinese recruits and their low caliber.²

However, the problem was not soon solved, for Cox reiterated his grievance to Davis in his weekly report written on May 10:³ "The troops for the Commando units were to be hand-picked and they were to be the cream of the Chinese Army. The last troops that arrived were below the standards necessary for highly specialized units such as the Commandos. Steps have been initiated to rectify this situation by informing higher echelons of it." The following day he reported to Washington that owing to the Chinese failure to live up to their part of the bargain the training schedule had fallen behind by one unit. In other words, OSS was training only seven commandos when they should, according to the original schedule, have been training eight.⁴

By May 18 at least some action had been taken, as reported by Cox in his progress report of that date: "Arrangements have just been completed with Chinese SOS to transport two thousand men to the Kunming area by 27 May 1945 from a replacement pool at Chan-yi. However, an OSS Medical Officer who accompanied the recruiting party to Chan-yi has already reported that barely 500 men are available there who meet Commando type requirements."⁵ Thus while one personnel problem had at least been partially dealt with the other remained as acute as ever. And there was less than three months remaining before Theater's readiness deadline of August 1.

From May 22 to the middle of June the personnel picture changed but little, as revealed in communications of this period. With some exceptions, the recruits making up the first ten commandos seemed to prove satisfactory. Concerning the rest, however, the usual complaints prevailed, complaints which were genuine enough and serious enough to lead to further modifications and delays in the training schedule. On May 22 Heppner discussed the situation in a letter to Wedemeyer.¹ He recalled that early in May the OG command had been able to start only two, instead of three, units on their training program. When the 500 troops referred to on May 18 actually arrived in camp, "it was immediately apparent that they could not absorb training at the necessary rate, and that a majority would have to be eliminated. As a result it has been necessary to postpone, for one week, training of Commandos #11, 12, and 13. During this week an attempt will be made to screen an additional 500 troops and to obtain, from the total of 1,000, sufficient personnel for these three Commandos."² Heppner closed with the statement that OSS had fulfilled all its obligations and the warning that "unless the Chinese likewise meet their commitments, no more than ten (10) Commando Units can be expected to be ready for action at the required time."

On May 31 the prospects appeared somewhat brighter. On that day Cox reported to Davis that recruiting parties had been authorized to screen the Chinese 48th Division. As a result "approximately 400 men have been selected thus far and it is hoped that Commandos #13, 14 and 15 will commence training next Monday 4 June."³ Only a week later,

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1. Heppner to Wedemeyer, 22 May 1945, in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.4. CG, USF, CT - Letters.
Folder #15.
 2. See also Cox on the same subject on 25 May 1945, in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.AD 1 - Operational Report.
 3. Apparently the OG Command had been able to salvage enough from
the wreckage of #11, 12, and 13 to create new units for #11 and
#12, for there is no further mention of them. In this report
Cox refers to the intervention of General Tu Lei Ming, Commander
of the Chinese 5th Army Group. A conference with Tu on May 23
apparently led to permission to screen the 48th Division, for
Cox stated in his May 31 report that "this recruiting has been
made possible by General Tu Lei Ming, Commanding General of the
5th Army Group, who has been giving the entire Commando project
a great deal of support." See the following document for mention
of this conference on May 23:
Cox to OPSO, 25 May 1945, in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.AD 1 - Operational Report.
- The May 31 report will be found in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.AD 1 - Operational Report.

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however, fresh problems arose. On that day Cox reported to Davis that Commando #5, which had been unsatisfactory from the start, had "fallen further and further below strength, continually, and because of poor Chinese officers, has not been satisfactory in training." In consequence of this situation and because the other commandos needed replacements, it had been "decided to break up the Fifth Commando, use the best men to bring remaining Commandos up to T/O strength, and to weed out the weak officers and men. A new Fifth Commando will commence training at the same time as the 19th and 20th Commandos."¹ To balance this unfavorable development was the fact that Commandos #13, 14, and 15 actually did begin training on June 4.

The general situation regarding Commandos #11 through 20 was summed up in rather gloomy fashion in an exchange of radiograms between Cox and Davis on June 7-8. Davis radioed Cox on June 7 and asked for information on the "current Chinese personnel situation for commandos 16 to 20 and your best estimate as to whether additional personnel needed will be made available in time."² Cox replied on the following day that #13, 14, and 15 had actually begun training on June 4 and that enough men were on hand to begin training #16, 17, and 18 on June 11. As for #19 and 20, their training would be begun on June 18, "provided cooperation on recruiting continues." The new #5 would also begin its training on June 18. He then stated as his personal opinion that "Commandos 11 through 20 will have personnel barely meeting our minimum requirements." Also, "reduced ceiling on OSS plus quality of personnel being produced, by Chinese for supposedly elite commandos, make poor possibility of producing twenty

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1. Cox to OPSO, Weekly Operational Report, 7 June 1945, in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.AD 1 - Operational Report.
2. This exchange will be found in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
Reg. OP.3. - Projects: BOSTON,
Administration, etc. 149a.

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1. The words "reduced ceiling" and "staffing" of the commandos
concern American personnel. As previously stated, the
American personnel problem was never as acute, from either
the procurement or the qualitative points of view, as was the
Chinese.
2. Cox to Tu Lei Ming, 18 June 1945, in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.4 - General Tu Lei Ming.
Folder #11.
3. Cox to OPSO, Weekly Operational Report, 21 June 1945, in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.AD 1 - Operational Report.

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superior commandos. Recomm positive action by War Ministry and Theater to produce best of Chinese soldiers, and Theater action on ceiling to provide adeq staffing for twenty commandos..."¹

From the middle of June to the Japanese surrender in August, 1945, the personnel problem as described above did not alter in any significant manner. The CG authorities were bedeviled as before by shortages of recruits and by the inferior caliber of those recruits whom they did succeed in obtaining. Although both Cox and Heppner persisted in their efforts to remedy the situation, no real support from above was forthcoming. General Tu remained a strong supporter of the program, but even his efforts had only limited success. On June 18 Cox wrote to Tu to report on the program's progress and to outline the features of what had become the usual desperate personnel situation. By this date there were 35 officer and 110 enlisted vacancies in the commandos already formed. In addition, 10 officer and 100 enlisted vacancies were expected to occur as training casualties. Finally, Cox estimated that 25 officers and 600 enlisted men would be rejected during training. He urged, therefore, the procurement of a total of 70 officers and 800 enlisted men to fill the foregoing needs.² A few days later he reported to Davis that 150 out of 700 new recruits for Commandos #19, 20, and 5 had had to be rejected as below the caliber required and made the following gloomy statement:³

"Comparison of results thus far obtained indicate ... that the poor type of personnel now being obtained (Commandos 11 through 20) will greatly limit results obtained. Even a small amount of support by Theater and by the Chinese Army to the project could have paid huge dividends."

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Clearly, Cox's confidence in future results was beginning to suffer under the strain.

This strain is reflected in a communication of July 2 from Davis to Col. Harry W. Little, Jr., the OSS Operations Officer in Chungking:¹

"Statement in report about commandos may have seemed illtempered but assure you we are reaching end of our rope on personnel situation. C.C.C. has been most cooperative but is in no position to solve our problems. We have always felt and have stated so repeatedly that firm action on highest level is necessary if these commando units are to get the type of soldier they should have. As it is now they accept less than six percent of men screened and even these are not so hot. Sole reason for the many changes in training schedule has been failure on part of Chinese to produce recruits."

Even allowing for exaggeration regarding the percentage of rejections, this radiogram clearly reflects the discouragement which by now had permeated American OG headquarters.²

Two more major attempts were made before the surrender of Japan to do something about the personnel situation. On July 23 Cox radioced Davis, now the Deputy Strategic Services Officer, as follows:³

"Every general [i.e., Chinese general] wants at least three commandos for his own but no one gives me the men pd General Lee advises that minister of war promised him one thousand of cream of China within ten days fifteen days ago pd as you know replacements needed immediately pd would it be possible for you to contact minister of war and jack him up pd"

On the following day Davis addressed a letter to Wedemeyer, in which he summarized the situation. He pointed out that the Chinese First Parachute Regiment (which had been designated at the beginning as the chief source for OG recruits) had provided enough men only for the first five commandos and that the remainder had been obtained "only through the

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1. Radiogram, OPSC to Little (Chungking), 2 July 1945, in
OSS Archives - Kunning.
Reg. OP.3. - Projects: BOSTON,
Administration, etc. 149a.
2. On the following day Cox made another attempt to remedy the
personnel difficulties. He wrote to the Commanding General,
Supreme Chinese Armies, on July 3, requesting once more suf-
ficient recruits to staff his replacement pool which he had
already asked from General Tu on June 18.
See Cox to CG, Supreme Chinese Armies, 3 July 1945, in
OSS Archives - Kunning.
CG.OP.4 - General Tu Lai Ming.
Folder #11.
3. Radiogram, Cox to Davis, 23 July 1945, in
OSS Archives - Kunning.
Reg. OP.3. - Projects: BOSTON,
Administration, etc. 149a.

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1. Davis to CG/USAF/CT (Attention AC of 8, G-5), 24 July 1945, in
OSS Archives - Kunning.
Reg. OP.3. - Projects: BOSTON,
Administration, etc. 149a.
2. Cox to CG/CCC, 7 August 1945, in
OSS Archives - Kunning.
CG.OP.4. Chinese Combat Command.
Folder #12.

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unremitting efforts of Colonel Cox and his staff in screening many thousands of Chinese soldiers to obtain the required number." He asserted that CG standards of selection were not impossibly high, since he and his colleagues had personally seen many Chinese units whose men were of far higher caliber than those provided for the commandos. Davis summarized Cox's July 23 radiogram to himself and stated: "these soldiers have still not materialized and if past experience is any criterion, it may be weeks or months before they will." Davis closed his letter with an urgent request that "every possible effort be made to induce the Ministry of War to fulfill its promise and to make available these soldiers immediately."¹

That this appeal to highest headquarters fell at some point upon deaf ears is shown by the letter from Cox to the Chinese Combat Command, dated August 7, in which he indicated that the personnel problem continued to be more serious than ever. In addition to the need for filling usual vacancies created by rejections before and during training it was now necessary to replace the combat casualties incurred by Commandos #1, 2, 8, 9, and 10, which had meanwhile gone into action. The final paragraph of this letter shows the stage which Cox's thinking had now reached.²

"Request that the CG, CCC seriously consider at this time, the worth of the Commandos to the war effort, and that if present indications show that they will furnish acceptable results to the CCC, that everything possible be done to provide the number and type of personnel required as soon as possible."

An incomplete series of weekly progress and efficiency reports on the commandos during their training period provides some clues to the problem of how capable were the Chinese officers and soldiers. It should be recalled that the majority of the complaints about them concerned those provided for Commandos #11 through 20, #1 through 10 being on the whole somewhat better. The term "somewhat better" is a relative one, however, and must be so understood. The reports in question deal with the first four weeks of training of Commando #8, the second and third of #9, and the first four of #10. The reports on these three commandos are particularly interesting, because these units later formed the OG battalion which participated with the regular Chinese army in the operation against the Japanese-held Tanchuk airfield. Commando #8 received a unit efficiency rating of "Excellent" for each of the four weeks. The individual ratings given the Chinese officers¹ vary from "Superior" for all four weeks in the case of the Second Branch (Rifle) Leader, who was described as the "best all around officer in Cdo [Commando],"² to three officers who in the first week's report were deemed not of Commando quality. The Branch ratings, when given, are mostly "Excellent." The Chinese commanding officer received one "Superior" and three "Excellents." Most Branch and Squad leaders earned ratings from "Good" to the one "Superior" already mentioned.²

The two reports on Commando #9 give the unit as a whole a rating of "Excellent." The first describes the commando's morale as "extremely high" and the condition of their weapons was "Excellent." Their physical

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1. The "Senior American Officer" of the Commando filled in the weekly unit efficiency report and issued the ratings for the Commando as a whole, for the Branches, and for the individual Chinese officers. He did not rate the Chinese enlisted men individually. The "Senior American Officer" commanded the American cadre assigned to the Commando and acted as the chief adviser to the Chinese commander and his subordinates.
2. These reports will be found in
OSS Archives - Kunming,
OG.OP.5. - 8th Commando (Combat). #12.

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1. These reports will be found in
OSS Archives - Kunming,
OG.OP.5. - 9th Commando (Combat). #11.
2. These reports will be found in
OSS Archives - Kunming,
OG.OP.5. - 10th Commando (Combat). #10.

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condition had "improved considerably since arrival." The Executive Officer of the commando was given a "Superior" rating for both weeks and was commented on in the first report as follows: "This officer is giving cooperation toward training and administrative matters in a superior fashion. Due to his efforts the Commando has a well above average attendance and promptness record. It has become daily S.O.P. for him to account accurately for all absentees." The Commanding Officer received an "Excellent" in both cases. The Branch Leaders varied from "Satisfactory" to "Superior," with most of them being termed "Excellent."¹

The Senior American Officer of Commando #10 either was stricter than his colleagues or had less promising material with which to work. In contrast to the other two units, #10 received for the four weeks a unit efficiency rating of only "Very Satisfactory." The Branches and the Branch and Squad Leaders in Commando #10 received more ratings of "Very Satisfactory" than did their colleagues in #8 and 9. All squad leaders "show good judgment and leadership." The Commanding Officer received an "Excellent" for each of the four weeks, with the additional comment on the first report that he showed aggressiveness and on the fourth that he "demonstrates excellent tactical knowledge." He was described in the third report as "very capable, efficient, strict disciplinarian" and as "open to suggestion."² It is permissible to speculate, therefore, that these ratings reflect a greater degree of strictness on the part of the American rating officer.

It is difficult to draw definitive conclusions concerning the effectiveness and capability of the Chinese officers and men once they

had begun their commando training. On the one hand, there were the continual pleas by Cox and others for more men and their complaints that the personnel provided was of inferior quality.¹ On the other hand, the reports just summarized indicate competent levels of performance by most of the Chinese officers and men. Two factors, however, reduce or eliminate entirely this seeming inconsistency. One is the nature of the ratings given. It should be remembered that during World War II a military efficiency rating of anything below "Excellent" was, to say the least, damning with faint praise. With this in mind the ratings given Commandos #8, 9, and 10 become more consistent with the pleas and complaints continually voiced by the higher OG authorities. More important than this, however, is the question of American as opposed to Chinese standards of performance. It is to be doubted that the rating officers applied to these Chinese trainees the same standards which they would have applied to American OG trainees. Evidence of this is to be found in the reports on Commandos #9 and 10 and in Cox's correspondence. In this third report the Senior American Officer of Commando #10 says:

"The commando as a whole has shown an aptitude for learning daily lessons. However, due to language difficulties it is the opinion of this officer that more demonstration be attempted and less lecture time be devoted for instructional purposes."

and

"This officer is of the opinion that the officers and men have done exceedingly well in view of the many obstacles & difficulties that must be overcome daily."

and

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1. It may be argued that these complaints were just another manifestation of the occasional tendency in governmental and military circles to exaggerate deficiencies and requirements in order to be sure of getting what the requesters really want. This is highly improbable in this case, however, since the requirements had already been set forth by authorities higher than OSS and since the OG authorities were faced with the necessity of having all commandos ready for action by August 1, 1945.

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1. Cox to Tu Lei Ming, 18 June 1945, in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.h. - General Tu Lei Ming.
Folder #11.

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"The health of the commando is at present being jeopardized by the location of billets in an extremely filthy village. This accounts for the greater portion of our sick."

In the fourth report he comments:

"The general condition of the commando at this time is quite satisfactory. Barring minor deficiencies they are as ready for combat as they can be expected ever to be with the training background they have."

The following comment appears in the second report of Commando #9:

"Due to his [the Chinese Executive Officer's] efforts the Commando has a well above average attendance and promptness record. It has become daily S.O.P. for him to account accurately for all absentees."

Cox wrote the following to General Tu Lei Ming:¹

"In general, the training is progressing satisfactorily. In a few instances, the instruction has not been up to best American standards, and every effort is being made to improve our work. As a result of the General's [i.e., Tu Lei Ming's] recent visit, attendance at classes has improved considerably. The interest and attention of the Chinese soldier is almost always a reflection of the ability of the Chinese officer over him. Every effort is being made to improve the quality of the officers, but there still remain a few who are not doing a good job."

These six comments are significant and show that ratings of "Superior" and "Excellent" must not be taken to mean the same as when applied to American units. They reveal that the Americans, whose role, it must constantly be remembered, was confined to that of advice, had to contend with various factors beyond their control. They had to contend with the language problem, which inevitably affected the quality of the instruction, despite the use of interpreters. They continually faced "many obstacles & difficulties." There was a health problem. And Cox admits that the

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training is progressing only "satisfactorily" and that "in a few instances the instruction has not been up to best American standards." It is revealing, too, that both the Senior American Officer of Commando #9 and Cox himself feel called upon to point out as unusual and worthy of special mention the improvement in promptness and in attendance at classes. In one case a Chinese officer is singled out for special commendation because of his bringing his unit's attendance "well above the average attendance and promptness record." And Cox's remark to Tu on the same subject is of equal significance. Perhaps the most important evidence of the standard of performance is the remark that Commando #10 is "as ready for combat as they can be expected ever to be with the training background they have."

In summary, therefore, it is difficult to believe that the ratings of these Chinese units were applied with the same exactness as they would have been applied to similar American units. The difference in standards, background, training conditions and performance is clear. Furthermore, it must be remembered that the Americans were very much hampered in their training task by the ruling that they could do no more than advise. In the absence of zealous Chinese officers, therefore, their hands were virtually tied.

This account of OG personnel problems has been long. It is perhaps too obvious to state that the success of a unit's operations depends on its personnel. It remains true, however, that adequate weapons and supplies are useless without fully-trained and competent officers and men. The OGs were

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given a task of enormous complexity. Their mission was, as has been shown, a dual one, in that they were to be prepared to function both as true guerrillas and as regular troops of the line. The time allotted for training was short at best. In view of these facts, in view of the awkward and complex relationship between Americans and Chinese, which was dictated by the diplomatic and political situation as much as by the military situation in China, and in view of the restrictions placed upon the Americans, the quality of the personnel was even more important in this instance than perhaps in any other set of circumstances. In short, everything depended upon it, since the OG authorities were given once more the responsibility of producing results without adequate authority to enable them to do so.¹ There can be little doubt that the quality of the Chinese personnel was not equal to what were considered to be proper OG standards. It remains to be seen how these Chinese OGs functioned under combat conditions.

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1. Another serious personnel problem was that of the interpreting officers. These were Chinese who were hired under contract or drafted and who were assigned to the commandos. Their function is obvious. During the training period the OG interpreters proved to be a source of friction, particularly so since they had the honorary rank of officers and since in practice they were not under as strict military discipline as were the OGs. This friction increased during April and May, 1945, and finally resulted in an "OG Interpreter Survey" conducted by the X-2 (Counterespionage) Branch of OSS, during which no evidence of subversion or espionage was found. Consult the following documents for information concerning the OG interpreters during this period.

1. Memorandum signed by Cox, dated April 5, 1945, addressed to "Interpreters for Chinese Commandos" and explaining the interpreters' status and responsibilities. This will be found in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.4. - Personnel.
Folder #21.
2. A Chinese Combat Command instruction to all personnel, dated April 24, 1945, dealing with the use of interpreters. This will be found in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
OSS.OP.1 - Theater Directives.
3. An OSS Operations Committee Meeting Summary, dated May 18, 1945, in which Cox discusses briefly the problem of the interpreters' behavior. This will be found in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.6. OPSCOM, Folder #7.
4. Cox's Progress Report on Commandos, dated May 18, 1945, in part of which he discusses the problem posed by the interpreters' attitude. This will be found in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.4. CG, USF, CT - Letters.
Folder #15.

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1. (Contd.)

5. The complete text of the "OG Interpreter Survey", mentioned above, which was conducted by investigators from the I-2 Branch (Counterespionage) of OSS, dated May 22, 1945. The covering letter to Hoppner is dated May 24, 1945. This will be found in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.3. - Folder #1.

Since the interpreter problem presented no features essentially different from other aspects of Chinese-American relationships already discussed, it is sufficient to mention the point and to refer those interested in additional study of the question to the above-mentioned documents.

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I. OG OPERATION "APPLE,"
JULY - AUGUST, 1945

Chinese Commando #1 went by the code-name APPLE. On July 1, 1945, OSS issued the operational plan for APPLE, which was to parachute into the "area south of WEST RIVER between WUCHOW and KAO-YAO, on the morning of 12 July 1945."¹ OSS ordered APPLE to pay "particular attention" to the "intelligence derived from the conduct of these operations" and gave it six primary tasks:

- "a. Disrupting enemy lines of communication and destruction of enemy river traffic along WEST RIVER at such times and places as may be selected by the Commando Leader.
- b. Disrupting enemy lines of communication and destruction of enemy supply columns using the area road net, at such times and places as may be selected by the Commando Leader.
- c. Attacking and destroying such enemy installations within the area of operation as may be within the capabilities of the Commando, as determined by the Commando Leader.
- d. Preparing a plan of attack and seizure of the key town of WUCHOW ... to hold WUCHOW until relieved by designated Chinese forces or as directed by higher headquarters. Warning order will be issued through this headquarters.
- e. Preparing a plan of attack and seizure of the key town of KAO-YAO ... to be executed on call from higher headquarters. To hold KAO-YAO until relieved by designated Chinese forces or as directed by higher headquarters. Warning order will be issued through this headquarters.
- f. Preparing a plan for the establishment of defended road blocks at critical points in the enemy road net throughout the operational area and be prepared to establish these road blocks on call."

Analysis of these missions reveals a number of significant points. In terms of guerrilla warfare doctrine as enunciated by Donovan and his associates, the first three are true guerrilla operations. APPLE was to concentrate its efforts against enemy lines of communication, supply

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1. A copy of this document will be found in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.5. - 1st Commando (Combat) - #19.

See Tab "C" for maps to serve as an annex to this study of
OG Operation APPLE.

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1. The term "Commando Leader" refers to the Chinese commanding officer. As mentioned before, his American colleague and adviser was called the "Senior American Officer."

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columns, and installations. It was to attack, disrupt, and destroy. The Commando Leader was left to his own devices in the matter of selecting specific targets for attention and in the matter of determining whether or not his unit was able to carry out a given task. He was thus not governed in his every move and decision by orders from above. Success or failure depended on the unit itself and on its leader's judgment.¹ While the obligation to attack "installations" might be regarded as a violation of the injunction in guerrilla doctrine against attack and defense of fixed installations and positions, this is not necessarily so, for in each case the operation was to be within the capability of the commando, as determined by the Commando Leader.

The second three missions, on the other hand, show very clearly the dual nature of the OI operational concept long since decided upon in Washington and more recently in China. The most obvious point is that they were designed to give direct tactical support to regular military operations. APPLE was directed to prepare plans for the seizure and retention until relieved, or otherwise ordered, of the "key" towns of Wuchow and Kaoyao and for the "establishment of defended road blocks at critical points in the enemy road net throughout the operational area." The defended road blocks and the attacks on the two towns were to be prepared on call. These operations partook of the nature of regular infantry assaults. APPLE was both to attack and defend fixed positions and was to do so when directed to do so by higher headquarters, regardless of the Commando Leader's own judgment concerning his unit's

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capabilities. Finally, the two towns in question and the "operational area" in which road blocks were to be set up and defended lay directly in the path of the Allied advance envisaged by Operation CARBONADO and were important to any West River operation. In sum, therefore, the mission given to APPLE conformed in every detail with the modified concept of OG operations, with the principles enunciated at Wedemeyer's Clandestine Conference No. 1 (January, 1945), with the mission of Operation CARBONADO, and with the type of training given to the OGs in consequence. The whole mission, as defined, partook strongly of the combination in the same operation of both tactical and strategic aspects. It must be admitted, furthermore, that even the strategic objectives had much of the tactical about them, since they lay within the area of tactical effort by regular military forces. The isolation of the battlefield was the goal.

Intelligence concerning the enemy within the area of operations was not very complete. In the "Intelligence Annex No. 1 to Operation 'APPLE'," dated July 1, 1945, it was stated that "information concerning enemy forces along the WEST RIVER (HSI CHIANG) is very limited. For general locations and identifications see map overlay ..."¹ Study of the map yields no information concerning Japanese numerical strength, but does give an indication of the location of units. The bulk of Japanese strength was concentrated in and around Canton and to the north and east of that city. The enemy had entrusted the defense of the West River area to the

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1. A copy of this document and of the map overlay referred to will be found in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.6. - Folder #3. Misc.

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1. This material is taken from the "OSS Operational Plan for APPLE," dated July 1, 1945, in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.5. - 1st Commando (Combat) - #19.
2. In connection with Li and his "People's Mobilization Commission," the following news item is of interest. On page 43 of the May 31, 1954, issue of the weekly newsmagazine "Newsweek" there is a photograph with the following caption under it: "In Peking, Red chairman Mao Tse-tung, flanked by five vice chairmen, watches May Day parade from the Gate of Heavenly Peace. Left to right, Li Chi-shen, Liu Shao-chi, Mao, Gen. Chu Teh, Mme. Sun Yat-sen, and Chang Lan."

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13th Independent Infantry Brigade. Elements of this were in Wuchow, in and around Kaoyao, in and around Canton, and near the coast due south of Canton. The situation presents two factors of interest. Total Japanese organized ground forces strength available for the defense of the West River valley was not great, for the enemy had concentrated most of his strength in and around Canton. However, it is of interest to note that he had concentrated elements of what organized forces he had allotted to the West River in or close to the towns of Wuchow and Kaoyao, which APPLE was to be prepared to capture and defend.

The situation of friendly forces in the area was as follows.¹ General Yu Han-mou commanded the Seventh War Area, in which were located troops of the Chinese 65th Army. Yu was reported to be hostile to the Chungking government, to be a member of the South Chinese Secessionist Movement, and closely allied with Marshal Li-chi-shen's "People's Mobilization Commission," which the report described as "powerful" in the southern part of Kwangsi Province.² Yu's regular troops of the 65th Army in the VII War Area were considered to be of "negligible" military value. American military observers considered that Yu would commit them "only in the event of an Allied landing on the Coast," since they had refused battle with any Japanese forces for the past year. A General Fang, whose second-in-command was Colonel Wat, was the commander of the "only known reported organized guerrilla band to be operating west along the WEST RIVER." This group belonged to the "National Government Guerrilla Headquarters," located at Shaping. Other irregular forces in the area were

composed of small groups loosely controlled by the central government, strictly local militia groups, and the river pirates. The first two groups were generally anti-Japanese, while the third was for sale to the highest bidder. The West River area could therefore be considered as a kind of no-man's-land, since effective control really resided in the hands of irregular groups of uncertain temper, rather than firmly in the hands of either the Japanese or the Chinese central government.

The same report gives a lengthy description of the terrain, roads, and communications of the area. The terrain in general was rough and hilly, with the river valley itself broken up by hills and varying in width from about 10 miles to "narrow gorges." The "roads in this area are probably the worst in all of China. Although some motor roads are indicated, the vast majority of land ways are small, tortuous paths. In the lower areas they are paved with flag-stones and follow the paddy-dike lines. In the uplands they normally follow the ridge lines and are unpaved." An important feature of the area was that "due to the density of the tough saw-grass covering higher hills" it was "most difficult for foot-troops to move off" the paths in the hills. Information on communications was scanty. There was no information at all on the existence of a telephone system. Information on telegraph lines was meager and unreliable. One radio station was known to exist in Wuchow "and there is an unconfirmed report of a similar station in KAOYAO." It is evident from the information contained in these intelligence annexes that APPLE would have to be prepared to operate pretty much on its own

resources. While the Japanese forces it might have to face were not large, it could expect no reliable assistance from Chinese groups already in the area and would have to rely on its own equipment for communications.

An SO team (GAZELLE), already in the area, was ordered to assist in the arrangements for the reception of APPLE. Also, a three-man advance unit of APPLE was dropped in the area on July 10, to help with reception arrangements and to provide last-minute information.¹ On July 11, 1945, GAZELLE radioed back to the base that there were 300 Japanese troops in Kaoyao and that no Chinese troops were to be found south of the river. No Japanese gunboats were on the river. Japanese supplies were stored in caves north of Kaoyao and were carried in barges towed by motor launches. These convoys were usually guarded by two Japanese soldiers, traveled at night, and made their stops at small villages along the north bank of the river. APPLE would not have to worry about food, since it was plentiful. Now would it have to concern itself with the attitude of the local population, which was said to look upon the Americans with favor. The rate of exchange was about 400 Chinese dollars to 1 American. GAZELLE urged that APPLE's personnel be told not to mention the rate prevailing in Kunming, in the interest, of course, of keeping down the rates and prices in the West River area.² The same day APPLE's advance unit reported that the Drop Zone was ready for the drop scheduled for the following day.³ On July 12, 1945, APPLE parachuted safely behind the Japanese lines near Kaoyao. It was reported that all went well, except for the loss of one Chinese, who landed in a fish pond and drowned.⁴

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1. Detailed Report on mounting of APPLE Operation, dated July 18, 1945, in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
SO.OP.12 (Box 1).
5 OG - APPLE, BLACKBERRY, CHERRY.
2. Radiogram, GAZELLE to Wampler (the head of SO/OSS),
11 July 1945, in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.5. - 2nd Commando (Combat) - #18.
3. Radiogram, Carpenter (APPLE advance unit) to Cox, 11 July
1945, in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.5. - 2nd Commando (Combat) - #18.
4. Cox to OPSO, Weekly operational report, 12 July 1945, in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.AD 1 - Operational Report.

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1. Detailed Report on APPLE Operation, dated 18 July 1945, signed
by Lt. Col. Lucius O. Rucker, Jr., and addressed to the
Strategic Services Officer/OSS/CT. Col. Rucker was head of
the OG Parachute Training School and Chief of Air Operations.
A copy of this report will be found in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
SO.OP.12 (Box 1).
5 OG - APPLE, BLACKBERRY, CHERRY.
2. A copy of this schedule, dated July 12, 1945, will be found in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.5. - 1st Commando (Combat) - #19.

The complete plane-load manifests, personnel rosters, financial,
supply and re-supply packaging (with code-markings), communica-
tions, and other administrative arrangements for APPLE will also
be found in this folder.

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Before beginning a discussion of APPLE's actual activities in the field it is of importance and interest to note the transportation and parachuting arrangements for the unit. This information will be found in a detailed report on the actual air transport operation.¹ The time-schedule which was carried out was as follows:

- "0305:- First aircraft took off. All take-offs were one (1) minute apart.
- 0311:- Aircraft No. 5 developed engine trouble.
- 0330:- Aircraft No. 5 landed to change load.
- 0345:- Aircraft No. 5 took off again.
- 0600:- Rendezvous made at NANNING. All fourteen (14) aircraft in formation 50 ft. out, 50 ft. back, 4 elements of 3 and 1 element of 2.
- 0823:- First aircraft passed directly over target 'T'.
- 0836:- Drop completed. All men and equipment out. Began return trip to CHENGKUNG.
- 1330:- First aircraft landed at CHENGKUNG."²

The load to be air-lifted consisted of "174 Chinese and American parachutists, 28 containers, and 30 packages of arms, ammunition, and supplies, requiring fourteen airplanes." The 27th Troop Carrier Squadron of Fourteenth Air Force handled all arrangements and made the actual lift. The chief loading principle was that of keeping "each section, i.e., machine gun squad, rifle squad, mortar squad, or other units intact along with their equipment so that if an emergency arose necessitating a jump at some unexpected place, they would have a combat unit together with its officers, personnel and equipment." The unit rode in trucks the 18 miles from the Commando camp to the Chengkung airdrome. Cox assigned one 2½-ton truck to each of the fourteen planes and sent along an extra vehicle in case of breakdowns en route. Personnel and equipment were loaded in the trucks according to the plane to which the truck and they were assigned.

Early in the evening of July 11 all plane crews and parachute school dispatchers were given a thorough preliminary briefing to cover the route as far as the plane rendezvous point at Nanning. For security reasons, they were not given the location of the exact Drop Zone until 0100 hours on July 12, or just prior to the actual departure time. In addition to the fourteen C-47¹ transport planes actually lifting the commando, the air fleet consisted of four P-51 fighters, which escorted them from Nanning to the Drop Zone and back, and one B-25, sent along to "obtain aerial photographic coverage."

The truck convoy arrived at Chengkung Airfield at 2200 hours on July 11. Meanwhile, the parachute school dispatchers had reported in to the planes to which they had been assigned, and occupied themselves with taping the doors, checking the anchor cables, and seeing that their planes were ready for loading and taking off. The OGs were given food and hot drinks and spent the remaining time before loading in two revetment areas on the opposite side of the field from where the planes awaited them. At 0030 hours, July 12, the trucks were reloaded and crossed the field to the parking line, with the truck assigned to Plane Number 14 in the lead and the others in reverse order. Each truck reported to the plane bearing the number corresponding to its own. By 0200 the planes were loaded and the men in place. During the trip all the men were airsick. Except for the mishap to Aircraft No. 5 reported above, the trip to the Drop Zone proceeded without other incident. The planes

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1. The figure of 14 C-47s is taken from Cox to OP80, Weekly operation report, dated 19 July 1945, in OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.AD 1 - Operational Report.

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1. Letter, Capt. Leopold J. Karwaski, Leader of Team GAZELLE, to Wampler, 16 July 1945, in OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.7. - APPLE Operation.
Folder #11.

Karwaski also reported that APPLE's men had drastically inflated prices in the area. He stated that they paid 100 Chinese dollars for a cup of tea.

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traveled at 100 to 105 miles per hour at 500-600 feet altitude. The chief difficulty occurred over the Drop Zone as follows:

"They arrived at DZ at 0825 hours and found the panels of the reception committee with no difficulty. The original plan was to make one pass over the DZ with all equipment and personnel being dispatched. However, several of the dispatchers were hampered in their dispatching by airsickness, with its resulting weakening of the jumpers and two passes were necessary in order to clean out the loads. The whole formation made a second pass and the few planes that had been unable to dispatch their loads on the first pass threw out the remaining equipment."

The drop was counted as successful, since the only casualties were the one Chinese who landed in a fish pond and drowned and one whose arm became entangled in the static line of another jumper and was broken as he jumped. All equipment landed safely. It is possible, however, that the broken arm could have been the only casualty on the drop, for the head of the SO team GAZELLE reported the following about APPLE's drop.¹

"This kid that drowned was seen by a few Chinese paratroopers, but instead of going to his assistance, they ran back one thousand yards for an American, hot stuff."

After the planes' return to base the dispatchers and plane crews held a meeting and made the following suggestions to improve operations in the future:

- a. Do not make drop approaching water, even though this means air craft cannot fly the direction of the panel on the field.
- b. All planes parked in line before taping doors and loading equipment to prevent confusion among the dispatchers in that they may load a plane other than that assigned to them.
- c. Must have covers for trucks so that chutes don't get wet on way to field. A wet chute may cause a malfunction and endanger the jumper's life.
- d. Have cigarettes, candy, gum, etc., for the jumpers while flying, and clothing or blankets to keep the men warm during flight.

- e. Be sure that all men fill their canteens before taking off.
- f. Have a briefing of all dispatchers just prior to loading in case there has been a change in plans after the preliminary briefing of all dispatchers and members of the air crews."

The reconstruction of APPLE's activities during the month between its arrival in the West River area and the Japanese surrender in mid-August is relatively easy from the strictly chronological point of view, owing to the existence of regular reports from Cox to his superiors. However, it is permissible to wish to look somewhat beyond these routine reports, for two reasons. First is their brevity, which makes it hard to obtain much more than the outline of events. Second, is their character, which, it must be remembered, was governed by the Directive of May 30, 1945, concerning the nature of reports. This stated that reports must emphasize accomplishments rather than difficulties.¹ The necessary frequency of radio silence, transmission difficulties, and the rapid dissolution of units at the end of the war, all contributed to the relative scarcity of full reports from the field and therefore to the difficulty of obtaining complete information on operations.

After landing between Wuchow and Kaoyao on July 12, APPLE prepared to move to Loytinguyen.² The Demolition Section was sent to mine the road near Yang-chiang-hsien. The Chinese in the area "seem very cooperative and very partial to Americans."³ For four days the Japanese chased APPLE, which "cleverly evaded them and made their way to LO-TING. They will establish a base there from which they will begin operations."⁴ At Lo-ting radio trouble developed, which meant that "only meagre information

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1. See Footnote #2, page 57, of this paper.
2. It has been impossible for either the present writer or the Map Library Division/ORR to locate this town.
3. Cox to OPSO, Weekly Operational Report, dated 19 July 1945, in OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.AD 1 - Operational Report.
4. Cox to OPSO, Weekly Operational Report, dated 26 July 1945, in OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.AD 1 - Operational Report.

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1. Cox to Heppner, OG Monthly Report, dated 31 July 1945, in OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.3 - Monthly Report. Folder #3.
2. Cox to OPSO, Weekly Operational Report, dated 2 August 1945, in OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.AD 1 - Operational Report.
3. Cox to CG/Reserve Command and to CG/Chinese Commandos, 6 August 1945, in OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.4. Commanding General, 1st Parachute Regiment. Folder #13.
4. Cox to Heppner, OG Monthly Report, dated 31 August 1945, in OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.1 - CHINA (Co. "B") - OPERATIONS.

No Nankong river exists under this name. It is suggested that the junction of the West and Nan-chiang Rivers may be the scene of this action. This junction has been circled on the map.

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5. See also the following reference for Cox's citations of various American personnel of APPLE for their conduct during this and other activities of the unit.
OSS Archives - Kruming.
OG.OP.7. - Citations. Folder #25.

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was obtained during the next few days, but some contact was maintained through other OSS units operating in this area."¹ The same report states that Lo-ting proved to be an excellent base for operations. There was in the area a General Tam, who had a force of about 6,000 guerrillas under his command. "He displayed willingness to cooperate but he was initially reluctant to engage in decisive actions against the enemy, fearing they might ravage the area. However he was induced by the Commando leader to plan combined operations." At the same time APPLE set up an intelligence net to cover both Canton and the West River area and carried out numerous reconnaissance activities. On August 2 it was reported that APPLE and Tam had drawn up plans for a simultaneous attack on three villages on the south bank of the West River.² On August 4 APPLE reported that it was on an operation and would report as soon as it returned.³ On August 9 the report was that APPLE had "attacked a Jap fortified position at the junction of NAMKONG & WEST RIVERS on 5 August. The position had 3-70 mm guns, mortars, and machine guns. Jap casualties were 8 dead and 4 wounded. Commando casualties were 7 wounded and 3 missing believed dead, no Americans. 200 Jap reinforcements arrived from TAHKING 2 hours after attack began. The conduct and discipline of the commando under fire was superior."⁴ This same report described this attack as APPLE's "initial operation."⁵

There are in existence two complete reports from the Senior American Officer of APPLE, Captain Vernon G. Hoppers, Inf., to Cox. These cover the period from July 12 to the Unit's arrival at Lo-ting on July 25. The

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first is a "Report on Area" and provides some information. The second is a "Report of First Commando 12 to 25 July 1945" and is invaluable for supplementing the briefer official reports.

In the first of these documents Hoppers confirmed the main features of earlier intelligence reports.¹ The country was agricultural, with a plentiful supply of food. The Americans were politically popular, while the British were equally detested. The local officials were cool towards the Chung-king government, "because they have had no support from it." Local military leaders maintained a sort of "gentleman's agreement" with the Japanese, with the result that a large smuggling trade flourished throughout the area. There were about 2,000 Communists about 30 miles southwest of Lo-ting, of whom all local military men were afraid. The only regular Chinese division in the area, the 158th, was described as having "done no fighting and evidently have no intentions of doing any." Hoppers closed this report with a few suggestions for the benefit of future commandos in the field. He thought it extremely important to give each commando a thorough briefing on the money situation. In the case of his own unit, he confirmed Karwaski's July 16 report of APPLE's behavior in these words: "The men of the first commando are actually by the exchange here being paid better than \$60 gold per E.M. and consequently are spoiled. They have inflated the exchange in every town we pass through." Since the operations were financed by the Americans with money entrusted to the Senior American Officer in the field, this matter was of considerable importance. The lack of control of the Americans over

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1. This handwritten report is undated and will be found in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.7 - APPLE Operation.
Folder #11.

In both of Hoppers' reports the spelling and punctuation
have been corrected. The words, however, remain unchanged.

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the Chinese personnel is graphically shown by this passage. Hoppers' second suggestion concerned the interpreter problem. It will be recalled that the interpreters were hired at Chungking and that the table of organization assigned eight of them to each commando. Hoppers makes what should have from the beginning been an obvious point to higher headquarters when he says: "Interpreters should be picked for the provincial language which they speak." He says, further:

"I have only one interpreter who is worth a damn. All of them are too young and have had no experience in handling coolies, merchants or anyone else. Interpreters hired in the area in which you operate are a great deal more useful. When hired through the magistrate they are thoroughly trustworthy and can save you a great deal of money and time. Mr. Po Chun Liung 1453. has done a very good job. Int. Charlie Chan was an agitator so we used him as a courier."

The trouble with the interpreters which erupted during the training period evidently became quite serious once the unit got into the field.

In his report on the period July 12 - 25 Hoppers provided a rather depressing picture of the activities of the First Commando. This report is of such interest, owing to its frankness and to its authorship by one who was in a responsible position with APPLE, that the significant portions of it are herewith reproduced. The contrasts with the routine reports summarized above should be noted.

"Jumped at Kai-Ping at approx. 9:00 AM to well organized reception. Some of the jump masters were poorly coordinated with pilots. Some planes were stood up and hooked up one hour before jumping [i.e., the parachutists were stood up and hooked up]. The jump height was from 250 to 300 feet. This was probably due to difficulty of getting bundles out of door. The planes did not fly across the T in the right direction. If they had, all of the men would have landed on dry ground. As it was one man landed in a lake and was drowned, two more almost landed in it and the greater majority landed in wet rice paddies.

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When we hit the ground the Commando personnel were physically exhausted. A great many refused to help gather equipment. This was the first indication of a very poor discipline. ... When they were told that they should carry their parachutes into town, about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles distant, they were very unhappy. All other equipment was being moved by coolies. Some of them threw the parachutes in the rice paddies on the way in.

We spent two days in Kai-ping gathering information and waiting for Lt. Framler to return from the West River area. During these two days the Chinese soldiers bought everything that was loose in the town and prices went up over twice what they were. Colonel Ching /the Chinese Commando Leader/ promised to restrict them to the area, but this never materialized, despite my constant reminding him that they were inflating the market. On the second day in Kai-ping I sent Lt. Hudson with the Demo. Section on a mining and recon. mission down the coast road. I had received word that a Jap column was halted near Yang-chiang-hsien and there we might be able to booby-trap some empty bldgs. Also for a look at the road itself and the terrain around it. The mission was not successful where the mining was concerned, for the Japs were on the outskirts ..., but they did make a good recon. of the road. ... The unit left Kai-ping in-route to Loh-ting on the 15th. After the first $\frac{1}{2}$ day of marching not one Chinese soldier was carrying his pack. All equip. was being carried by coolies. After the first day rifles and belts began to appear on the coolies' loads. I went to Col. Ching and told him the men must carry at least their arms in case of attack. The men started carrying them for about two days when they started to drop out again. We corrected this again. ... On arrival at San-hing I decided to base there, for the most narrow part of the West River is east of Kao-yao about eight miles. The river narrows at some places to 200 or 300 yards which is ideal for ambush operations. I ... went to San-qui, which is located about 5 miles from the West River. ... When we arrived at San-hing /i.e., returned from San-qui/ we found the entire commando packed and ready to evacuate. We heard the news that two Jap columns were moving from Kai-ping toward San-hing and were then about 30 kilometers southeast of San-hing. I insisted to Col. Ching and Major Lo /one of the Chinese officers/ that we should take sampans down to San-qui, to carry out our original plan. ... There is a mountain range east of San-qui, which we could have gone into in case they came after us, and there was a possibility of hitting their flank as they came down the river.

Their excuse for not wanting to go was that we could not get past the Jap column, which was at that time still 16 miles away. When I insisted that we still had our mission to accomplish they offered no further excuse, but continued preparations for the move. From

San-hing to Loh-ting we were really given a picture of the First Commando. No more than three miles out of San-hing packs, ammo, and other equipment began to fall by the wayside. One man tried to throw away his tommy gun along with the rest of his equipment. Sgt. DeCamp broke up a fight between the Col. [I.e., Col. Ching] and this man. The American personnel ran a scavenger unit behind the commando picking up discarded equipment. One Chinese soldier was restrained from throwing away a mortar at the point of a gun. Maj. Lo & Col. Ching sulked along at the rear of the column. I controlled, as best I could, the march, with a radio in the front and one in the rear. At one point where we crossed a river, I tried to leave a rear guard of one rifle branch, the M.G. Branch, and a mortar squad, to ambush the Japs as they tried to cross the river. They refused to do so. The remainder of the march to LOH-TING was just a repetition of the same thing. We are still trying. There is still a chance of doing something. The American personnel have really done a good job. And for most of them it was quite a slap in the face to have their judgment go so completely haywire. Most of the men have the patience of Confucius. ... The report of the Commando is as absolutely fair as I can make it. Many small things are not mentioned, but it at least draws a verbal picture of our struggle against the enemy behind the lines (if we could get them near the enemy). I have checked this report over with every man for some things I did not see myself. (How are the other boys making out?)"1

The second principal primary source on the adventures of APPLE in the field is the series of radioed reports which APPLE and GAZELLE sent back to headquarters and which have been preserved. These add no additional material not found in either Cox's or Hoppers' reports, but do furnish illuminating details on some of the operations. On July 25 GAZELLE radioed to Wampler as follows:²

"OUR GUERRILLAS QUITTING US. NOT ENOUGH MONEY FOR FOOD. WE PAY OUR MEN 30 C.N. PER DAY. APPLE CHINESE PAY 100 C.N. AND SPEND MONEY LIKE MAD. PRICES RAISED EVERYWHERE THEY GO. DUE TO PRESENT SITUATION REGARDS TO JAP MOVE WE PROCEEDING ALONG SAME ROUTE AS APPLE. CHINESE NOT PUTTING UP STAND ANY PLACE. GUERRILLIA UNITS IN KWANTUNG BIG LAUGH. REPORTS RELATIVE TO THEIR STRENGTH EXTREMELY EXAGGERATED."

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1. The correct identification of "San-hing" and "San-qui" remains in doubt, since neither the present writer nor the Map Library Division/OPR has been able to locate any places by these names. It is suggested that the correct rendering of "San-hing" is "Hein-hsing." This city is therefore underlined on the map. Its location between Kai-p'ing and Lo-ting make it possible that it is the place which Hoppers had in mind, since he is describing the journey between Kai-p'ing and Lo-ting.

It is suggested tentatively, again on the basis of the text, that "San-qui" may actually be "San-ho-hsü," which has also been underlined on the map.

2. Radiogram, GAZELLE to Wampler, 25 July 1945, in OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.5. - 2nd Commando (Combat) - #18.

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1. Radiogram, GAZELLE to Wampler, 25 July 1945, in OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.5. - 2nd Commando (Combat) - #18.
2. Radiogram, APPLE to Cox, 28 July 1945, in OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.5. - 2nd Commando (Combat) - #18.
3. Radiogram, APPLE to Cox, 30 July 1945, in OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.5. - 2nd Commando (Combat) - #18.
4. Radiogram, APPLE to Cox, 4 August 1945, in OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.5. - 2nd Commando (Combat) - #18.

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On the following day GAZELLE radioed another report, which was uncomplimentary to the Chinese and based on both APPLE's and GAZELLE's experiences:¹

"CHINESE SEEM LEAST DESIROUS OF COMBAT. NOT ONLY TRUE OF APPLE BUT ALL CHINESE ... IN LAST JAP PUSH HERE NO RESISTANCE OFFERED ANYWHERE. AMERICANS COOPERATE WITH CHINESE BUT BROWNED OFF DUE TO THEIR NONAGGRESSIVE ATTITUDE. ... PLENTY SPACE FOR FIGHTING THIS PROVINCE IF CHINESE WOULD ONLY COOPERATE. IDEAL SITUATION IS TO HAVE TROOPS UNDER DIRECT COMMAND OF AMERICANS. ROUGHER TREATMENT CHINESE RECEIVE THE MORE APPRECIATIVE THEY ARE. EVERY ONE DOING BEST TO OBTAIN RESULTS. TOUGH SLEDDING AT PRESENT."

The money situation was reflected on July 28 in APPLE's request for 2,000,000 Chinese dollars.² On July 30 APPLE reported that it had contacted General Tam and had persuaded him to release 300 of his 6,000 troops to assist the commando in the attack on the three villages on the south bank of the West River.³

The complexity of any operations in China, and particularly those behind the enemy lines, was illustrated by Hoppers' adventures with the above-mentioned General Tam. It will be recalled that Theater had decreed that the Americans should have nothing to do with internal Chinese political affairs. This explains Hoppers' attitude. The incident, of which nothing eventually came, shows the difficulty of remaining aloof. Hoppers radioed as follows:⁴

"HAVE RUN INTO POLITICAL TANGLE. GENERAL TAM ... LOCATED TAKHING WANTS GENERAL HO ... TO RECOGNIZE HIS TROOPS AS REGULAR ARMY. HE HAS SIX THOUSAND MEN WHO ARE PART OF THE NINETEENTH ROUTE

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ARMY OF SHANGHI. GENERAL TAM AND GENERAL HO ARE OLD FRIENDS. HE WILL TAKE ORDERS FROM ME IF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT WILL RECOGNIZE AND SUPPLY HIM. CAN YOU CONTACT GENERAL HO FOR ANSWER. I AM ACTING AS MIDDLE MAN, HAVE PROMISED NOTHING. 300 OF HIS MEN NOW ON OPERATION WITH PART OF COMMANDO. CONTACTED MR. CHEN ... WHO HAS 700, ALL ARMED GUERRILLAS. ... ALL HE WANTS IS AMMO."

While the Theater decree concerning involvement in political affairs was undoubtedly inspired by the best of motives, it is clear that such a restriction, given conditions in China generally, and particularly given those prevailing behind enemy lines, was too categorical at best and too unrealistic and impossible at worst. Since guerrilla doctrine from the beginning had emphasized that operations could not be mounted at all without at the very least the tacit support of the local population, it was demanding too much to expect that the OGs could possibly completely ignore local powers and strong men.

Thus far, the accounts of APPLE's activities have emphasized the difficulties, with particular emphasis, borne out by experience, on the Chinese lack of discipline and aggressive spirit. The following account of the penultimate operation of APPLE serves, on the other hand, to show that all the American work was not a complete waste of time and at the same time provides a clue to the rather sorry performance during the first weeks of APPLE's mission in the field.¹

"COMMANDO ATTACKED JAP FORTIFIED POSITION HELD BY 40 JAPS AT JUNCTION OF NAMKONG AND WEST RIVER. JAP CASUALTIES 8 DEAD, 4

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1. Radiogram, APPLE to Cox, 7 August 1945, in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.5. - 2nd Commando (Combat) - #18.

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1. See the citations in,
OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.7. - Citations, Folder #25.

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WOUNDED OUTSIDE THE FORTIFICATIONS. COMMANDO CASUALTIES
7 WOUNDED, 3 MISSING BELIEVED KILLED. LT BRIDGES, LT CARPENTER
DID SUPERIOR JOB OF TROOP LEADING. RECOMMEND CPL CAHILL FOR
SILVER STAR, HE CROSSED 50 YDS OPEN FIELD TO CARRY OUT WOUNDED
CHINESE SOLDIER. NO AMERICANS WOUNDED, DISCIPLINE OF COMMANDO
UNDER FIRE SUPERIOR IN EVERY RESPECT, THEY WENT RIGHT INTO
HOUSES AFTER JAPS THEN PUSHED TO WITHIN 20 YDS OF JAP FORT."

Since the Japanese reinforced their garrison, the Commando had to withdraw.
The operation in one sense could not be called a success. It is evident,
however, from this text that the Chinese soldiers behaved in an exemplary
manner. The reason was not that they themselves had changed in any way.
Rather it was that when the fighting actually began the American officers
and enlisted men took over the combat leadership of APPLE. In other words,
under the conditions of stress it was the Chinese officer who was at
fault, rather than the Chinese soldier. The latter showed himself in this
attack capable of fighting bravely and well when he received proper leader-
ship. This point is confirmed in the citations of two American officers
and three American enlisted men for the Silver and Bronze Stars respectively
for their roles in the operation of August 1 against a Japanese-held
village. In each case, the citation speaks of the personal leadership
which the Americans exercised and the good response of the Chinese soldiers
to that leadership.¹ The attack of August 5 just described evidently
led to some reproaches from Cox, who was known to be opposed in principle
to using OGs to attack fortified places. On August 11 APPLE explained

the reason for the attack and confirmed what has been said above concerning the Chinese officers.¹

"ATTACK AGAINST POSITION AT NAMKONGHAU PLANNED AS SURPRISE DAWN ATTACK. REASON FOR MEN KILLED AND WOUNDED WAS LACK OF AGGRESSIVE SPIRIT IN MAJ. LO. REASON FOR ATTACK ON POSITION: THERE ARE NO COLUMNS AND VERY LITTLE TRAFFIC ON WEST RIVER. WE HAD TO FIGHT SOME ONE."

The final APPLE operation before the end of the war was an attack by its Machine Gun Section on a Japanese headquarters, in which it was reported that four Japanese were killed and an unknown number wounded.²

The question always arises of the manner in which to judge an operation. From one point of view this project can be regarded as a failure. In terms of concrete results achieved the unit accomplished little. During the month it was in the field it attacked four Japanese-held or Japanese-fortified villages and strongpoints and one Japanese headquarters of undetermined importance. None of these were apparently of any particular tactical or strategic significance, their significance insofar as APPLE was concerned being their role in accustoming the unit to combat operations. There is no evidence that these attacks particularly hampered the Japanese. That they did annoy them is certain, for the enemy did take the trouble to reinforce one of his threatened garrisons and thereby caused APPLE to withdraw. Concerning the tactical role of the OGs in support of regular military operations, there is no evidence that APPLE was of any particular assistance to Operation CARBONADO, since the above-mentioned

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1. Radiogram, APPLE to Cox, 11 August 1945, in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.5. - 2nd Commando (Combat) - #18.

No locality exists under this name. See Footnote Number 4,
p. 85.

2. Radiogram, APPLE to Cox, 13 August 1945, in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.5. - 2nd Commando (Combat) - #18.

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attacks were made on APPLE's own initiative. The intelligence which the unit sent back according to its secondary responsibility did not either add materially to, or seriously modify, the information already available from other sources. From this point of view, therefore, it may be argued that the results obtained in this case did not justify, from either the tactical or the guerrilla warfare viewpoints, the time, anguish, and effort which Cox and his associates put into the project.

To make the above one's definitive judgment on the affair, however, would be both a gross oversimplification and an injustice. The judge should bear two things in mind. One is that significant targets were few and far between at this stage of the war. The Japanese had largely completed their withdrawal from the area in which APPLE was to operate and had left the field for the most part to local guerrilla groups. The only regular Japanese forces left were the elements of the 13th Independent Infantry Brigade, which was scattered piecemeal over the area. Enemy river and road traffic was correspondingly insignificant. As Hoppers put it in his radiogram of August 11: "We had to fight someone." To expect truly great results in such a situation is therefore asking too much. The second thing, the element which really hampered operations, was the almost impossible arrangement for command and control of the unit. The Americans, as demonstrated earlier, had been put into the very difficult position of possessing responsibility without authority. They were to advise the Chinese, but were forbidden to command them. Command of an operation would therefore either not exist at all or would fall into the

hands of those best capable of exercising it, irrespective of pronouncements and directives. The history of APPLE shows this. Examination of Hoppers' report of the period July 12 - 25 is an excellent illustration of the situation in which the Americans found themselves. In the absence of Chinese will, there was little the Americans could do. When an action was actually undertaken it was the Americans who really did the leading and commanding, as shown in the accounts of and citations for the actions against the four villages and the Japanese headquarters. Now, from this material two things become clear. One is that the Chinese officers were not of the caliber required for OG operations. Hoppers and GAZELLE both agree on their lack of aggressiveness. Hoppers, furthermore, recounts in some detail his adventures in trying to operate within the framework of the Theater directive concerning command of field units and relations between Chinese and Americans. GAZELLE made the following point in its radio-gram of July 25, which has already been quoted:

"IDEAL SITUATION IS TO HAVE TROOPS UNDER DIRECT COMMAND OF AMERICANS. ROUGHER TREATMENT CHINESE RECEIVE THE MORE APPRECIATIVE THEY ARE."

While the last sentence may be debatable, there is little question that under the leadership of the Americans the Chinese soldiers performed well, as shown by the brief account of the action of August 5 and in the citations for the action of August 1.

In sum, therefore, APPLE was operating under two great handicaps: the lack of targets and an impossible command situation. The circumstances were quite beyond its control. Accordingly, it is too much to expect a record of startling results in the field.

J. OG OPERATION "BLUEBERRY,"
JULY - AUGUST, 1945

While APPLE was operating directly in the path of, and in direct tactical support of, Operation CARBONADO in the West River valley and towards Canton, the second OG unit was preparing to go into the field around the area of Chang-sha. It parachuted near Chakiang on the morning of July 27, 1945,¹ and operated in the Chang-sha - Shaoyang (Paoking) - Hang-yang triangle from that date until the end of the war a little more than two weeks later.

BLUEBERRY's mission was generally similar to that of APPLE and was set forth as follows:²

- a. Disrupting enemy lines of communication and destruction of enemy river traffic along HSIANG CHIANG at such times and places as may be selected by the Commando Leader.
- b. Disrupting enemy lines of communication and destruction of enemy supply columns using the area road net, at such times and places as may be selected by the Commando Leader.
- c. Disrupting the flow of enemy rail traffic and the destruction of railroad equipment and facilities in use by the enemy, at such times and places as may be selected by the Commando Leader.
- d. Preparing a plan for the establishment of defended road blocks at critical points in the enemy road net throughout the operational area and be prepared to establish these road blocks on call.
- e. Attacking and destroying such enemy installations within the area of operation as may be within the capabilities of the Commando, as determined by the Commando Leader.
- f. The Commando Leader will establish friendly relations with Military Commands and Guerrilla Organizations in the area of operation and cooperate with these activities wherever possible, for mutual benefit."

It will be noted that BLUEBERRY's mission differed in several important respects from that of APPLE. In contrast to the latter's mission, BLUEBERRY's responsibilities included only one instance in which the control

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1. Cox to Heppner, OG Monthly Report, July 1945, dated 31 July 1945, in
OSS Archives - Kunming
OG.OP.3. - Monthly Report, Folder #3.

See Tab "D" for maps to serve as an annex to this study of OG
Operation BLUEBERRY.

2. OSS Operational Plan for BLUEBERRY, 22 July 1945, in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.5. - 2nd Commando (Combat) - #18.

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1. See the discussion above of Operation CARBONADO and projected
OSS participation therein, pp. 29-40 and especially pp. 29-32.

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of the commando was out of the hands of the Commando Leader. This exception is to be found in the order to BLUEBERRY to be prepared on call to establish "defended road blocks at critical points in the enemy road net throughout the operational area." With the exception of the road block mission the tasks given to BLUEBERRY were all in accord with the traditional guerrilla doctrine. They were missions of attack rather than of defense and were to be decided upon by the unit leader and not by a higher headquarters removed from the scene of operations. This practice of control by the unit leader is seen again in the final paragraph of the mission directive. He was therein directed to "establish friendly relations" with local military and guerrilla organizations and to "cooperate" with them "for mutual benefit," whenever possible. There was thus provision for cooperation with groups in the area on a military basis ("for mutual benefit") without violating the Theater injunctions against mixing in political affairs. Since BLUEBERRY was to be in the area only for military purposes, the phrase "for mutual benefit" can have no other meaning.

Operation CARBONADO provided for a "defensive and diversionary" effort to "remain on the active defense in the PAOKING - CHANGTEH - KWEILIN area by blocking approaches from CHANGSHA - HENGYANG area." This explains the differences between APPLE's and BLUEBERRY's missions. Whereas the former envisaged offensive tactical operations in direct and immediate support of the regular Chinese armies advancing eastward towards Canton, the latter clearly had the defensive purpose of "isolating the battlefield."¹

Considerable intelligence on the area was available to BLUEBERRY before its departure. Of especial importance were sections on the enemy strength and situation, the topography, and the condition of communications routes.¹ The terrain of both Hunan and Kiangsi provinces was described as "distinctly hilly or mountainous." There was relatively little level land, while the many mountains and hills rose often to peaks of two to three thousand feet, with an occasional summit up to five thousand feet. In sum, "for the most part the area is a network of mountains with only limited strips of level land along the rivers. ... The hill slopes are usually steep, and in many places the swift streams have cut picturesque gorges to depths of several hundred feet." "The hillsides are a wilderness, covered with natural vegetation. Forest at one time covered the entire region, but the trees have now been largely cut out near all waterways except for the higher peaks." Neither province was thickly settled. "Most towns and villages are located along river valleys and the upland regions, approximately 75% of the total area, are almost completely unsettled." It will be obvious that such countryside offered almost the ideal situation for the conduct of guerrilla warfare.

The enemy controlled the principal cities, rivers, roads, and such railroads as had not been dismantled or destroyed during the course of the Sino-Japanese struggle. Owing to the gradual Japanese withdrawal to the north and east, their dependence on the communications routes was of particular importance. The city of Heng-yang was an important railroad junction, since both the Hunan-Kwangsi and the Canton-Hankow lines met there and

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1. See the various Annexes, Attachments, and Appendixes to Operational Plan BLUEBERRY, 22 July 1945, in OSS Archives - Kunning.
OG.OP.4. - Folder #26, Misc.

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continued north through Chang-sha. "This section consists of a single standard gauge track." The following description of the manner in which the Japanese operated the railroad shows the potentialities for guerrilla operations against it.

"Traffic over this section of the railroad is small due to the damaged condition of the line, harassing tactics of guerrilla forces, and 11th Air Force bombings. Present usage of the line is limited to the operation of 'motor trucks'. These consist of two trucks with tires replaced by flanged iron wheels and pulling and pushing between them four cars. The Japanese are using this section of the railroad for military transportation, and operate cars over the road only at night in order to avoid aerial bombing. Many of the bridges are make-shift affairs made of railroad ties and during the day the Japanese camouflage these bridges by placing straw huts on them.

Stations are guarded by detachments of varying sizes depending on the importance of the station and the activity of guerrilla forces. The Japanese operate patrols of 10-20 men along the railroad. Japanese in civilian clothing are responsible for the reconnaissance. Reprisals are taken for acts of sabotage. It was reported in May of this year that the main enemy garrisons between CH'ANG-SHA and HENG-YANG are located at HENG-SHAN ..., I-SU-HO ..., HSIANG-T'AN ... and HENG-YANG."

Although the Japanese were able to use the roads, their control over them was limited. The road between Chang-sha and Heng-yang was reported to be a twenty-five-foot-wide all-weather road in good condition. This particular road was important to the enemy, for he used it for the major portion of his traffic in the Chang-sha - Heng-yang corridor. Owing to bombing attacks by the 11th Air Force, the Japanese used it mostly at night. Japanese convoy and protection techniques were shown to be as follows:

"The Japanese maintain garrisons at short intervals along the road for the protection and maintenance of the road. These garrisons include guard detachments, supply warehouses, and road maintenance crews. According to a Chinese source guard

patrols are small and avoid interference with parties crossing the road rather than risk a clash with guerrillas. Permanent pillboxes are maintained at strategic points, i.e., bridges, fueling points.

Japanese convoy habits on the road vary depending on the activity of guerrilla groups. Convoys usually move between 2000 and 2400. During the day the Japanese send single trucks rather than convoys over the road. They pursue the following policy: (1) Trucks spaced 25' or 50' apart. Guard consists of armed soldier in each truck. (2) Convoy preceded and followed by tanks. (3) Squads of armed soldiers ride in first and last truck."

The local political situation presented its usual features of complexity, jockeying for power, and indifference to the course of the war:¹

"Local Political Sentiment

(1) Since 1936-37 there has been no open Communist influence in Hunan and Kiangsi provinces. Pockets of ex-Communist guerrillas may exist in the mountainous regions on the borders of Kiangsi, but their connection with the Yen'an regime has long been severed and their activities turned to banditry. Recent Chungking dispatches, however, publicize a Communist pocket on the borders of Hunan, Kweichow, and Szechuan; unconfirmed reports speak of Nationalist clashes with Communists in the region between Tung-t'ing and Po-yang Lakes, near the Yangtze River; the Yen'an regime has called to the attention of Americans the possibility of re-activating the Kiangsi border Communist pockets left behind at the time of the Long March and has recently indicated that both Hunan and Kiangsi are potential areas of expansion.

(2) Popular resistance to the Japanese invasion was not well organized and local population has remained largely apathetic and indifferent to the course of the war. Chungking-appointed magistrates are in power in the occupied area and some Puppets have been used by the Japanese."

Precise information concerning the enemy's numerical strength was lacking, although there was considerable material concerning enemy unit strength and some information concerning the direction of troop movements. Apart from Area Army and Army headquarters, six Infantry Divisions and two

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1. In view of the developments in China since the above passage was written and in view of the heights to which Li-chi-shen (See Footnote #2, Page 78 above) eventually rose, it is permissible to question, despite wishful thinking at the time, the degree to which the Communist guerrillas' "connection with the Yenan regime has long been severed and their activities turned to banditry." This doubt is strengthened by an examination of the latter part of the paragraph above concerning the Communist guerrillas in Kiangsi.

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Independent Mixed Brigades had been identified in the Japanese corridor. These forces, with which BLUEBERRY would have to reckon, had a Table of Organization strength of about 105,000 men. This figure was not definitive, however, since the strength of the 86th Independent Mixed Brigade was listed as "Unknown" and since that of the 64th and 68th Infantry Divisions totaled a tentative 24,000. The operational strength of these eight units was about 91,000 and was no more definitive than their Table of Organization strength, since the strength of the 86th Independent Mixed Brigade was listed as "5,000 (?) " and since that of the 64th and 68th Infantry Divisions was a tentative 20,000. Even less was available concerning the "Local Strength" of these units. The only figures listed were "7,000 (?) " each for the 64th and 68th Infantry Divisions. Although these forces were concentrated in the South - North Japanese-held corridor, their general movements were north and east, in accordance with the enemy withdrawal towards Canton and other cities on or nearer the coast. Furthermore, as is evident from the information concerning the roads, rivers, and railroads, some sizeable part of the personnel of these units were being employed in garrison and convoy duty along the lines of communication. The enemy was accordingly compelled to disperse some of his strength, thus confirming in part Donovan's statement about the Japanese having flanks but no front.

The foregoing description and analysis of the mission with which BLUEBERRY was charged and of the general situation in the Chang-sha - Pao-king - Heng-yang area has shown that it was an ideal area for the mounting of guerrilla operations and provides some idea of why BLUEBERRY's mission

differed from that of APPLE. The terrain was rough and thinly populated; the enemy was in a position of dependence on vulnerable lines of communication and was engaged in withdrawing his forces; the local political sentiment, while not burning with hatred for the invaders, would in all probability at the very least not oppose BLUEBERRY; and there were already many SO teams and native irregular forces at work in the area. Furthermore, since this territory was not in the line of advance mapped out for CARBONADO, there was less reason than in the case of APPLE to tie the commando to direct support of regular military operations and consequently to subject it to strict control of higher headquarters.

BLUEBERRY was actually in the field and engaged in operations less than a month. Owing to this and to the relative scarcity of available information from the field, any account of the unit's activities must of necessity be a brief one. Furthermore, BLUEBERRY's activities present no features essentially different from those of its predecessor in the field.¹

As they had done in APPLE's case, the OG authorities arranged for an advance party to drop into the area and make contact with forces already there. In BLUEBERRY's case one man dropped in and made contact with SO Team ERMINÉ which had been there for some time. Together these people made the final arrangements for BLUEBERRY's reception and sent back the latest available information.² A radiogram from the field gave an optimistic picture of the possibilities for good guerrilla operations. These confirmed, in the following terms, the principal points made in earlier intelligence reports.³

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1. A copy of this document will be found in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.5. - 2nd Commando (Combat) - #18.

The complete plane-load manifests, personnel rosters, financial, supply and re-supply packaging (with code-markings), communications, and other administrative arrangements for BLUEBERRY will also be found in this folder.

2. Cox to OPSO, Weekly Operational Report, 19 July 1945, and
Cox to OPSO, Weekly Operational Report, 26 July 1945, both in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.AD 1 - Operational Report.
3. Radiogram, Rickerson (SI) to Cox, 20 July 1945, in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.5. - 2nd Commando (Combat) - #18.

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"HAVE MADE PERSONAL CONTACT WITH ALL PRINCIPAL GUERRILLA LEADERS IN AREA. ALL AGREE ON FULL COOPERATION. PLENTY FOOD AND SHELTER AVAILABLE. ... OUR TEAMS NEEDED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE DUE TO HEAVY WIP TRAFFIC ON MAIN HIGHWAY AT NIGHT BECAUSE OF RETREAT FROM PAOCHING AND KWEILING. JAPS ARE DUG IN ALONG PAOCHING - HENGYANG ROAD. HAVE REACHED SEVERAL LIKELY BASES ONLY SHORT DISTANCE FROM MAIN HIGHWAYS, RAILROADS AND COMMUNICATIONS. NIPS VERY VERY SHORT OF AMMO, FOOD AND SUPPLIES."

A message sent three days later added the information that the local guerrilla commander was "completely loyal, conscientious. Has complete support of populace." However, the same note of warning regarding Chinese military capabilities, already shown to have been true in the case of APPLE's operations, was added. The local soldiers were described as "good, but officers lack training." Above all, the unit "must avoid friction with locals."¹ On July 31 Cox reported that the unit had been dropped successfully. Local guerrillas saved BLUEBERRY from an unpleasant time, for the Japanese were in the vicinity, observed the drop, and attempted to destroy the commando. These local units beat off the enemy attacks.²

The commando immediately established contact with the local guerrillas and arranged for what proved to be its only major operation of record before the end of hostilities.³ Soon after BLUEBERRY's arrival on the scene there took place a meeting with General Wang (or Wong) and a General Chiang, the commander of the 10th Army Guerrillas.⁴ At this

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1. Radiogram, Rickerson (SI) to Cox, 23 July 1945, in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.5. - 2nd Commando (Combat) - #18.
2. Radiogram, BLUEBERRY to General Li, 1 August 1945, in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.5. - 2nd Commando (Combat) - #18.
and
Cox to Heppner, OG Monthly Report, dated 31 July 1945, in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.3. - Monthly Report. Folder #3.
3. Material for the account and discussion of this operation is
taken from the following sources:

Radiogram, BLUEBERRY to Cox, 6 August 1945, in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.5. - 2nd Commando (Combat) - #18.

Cox to Heppner, OG Monthly Report, dated 31 August 1945, in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.1 - CHINA (Co "B") - OPERATIONS.

Recommendations for the award of the Silver Star Medal to
one American officer and one American enlisted man for their
roles in this operation. These recommendations were addressed
by Cox to the Strategic Services Officer/Hq/OSS/CT and dated
21 August 1945 and 25 August 1945. They will be found in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.7. - Citations. Folder #25.

4. Chiang is not to be confused with Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek.
There is some contradiction concerning his exact title and position.
The radiogram refers to his troops as the "10th Army Guerrillas,"
while Cox's report to Heppner calls him "General Chiang of the 10th
Guerrilla Army." He was probably the commander of the 10th Guerrilla
Army, since the situation map overlay neither lists nor shows any
Chinese 10th Army among the units of the regular Chinese forces in
the area. This map overlay will be found in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.4. - Folder #26. Misc.

The point is not, in any case, a vital one, since there is no
question that the troops in question were guerrillas and that
they were under Chiang's command.

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meeting it was decided to attack enemy installations in or near the village of Taiyuanshih.¹ The attacking forces, consisting of BLUEBERRY plus an assortment of Chinese guerrillas belonging to Wang, Chiang, and others, outnumbered the Japanese garrison by a ratio of more than two to one. The enemy was entrenched behind permanent fortifications which included a pillbox system and an outer and inner ring of defenses.²

The attack was an unqualified failure. Although the attackers inflicted casualties on the Japanese they themselves suffered 18 men killed, 9 wounded, including two Americans, and one missing. The fire-fight lasted for five hours, after which the besiegers withdrew without being pursued by the defenders. However, not only did the guerrillas fail to capture the position, but they either could not or would not prevent the Japanese from sallying forth and burning some houses in the hills west of the town. At the conclusion of the engagement the attackers' ammunition was about exhausted and they were being menaced by Japanese reinforcements.

The chief reasons advanced for the failure were familiar ones. Some of the Chinese would not fight. The radiogram stated: "10th Army fought none, lousy." Coordination among the attackers was poor. And, insofar as BLUEBERRY was concerned, the unit's Chinese commanding officer exhibited the same lack of initiative and aggressiveness already noted in the case of his APPLE colleague. Cox stated the matter thus: "His [BLUEBERRY's Senior American Officer] only criticism was that the Chinese C.O. was not capable and had greatly hampered the employment of the Commando during the attack."

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1. Cox's report to Hoppner states that the attack was on Taiyuanshih, not otherwise described. The radiogram states that the mission was to take and hold Taiyuan. One of the two citations states that the "Commando attacked the Japanese garrison near the village of TAI YUAN TZE." The other says that the "Commando attacked enemy installations near the village of TAI YUAN TZE." All agree that the date of the operation was August 5, 1945. Cox's report and the citations were in part based on the radiogram. There is no doubt that all refer to the same operation.
2. See the intelligence reports discussed above, which describe the types of Japanese installations in this area. Taiyuanshih was evidently one of these.

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The radioed report from the scene expressed it this way: "American O.G.'s fought very well, but are extremely displeased with Col. Chiang, the Sino O.G. commander. I think he spoils all." It concluded with the statement that the chief value of all Chinese lay in "ambushes and small operations."

As a result of the evident failure of the Chinese the command and control of the unit tended, as in the case of APPLE, to fall by default into American hands. This is shown by the two citations, both of which state specifically that the men cited had led frontal assaults on the Japanese positions and emphatically that owing to the bravery of one of them "the American and Chinese troops were inspired to follow him with the result that heavy casualties were inflicted on the enemy."

It is unfortunate that in the cases of both APPLE and BLUEBERRY there is no material available to indicate what they accomplished apart from these fruitless attacks on Japanese positions. It is also unfortunate to be compelled to judge their accomplishments on the basis of the relatively brief time they spent in the field. There seems to be little question, however, that the attempt to have the Commandos operate in the manner of regular infantry troops was a failure. In each case where the unit attempted to attack a fortified position they were repulsed. The fault lay not with the men, since testimony shows that they conducted themselves very well. That much speaks well for the training which Cox and his associates had given them. Part of the trouble was owing to the general incompetence and lack of aggressiveness on the part of the Chinese officers. A greater part was the impossible situation of having the Americans present

to advise but forbidden to exercise command of any sort. And by far the greatest part of the trouble was that the units were compelled to do something tactically for which they were neither designed nor equipped. The almost identical experiences of both APPLE and BLUEBERRY, which operated in different areas and under different circumstances, emphasize the inherent weaknesses in the general plan for the OGs, weaknesses for which OSS cannot be held responsible.

K. OG OPERATION "BLACKBERRY,"
JULY - AUGUST, 1945.

In terms of concrete results achieved, OG Operation BLACKBERRY was the Chinese commandos' most successful endeavor. In terms of numbers it was the largest, including as it did the full complement of three commandos. In terms of the information which is available concerning its activities, it furnishes the most facts and the most interesting accounts of any of the commando operations. And yet it presents no features not evident in the accounts of the other two units. This fact is eloquent testimony to the existence of certain basic problems and weaknesses in the OG organization and in the methods which circumstances and higher headquarters forced upon it.

During the early part of July the Chinese Combat Command requested the services of three commando units, which were to be attached to CCC's Central Command for operations in the West River valley. The units were to move eastwards and capture the Tanchuk airfield, then held by the

Japanese. They were then to continue to move eastwards and operate ahead of the advancing Chinese armies engaged in putting into practice the plans of operation CARBONADO. A provisional battalion headquarters was to be attached to Chinese Headquarters and under Chinese orders maintain operational control of the three commando units.¹ The force consisted of the 8th, 9th, and 10th Commandos, known respectively by the code-names APRICOT, AVOCADO, and BANANA. The provisional commando battalion headquarters received the code-name of BLACKBERRY. The total battalion strength was 60 Americans, 25 interpreters, and 500 Chinese. On July 18 BLACKBERRY was airlifted to Liuchow. The departure from Chengkung airdrome was held up for some time on account of various avoidable administrative difficulties. A series of comments on the airlift operations listed the following reasons for the serious delays at the airdrome.²

- "a. Planes not centrally located
- b. Shortage of 2½ ton trucks
- c. Lack of Commando Rosters
- d. Issuing of ammunition and equipment in dark
- e. Each Commando not having assigned area
- f. Commandos carrying too much heavy equipment"

The planning and execution of BLACKBERRY's departure plan was evidently far less well-managed than APPLE's had been. From Liuchow they sailed in sampans down the river to Kwei-ping, which they reached on July 23 and where they remained for two days. On July 25 they resumed their voyage, followed by the 265th Regiment of the 89th Chinese Infantry Division. This regiment was to be the "striking force" of the attack on Tanchuk airfield and was to receive the support in this endeavor of the 266th

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1. Cox to OPSO, Weekly operational report, 19 July 1945, and Cox to OPSO, Weekly operational report, 26 July 1945, in OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.AD 1 - Operational Report.
2. A copy of this document will be found in OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.5. Operation BLACKBERRY. Folder #1.

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1. Letter, "Doc" (Major John B. Hamblet, MC) to "Colonel" (Cox), dated 7 August 1945, in OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.7. BANANA Operation. Folder #9.

The foregoing statements are borne out by the following documents and radiograms, to be found in the folders indicated. "Conclusions" on Tanchuk Operation, undated, in OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.7. BANANA Operation. Folder #9.

Radiogram, Cox to APPLE and BLUEBERRY, 9 August 1945,
Radiogram, Cox to BLACKBERRY (REAR), 13 August 1945, in OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.5. Operation BLACKBERRY. Folder #1.

2. Cox to Heppner, OG Monthly Report, 31 July 1945, in OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.3 - Monthly Report. Folder #3.

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3. Cox to Heppner, OG Monthly Report, 31 July 1945, in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.3 - Monthly Report. Folder #3.
4. Cox to Commanding General/Chinese Combat Command, 10 August 1945,
in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.4. Chinese Combat Command. Folder #12.

Cox to Heppner, OG Monthly Report, 31 August 1945, in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.1. - CHINA (Co "B") - OPERATIONS.

See Tab "B" for maps and sketches to serve as an annex to this
study of OG Operation BLACKBERRY.
5. Cox to Commanding General/Reserve Command and to Commanding
General/Chinese Commandos, 6 August 1945, in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.4. Commanding General, 1st Parachute Regiment, Folder
#13.
6. Cox to Heppner, OG Monthly Report, 31 August 1945, in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.1. - CHINA (Co "B") - OPERATIONS.

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Regiment. The river voyage from Liuchow to the Tanchuk area was a "comfortable"¹ one, at least by Chinese standards, and was undisturbed by any Japanese activity. Owing to the usual Chinese delays the 265th did not join the OGs in the Tanchuk area until July 29. The reason for this was "the refusal of the regimental commander to commit his men until the division arrived. This despite orders from Marshal Tang at LIUCHOW."² The Japanese strength at the airfield was from two to three hundred men, "supported by 4 artillery pieces, 2 anti-aircraft guns, and undetermined quantities of LMGs and mortars. Large stores of supplies had been brought in several months ago."³

On August 6 it was reported that numerous commando attacks on the airfield had failed, owing to the lack of support from the Chinese regiment. The OGs had captured their objectives, but, in the face of fierce Japanese resistance had had to relinquish them.⁴ During the course of the following night, however, the Japanese withdrew from the airfield in an easterly direction. The Chinese regiment thereupon "moved into Tanchuk against light opposition."⁵

Cox described the failure of the attempt and the casualties suffered by BLACKBERRY in the following words:⁶

"The 265th Regiment did not move, and except for sporadic fire, they did not contribute any effort to the encounter, notwithstanding the fact that the regimental Commander had been in on the planning of the attack. The failure of the 265th Regiment to be committed, allowed the Japs to turn all their attention to the Commandos and a five hour pitched battle took place, during which the Commandos were subjected to deadly and accurate mortar fire, and much sniping. When this ammunition gave out, the Commandos were forced to withdraw to safer ground. They had suffered casualties to the number of 22 killed, 31 wounded, and one interpreting officer killed. By some miracle, no American casualties were sustained, even though they had been in the thick of the fighting. During the night of 3 August, the Japs withdrew from TANCHUK and the 265th Regiment moved into the town and the airfield."

Following this action BLACKBERRY remained at Tanchuk until the end of the war.

In its main outlines BLACKBERRY's mission, as defined by the Operation Plan, conforms to the pattern already observed in the cases of APPLE and BLUEBERRY. The chief difference is that the tactical employment of the units in direct support of regular military operations is much more important than the guerrilla activities. The Operation Plan, dated July 15, 1945, spelled out BLACKBERRY's mission in considerable detail and attempted to resolve the problem of who was to exercise command. The mission was as follows:¹

"First Battalion Chinese Commandos (Provisional), consisting of provisional Battalion Headquarters, Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Commandos, will move via air transportation, on 18-19 July 1945, to LIUCHOW ..., and will there be placed under the Commanding General, 89th Chinese Division, for the purpose of carrying out such missions as may be within their capabilities. These missions may include:

- a. Reconnaissance of the area of operation in advance of the Division.
- b. Attack and destruction of such enemy garrisons and installations, along the route of advance, as may be within the capabilities of the Commandos, as determined by their Leaders and as directed by the Division Commander.
- c. Attack and seizure of such key towns or features, along the route of advance, as may be within the capabilities of the Commandos, as determined by their Leaders and as ordered by the Division Commander. Holding of such points until relieved by elements of the Division or as directed by the Division Commander.
- d. During coordinated attack of an enemy position by elements of the Division, to establish such road blocks as may be directed by the Division Commander for the purpose of preventing withdrawal of enemy forces or their reenforcement.

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1. Operational Groups: BLACKBERRY, APO 627. Operation Plan, 15 July 1945. A copy of this plan will be found in OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP. 5. Operation BLACKBERRY. Folder #1.

The complete personnel rosters, financial, supply and re-supply packaging (with code-markings), communications, and other administrative arrangements for BLACKBERRY will also be found in this folder.

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1. Operational Groups: BLACKBERRY, APO 627. Operation Plan. 15 July 1945, in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.5. Operation BLACKBERRY. Folder #1.

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- e. Disruption of enemy lines of communication in the WEST RIVER area, along the route of advance of the Division, at such times and places as may be directed by the Division Commander.
- f. Seizure of enemy transportation equipment, land or water, which would assist the advance of the Division.
- g. Particular attention will be paid to the intelligence derived from the conduct of these operations. A high priority will be assigned to the transmission or forwarding of enemy information to this headquarters."

Additional material bearing on BLACKBERRY's mission was included in another part of the Operation Plan:¹

"3. MOVEMENT TO AREA OF OPERATION

- f. Subject to orders, to be issued by representatives of Commanding General 89th Chinese Division, at LIUCHOW, units will be held in readiness to move out along route of advance within first twenty-four hour period after arrival.
- g. Decision as to employment of subordinate elements of the Battalion or individual Commandos will rest with the Battalion Commander or Commando Leaders concerned as the situation requires.
- h. It is expected that the Battalion will be met at LIUCHOW by representatives of Commanding General 89th Chinese Division, who will be able to provide information as to ration procurement, availability of coolie labor, acceptable currency, etc."

This OG mission most clearly called for guerrilla units to operate in direct support of regular military operations and under the close control of Division commanders. Excluding the missions concerning the collection of intelligence information, it is at once evident that none of BLUEBERRY's authorized activities include true guerrilla operations. For one thing, the unit's area of operations was closely confined in every

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case to that lying athwart the Division's route of advance. In other words, BLACKBERRY was to provide the closest of tactical support to the Chinese 89th Division. There was no provision for the type of harassing activities contemplated by Donovan and his associates. In addition, all parts of the missions envisage regular infantry assaults upon, and defense of, prepared positions, rather than the hit-and-run type of guerrilla attack, harassment, and destruction. BLACKBERRY was to attack and destroy enemy garrisons; to attack, seize, and hold towns and "features"; to establish road blocks and defend them against advancing or withdrawing regular enemy units; and to seize and hold enemy transportation equipment and disrupt enemy lines of communication. Thus was set forth in concrete terms the meaning of "direct tactical support of the advancing armies," which was quite a different responsibility from that which both Cox and Donovan had contemplated for the OGs.

It had been directed from the beginning in China that control over the OGs was to rest with the Theater Commander, who might delegate it to subordinate commanders. In this case the commander of the 89th Chinese Infantry Division had complete control of the unit, although he was compelled, by the terms of this Operation Plan, to consult BLACKBERRY's Commando Leader. The directive stated that BLACKBERRY was to "be placed under the Commanding General, 89th Chinese Division, for the purpose of carrying out such missions as may be within their capabilities." The existence of this "capabilities" clause gives rise to an interesting question: who was to determine the capabilities? In two of the paragraphs

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which define the missions in detail the following answers were provided:

- "b. Attack and destruction of such enemy garrisons and installations, along the route of advance, as may be within the capabilities of the Commandos, as determined by their Leaders and as directed by the Division Commander.
- c. Attack and seizure of such key towns or features, along the route of advance, as may be within the capabilities of the Commandos, as determined by their Leaders and as ordered by the Division Commander."

In the remaining paragraphs it was simply stated either that the Commandos were to do a particular job or that they were to do a particular job when ordered by the Division commander.

The directive therefore provides on legal grounds in these two cases some possibility of the Commando Leader's being able to influence the conduct of the operations of his unit. He was to determine capabilities. On practical grounds, however, this possibility seems rather remote. BLACKBERRY was, after all, specifically placed under the command of the Commanding General of the 89th Division. It is possible that the Commando Leader might, through the use of unusual powers of persuasion, be able to cause the Division Commander to modify a mission on the grounds that its accomplishment was not within the Commando's capabilities. But if the Division Commander nevertheless persisted in his decision there was, on practical grounds, no option for the Commando Leader but to obey. In sum, despite the existence of such qualifying clauses as these, there can be no doubt that the Commando was completely at the disposal of the Division Commander. Command must rest with someone in a military organization. In this case it rested completely with the Division Commander. The point to

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be borne in mind is that there was a vast difference in this case between what was "legally" possible and what was "practically" possible.

It is therefore clear that in terms of mission and function the BLACKBERRY operation bore no resemblance other than the most superficial one to a guerrilla operation of the type originally contemplated. BLACKBERRY was to act almost exclusively as an advance infantry assault unit.

Some idea can be gained of conditions in the operational area by reference to several intelligence reports drafted during the period from BLACKBERRY's departure from Liuchow and the action at Tanchuk.¹ These reports came to OG headquarters from AVOCADO's and BANANA's intelligence teams in the field.²

A venture into the West River valley area was an expedition into No-Man's-Land. AVOCADO's team encountered no enemy units, since they were either in the process of withdrawing eastwards or southwards or else were installed in fortified village and hill positions. At Shilung, on July 23, for instance, the team heard automatic rifle fire, which upon investigation turned out to be the result of the struggle between two rival political factions for possession of the town. One of these factions was "opposed to Central Government." No Japanese were involved. On the following day the team interviewed a local boatman, who informed them that there had been no Japanese in the area since the middle of June, but that elements of regular Chinese units had passed through. From the same source they heard a report that Japanese strength at Tanchuk was in the neighborhood of 300. At Kweiping they interviewed the commander of the local defense

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1. The intelligence available to BLACKBERRY before its departure from Kunming did not differ materially from that supplied to APPLE. See, therefore, the appropriate part of the section devoted to the activities of APPLE.

These pre-departure intelligence reports for BLACKBERRY will be found in

OSS Archives - Kunming.

OG.OP.5. - Operation BLACKBERRY. Folder #1.
and in

OSS Archives - Kunming.

OG.OP.6. - BLACKBERRY, etc. Folder #1.

2. See the following reports:

Report from AVOCADO intelligence team, dated 26 July 1945, and covering the period 23 - 25 July 1945;

Report from AVOCADO intelligence team, dated 8 August 1945, and covering the period 25 July - 4 August 1945;

Report from BANANA, dated 7 July 1945 [sic. 7 August is intended], and covering the period 26 July - 5 August 1945.

Copies of these reports will all be found in

OSS Archives - Kunming.

OG.OP.7. BANANA Operation. Folder #9.

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militia. He informed them that the enemy had left Kwiping during the third week in June and that Japanese strength at Tanchuk was in the neighborhood of 400, supported by mortars and light and heavy machine guns. The Tanchuk Japanese were said to be in "radio and steamboat communications" with their fellows down-river at Wuchow. At Ping-nam the team found some "Chinese Special Troops," who turned out to be U.S. Navy-trained guerrillas. From these and other sources information was gathered to indicate that the enemy was preparing to evacuate Tanchuk, since on July 25 "at 0130 hours more than eight (8) large boats left TANCHUK - filled with equipment and Jap soldiers. More boats are being prepared to move at the wharf in TANCHUK." By July 27 the group had moved to the Tanchuk neighborhood, where "the special Troop commander of this area was greatly pleased at my visiting his front lines and staged an attack on the village of MEHLING for my benefit." The attack was, ominous portent, repulsed. However, the enemy evacuated Mehling shortly thereafter. Tanchuk itself was found to be under attack and harassment by an undetermined number of local guerrillas. The purpose of these citations has been to show that the pre-operational intelligence reports were substantially correct in their view of the situation: the Japanese clinging to fortified positions and their lines of communication; the open countryside under the control of whatever local power had been able to impose its will on the inhabitants; and the fact that these local powers might or might not be particularly loyal to the central Chinese government. Such was the situation into which were thrust the Chinese commandos.

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The Tanchuk airfield operation was the only one in which BLACKBERRY participated before the end of the war. It is possible to analyze it rather fully, since three accounts and several field sketch maps have been preserved. These include one report written by an officer in battalion headquarters, which is useful for gaining a general picture of the operation, two reports written by an American officer with the 8th Commando (APRICOT), and one written by the Senior American Officer of the 10th Commando (BANANA). These are particularly valuable, because their authors all participated in the action.¹

According to the battalion report, the Chinese 265th Regiment, which was to make the main assault on Tanchuk, left Liuchow two days after BLACKBERRY's departure from the city. By the time Ping-nam was reached, however, the commando was five days ahead of the regiment, "despite orders from CCC and Marshal Tang of the 13th Army to the Col. [of the 265th] directing him not to delay anywhere enroute." After further delay, again attributed to the sloth of the Chinese commander of the 265th, both units assembled in the Tanchuk neighborhood.

The Tanchuk position was as follows.² The air strip was located about 2000 yards north of the West River, while Tanchuk village was on the river bank. About 500 yards east of the airfield was the village of To-chung, which served as a Japanese headquarters. To-chung nestled at the foot of a ridge which ran generally in a north-south direction and which had several high peaks. The village of Mei-Lin lay at the foot of the ridge about 1300

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1. Report by APRICOT on Tanchuk Operation, dated 7 August 1945;
Report by APRICOT on Tanchuk Operation, dated 8 August 1945;
Report by BANANA on Tanchuk Operation, no date, signed by Captain George Gunderman, Jr., Senior American Officer;
Report by BLACKBERRY on Tanchuk Operation, 10 August 1945.
These will all be found in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.7. BANANA Operation. Folder #9.

It will be recalled that "BLACKBERRY" was the code-name given to the operation as a whole and that it also was the code-name given to the battalion headquarters. The battalion consisted of the 8th, 9th, and 10th Commandos, whose code-names were, respectively: APRICOT, AVOCADO, BANANA.

See the same folder for a complete list of American officers and enlisted men engaged in Operation BLACKBERRY.

Since the radiograms from the field do not present any features different from the written accounts of BLACKBERRY's part in the Tanchuk operation, they will not be included here. See the following folders, however, for copies of them:

OSS Archives - Kunming.

OG.OP.5. - Operation BLACKBERRY. Folder #1.

and

OSS Archives - Kunming.

Reg. OP.3. Projects: BOSTON, Operational Reports & Cables, 149b.

2. See Tab "E.e.," Item I, for the sketch situation map on which this passage is based. A copy of this map will be found in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.7. BANANA Operation. Folder #9.

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yards north of To-chung. At the southern end (and highest point) of this ridge were located one set of Japanese defensive positions, facing north and east. This ridge was known as Hill #5. About 3000 yards east of the enemy works on Hill #5 was another and more precipitous ridge, which also had several peaks. The highest of these was approximately in the center of the ridge and contained another and more formidable set of enemy positions. The enemy defenses were arranged so as to provide a field of fire in any direction. This ridge also ran generally in a north - south direction and was known as Hill #4. BLACKBERRY Battalion headquarters were located on the extreme northerly slope of Hill #4 during the action. About 3500 yards to the north of Hill #4, and not connected with it, were Hills #2 and #3, which APRICOT occupied from July 28 to July 30 and from July 31 to August 2, respectively. These Japanese positions were strong, owing partly to the rough terrain, partly to the fortifications themselves, which included pill boxes, machine gun and mortar emplacements, and communication trenches, and partly to the support which the enemy was able to give with his 81mm mortars and other light artillery pieces. Some of these were located in To-chung and others on the hills themselves. Capture and retention of both Hills #4 and #5 was essential to capture and control of the airfield.

After the arrival of the 265th and BLACKBERRY in the Tanchuk area the Senior American Officer of the commando battalion suggested that the 265th do the actual attacking and capturing of the airfield and that the commandos "be placed downstream in an ambush on any escaping Japs." The Chinese

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colonel refused to agree to this plan, which, incidentally, was far more in accord with the true and original concept of what the commandos were supposed to do than what was actually done. Since, however, the Chinese colonel of the 265th would have nothing to do with BLACKBERRY's plan, the Americans could do nothing further. This was the result of Theater directives concerning Chinese - American relations in combat units. Accordingly, the following plan was adopted.¹

"Shortly after midnight and continuing sporadically until our 1.e., BLACKBERRY's. This and the succeeding quotation are taken from the report by the battalion officer/ main attack was launched, the regiment was to create a small diversionary attack on the southwest end of the airstrip near the village of Tanchuk. At 6:00 PM the 8th Commando was to open its attack on a high hill which had a strongly entrenched pill-box with other gun emplacements. At the same time a barrage of 60mm and 81mm mortar fire was to be laid down on two smaller hills which overlooked and surrounded the small village containing the Jap CP and their 70mm gun positions and an 81mm mortar position. When that fire was lifted, the 10th Commando, which meanwhile was to have crept up to the base of the two small hills, was to attack the hill and fire a yellow flare, indicating to the regiment that the line was taken by us and they would send a battalion to take the small town containing the Jap CP. The airport would then have been sure. This plan was accepted and agreed upon by the CO of the 265th and us.

Meanwhile, the 9th Commando less 2 sections, held back as reserve for the main detail, was to be on the river for an ambush against any Japs escaping in boats."

The dispatch of the 9th Commando (AVOCADO) for ambush preparations on the river shows that at least part of the American officer's plan was adopted. On the other hand, APRICOT and BANANA were given the uncongenial task of reducing Hills #4 and #5 respectively, while the 265th was to create diversion and to secure the airstrip once the vital hill positions had been captured.

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1. The statement "6:00 PM" is in error and should read "6:00 AM," meaning the morning of August 3. The 81mm mortars mentioned in the text as supporting the commandos were not part of their table of equipment, but belonged to the Chinese. The only mortars which the commandos used were the 60mm ones.

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This scheme went awry, however, in that the Chinese gave no support and that the Americans in one case were unable to capture their objective and in the other to hold it. Furthermore, the 9th Commando became involved in an unfortunate incident on the river. In one sense the operation did succeed, however, since the Chinese and Americans did ultimately get control of the airport and village. The Japanese voluntarily evacuated Tanchuk during the night of August 3 - 4. The brief account of these events follows:

"The attack of the 8th and 10th Commandos went off as planned and the 10th Commando fired the yellow flare and kept the line waiting for the Bn of the regiment to follow through on its part of the agreed plan and take the town. No activity was noticed at all on the part of the regiment save a few shots at the far other end of the field. Instead of a battalion to take the town only a small party was sent and they were repulsed by the Japs. After holding the two small hills for about 6 hours under murderous mortar fire, 70mm fire, 57 fire and snipers fire and never receiving the expected and promised help from the regiment, they were forced to withdraw because of high casualties and a complete expending of all their ammunition. The 8th Commando ran into much heavier opposition than was expected and about 4 o'clock in the afternoon were given order to withdraw, for the same reasons as the 10th.

The 9th Commando at about 6:00 AM sighted 6 sampans floating down the river toward their ambush. When the boats were within range of the ambush the Chinese CO gave orders to open fire on the boats. When the ambush was over, it was discovered that the boats contained Chinese civilians who had been carrying salt for the Japs at Tanchuk and other Jap points down the river. First aid was given the wounded by the Americans.

At about 11:20 the American CO requested permission ... to withdraw the Commando back to the base.

That night Jap sniper fire kept up on our positions on the high ground and then about midnight stopped. The next morning we observed Chinese of the regiment walking all over the hills we had fought on and taken the day previous. The remnants of the Japs had withdrawn during the night after the attack in very much of a hurry via the river and overland south of the West River."

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The two APRICOT reports give a more detailed account of the assaults in which that unit was engaged. The August 7 report speaks of the assault on Hill #4 as "the high point of Apricot's part in the operation." This was divided roughly into four phases, all on August 3, 1945: from 0300 to 0700, the approach; from 0700 to 0800, the assault attempt; from 0800 to 1500, the "attempt to reduce enemy emplacements with mortar and bazooka fire"; from 1500 to 1530, the withdrawal. The August 8 report goes into more detail. APRICOT's first objective was a ridge (line EF) on the approaches to the Japanese positions on Hill #4.¹ This ridge was to be reached by dawn. "From that point the attack on enemy positions at Z was to be launched with support from 81mm mortar on Hill 3 and from our own mortars and light machine guns." Coincident with this assault, "a diversionary attack against position Z was to be launched from the south slope at dawn." The First Branch (Rifle) "provided security at eastern base of Hill 4 and provided squad for the diversionary attack." Branches Two, Three (both Rifle), Four (Mortar), and Five (IMG) made up the force allotted to the main attack. Four and Five were to support Two and Three. Branch Six (Demolitions) "was broken up into ammo bearing details." Coolies were to help with ammunition bearing and general resupply. Owing to "lack of intelligence as to terrain and enemy positions," no specific plans had been made beyond the decision to attack position Z from line EF.

The approach to the jump-off point (EF) for the assault on the peak of Hill #4 (position Z) was delayed by overcast weather and confusing terrain. From this point the weaknesses in the command structure and in

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1. See Tab "E.f.," Item II. This is the sketch map of Hill #4 on which this account is based. The letters (viz., line EF, etc.) all refer to this sketch map. Item III shows in more detail the Japanese positions on Hill #4.

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1. The point G in blue is meant here.
The point G in red refers to the second Japanese counter-attack.
2. The attempt was certainly made to recognize this man's efforts, since he was recommended for a battlefield commission. This was denied him by higher headquarters.

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the definition of what must be the relationship between Americans and Chinese dominated the proceedings. Once position EF had been reached, there was a delay occasioned by the Chinese reluctance to proceed. At about 0630 the diversionary attack was launched from the point G.¹ The squad came under Japanese fire when about 100 yards from position Z. Thereupon ensued a remarkable incident. The American non-commissioned officer assigned to that squad "was unable to get the Chinese sqd. ldr. to move forward and attempted to lead an assault on his own. But the squad did not follow him." This American thereupon made an individual rush at the Japanese position Z and came within 25 yards of it. Although this diversionary attack accomplished little, it did have the result of drawing Japanese fire (which it was intended to do). At this point the main attack might have seized the Japanese position on the summit. The author of the report indulged in a masterpiece of understatement when he said, speaking of the one-man diversionary attack, that the American's "efforts are worthy of recognition":²

While these events were taking place, Branches Two and Three were having their difficulties. When the diversionary attack opened the commando mortars and machine guns opened fire on position Z and "wasted most of their ammo firing blindly in the direction of Z before the Americans could get them on the proper target." This was not easy, because "during this period the crest of the hill was covered by a cloud bank and observation was poor." The two branches maneuvered back and forth for

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some time between positions EF, CD, and AB, some of the movements being made without the knowledge of the Americans. Meanwhile the cloud bank lifted. The enemy "with its excellent fields of fire pinned both the 2d and 3d branches to the ground." Soon thereafter the Japanese made a counter-attack at point M, which failed to dislodge the commandos, but which inflicted casualties on them. Japanese snipers also took their toll and succeeded in disrupting the accuracy of the commandos' mortar and bazooka fire. This stalemate endured until mid-afternoon, at which time, owing to a second Japanese counter-attack this time against point G, and to the withdrawal of BANANA from its positions on Hill #5, a withdrawal was ordered. The enemy was left in possession of his position Z.

The 10th Commando (BANANA) received the mission of taking Hill #5, in order to support the 265th Regiment's assault on To-chung.¹ In pursuit of this goal BANANA attacked the hill and had captured it by 0630, driving off in the process an estimated squad of Japanese soldiers. The remainder of the time up to 1100 was spent in exchanging fire with the enemy. The latter returned BANANA's fire "and proceeded to lay an 81 mm barrage on our positions which was very effective and produced casualties." At 1100 the Chinese unit (of the 265th), after neither giving nor receiving much fire, began to withdraw. This withdrawal put BANANA in a most uncomfortable position, since "both sniping & artillery fire was being directed at our rear and left flank." A good deal of this hostile fire was coming from the enemy positions on Hill #4, which APRICOT had been unable to

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1. See Tab "E.h.," Item IV, for a sketch map showing the area in general and the movements of the 10th Commando (BANANA) in particular. Note that on this map that Hill #4 is mistakenly labeled "Hill #6" and that Hill #2 (or #3) is mistakenly labeled "Hill #4." See Items I - III for the correct version.

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eliminate. By noon the Chinese supporting unit had retreated to Mei-lin, which action completely exposed BANANA's right flank and permitted "the enemy to concentrate his entire volume of fire on our positions." Withdrawal was finally authorized and, after a "Banzai" attack by twenty-five Japanese had been repulsed with heavy casualties to the attackers, was successfully completed by mid-afternoon.

As has been already stated, the Japanese voluntarily withdrew from Tanchuk during the night, leaving both village and airfield in possession of the 265th and BLACKBERRY. In the sense of results achieved, the operation was thus a success. However, the enemy had repulsed the Allied effort to dislodge him by force. From the point of view of a successful tactical attack operation, therefore, the operation was a failure. This remains true, even assuming that the Japanese withdrew because they feared that heavier attacks would follow. This is only an assumption, however, since there is no evidence available to prove it and since the general Japanese policy beginning early in 1945 had been to withdraw their forces gradually but steadily towards Canton.

The Japanese held their position on Hill #4 with a small force estimated at between fifteen and thirty men. They held Hill #5 with an estimated squad. The remainder of the total estimated available Japanese strength of three hundred at Tanchuk was in Tanchuk village, To-chung village, and on the air field. The APRICOT force allotted to the main attack on Hill #4 comprised Branches Two and Three, with a total strength of 68,

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supported by Branches Four and Five, with a total strength of 41.¹ Thus, if the four branches are lumped together, the attackers outnumbered the defenders by between three and one-half and a bit more than seven to one, depending upon the number of Japanese actually on the hill. If only the main assault force (Branches Two and Three) are considered, the ratio in favor of the attackers was between a little more than two and a little less than five to one. The First Branch, which had the responsibility for mounting the diversionary attack, had at least a strength equal to that of the defenders and at most an advantage of more than two to one. The ratio of attackers to defenders on Hill #5 was equally favorable to the attackers. The total strength of BLACKBERRY² was 500 Chinese, 60 Americans, and 25 Interpreters. And yet the operation failed. Despite the enemy advantage of holding heights behind fortifications it is difficult not to agree with the statement of APRICOT's reporter in his August 8 report that "a bayonet and grenade assault by the 2d Branch under covering fire of the other branches would have carried the hill with possibly medium casualties."

Various valid reasons were advanced for the failure. BANANA blamed the supporting unit of the 265th Regiment, which withdrew and left the commando exposed to unrestricted enemy fire, and the rest of the Regiment, which failed completely to perform its part in the operation. Both APRICOT and BANANA attributed the failure to the conduct of the Chinese officers in command of their units and to the weaknesses in BLACKBERRY battalion headquarters. APRICOT's reporter recommended in his August 8 report that

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1. See Tab "B" for the Commandos' Table of Organization. The actual strength varied little from the T/O strength. The figures given in the text include Chinese, Americans, and Interpreters.
2. This figure includes AVOCADO, which did not take part in the main attack. In addition, of course, there was the Chinese 265th Regiment.

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the Chinese commander be replaced and castigated him in these terms:

"The conduct of the Chinese C.O. during the fight was disgraceful. At no time would he move out of his covered position to coordinate and direct the maneuvers of the two rifle branches. He never personally observed the forward position of his troops or made any move forward to do so. In my opinion he was dazed with fright and must be replaced."

Elsewhere in the same document the reporting officer stated that there were four reasons for the failure, all of which he laid "at the feet of the Chinese C.O.": "1. Poor supporting fires; 2. Lack of coordination; 3. Poor resupply; 4. Inertia of the commanding officer." BANANA's Senior American Officer was favorably disposed towards the Chinese officers in his unit, with the exception of the commander. Concerning the battalion commander and other officers he reported:

"It is the opinion of this Officer that throughout the recent action, the Bn command was extremely weak and lacked aggressiveness. Too much indecision was evident where a quickly calculated decision at the propitious time would have had more desirable effects and would have most certainly assured the annihilation of the Japanese forces."

and

"The failure of Chinese Officers to recognize imminent situations loses valuable time. Many occasions in the past few weeks have proven the Chinese Officers unwilling to cooperate to the point of uncalled for obstinacy."

There is no question but that the Theater Directives concerning the question of command and the relationship between Americans and Chinese personnel had created a situation wherein the conduct of the Chinese officers was of paramount importance. There is a remarkable consistency in the comments on this subject of those Americans who served with APPLE, BLUEBERRY, and

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BLACKBERRY. They all called attention to the unsatisfactory performance of the Chinese commando officers. Under such circumstances the burden of command fell by default upon the shoulders of the Americans assigned to the commandos. Study of the reports of the Tanchuk action reveals that in most cases the orders to advance, deploy, or retreat were given by the Americans. This is particularly true in the case of APRICOT's diversionary attack. Support for these statements is to be found in the citations for distinguished performance by the Americans. The recommendations invariably emphasized that the officers and men in question led their units, directed fire, and generally took the initiative in action.¹

A third major reason for the failure of the operation was the generally good use which the Japanese made of their resources. BANANA's Senior American Officer did not speak of them.² In both of his reports APRICOT's reporting officer spoke of Japanese tactics and how they affected the OGs. In his August 7 report he states that the Japanese fortifications were disappointingly fragile, but praises the enemy's tactics:

"They pinned Apricot down with automatic weapons or sniper fire from crest of hill. They infiltrated snipers around Apricot's left flank, clear down to lower reaches of mountain, and succeeded in pinning down 1st Branch minus one squad at back of hill. At same time snipers held 2d and 3d branches static in their positions, precluding maneuver. Two counter-attacks ... led by Nambu lights making lots of noise also immobilized our force. Action of the Jap snipers, operating individually was superior. The Jap snipers operating over the mountain to our left and in the rear was extremely deceptive and effective. We should have sent our counter snipers - also operating as individuals. This would have allowed us to maneuver.

His light counter attacks around Apricot's left flank were noisy. Again their tactics were good, as it kept Apricot worried."

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1. See the following folders for these citations:
OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.7. BANANA Operation. Folder #9.

OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.7. - Citations. Folder #25.

OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.4. - Promotions and Citations. Folder #25.
2. It should be remembered that BANANA gained its objective with little difficulty.

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1. "Conclusions" on the Tanchuk operation, undated, in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.7. BANANA Operation. Folder #9.

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In his August 8 report he says:

"Five snipers (estimate) infiltrating behind Apricot forced two branches into bowl below EF and discouraged maneuver. Also harried 1st Branch at base of hill pinning it down.

The Jap use of individual snipers using their own initiative was clever.

The Jap proved resourceful as an individual and as a unit."

Clearly, Japanese skill combined with the inertia of APRICOT's Chinese officers played an important part in the failure to take Hill #4.

Finally, it is necessary to consider the conduct and quality of the Chinese soldier. It has already been noted in the cases of APPLE and BLUEBERRY that there is little information on this subject beyond general statements that the soldiers conducted themselves well or that they fought well. In BLACKBERRY's case likewise most attention was directed towards the Chinese officers. However, the reports on the Tanchuk operation do provide a few clues and permit the drawing of the not too surprising conclusion that the Chinese soldiers for the most part behaved in direct ratio to the way in which their Chinese officers behaved.

One report makes the usual statement that "high praise must be given to the Individual Chinese soldier who fought gallant [sic] and well."¹ While this may be true in general it is certainly not true in all cases, since the comments of APRICOT's and BANANA's reporting officers differ radically and agree only in their unfavorable comments about battalion headquarters (which contained very few Chinese soldiers). APRICOT's August 8 report, in speaking of the approach movement to Hill #4, says:

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"Upon reaching initial objective 2d Branch thought that they had reached the crest and that the positions were unoccupied. Immediately the Chinese began to rejoice and it took some time to convince them that the Jap positions were beyond this point."

The diversionary attack on Hill #4 was carried out single-handedly by an American because the squad refused to follow him. At the same time "the mortars and machine guns went into position and opened fire. They wasted most of their ammo firing blindly in the direction of Z before the Americans could get them on the proper target." The bazooka and mortar fire from APRICOT during the stalemate around Hill #4 before the unit's withdrawal was "very inaccurate due to accurate sniping from the Jap positions. The pill box was still in good condition at 1200."

On the other hand, BANANA apparently conducted itself in an exemplary manner, for their American officer commented as follows:

"The 10th Commando had true aggressive assault spirit. They deployed well and held excellent fire discipline throughout the entire action. A cool, well aimed deliberate fire accounted for many Japanese casualties. Excellent marksmanship was displayed by the BAR crews and LMG crews. The preparatory mortar fire was excellent. Prior to the launching of the attack, it was delivered at a range of 1500 yards and needed very little adjustment. The American Senior Officer expresses the utmost admiration for the Chinese personnel of the 10th Commando and the Chinese officers."

The evidence has made it clear that BANANA's performance was in general superior to that of APRICOT. Not only did it take and hold its objective until forced off by a combination of withering Japanese fire and the failure of APRICOT and the Chinese supporting unit from the 265th Regiment, but also the comments of its Senior American Officer are far more favorable than are those of APRICOT's reporting officer. There was

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thus an uneven quality in the performance of the OGs which helps to explain the tactical failure of the operation. Another reason for the failure at Tanchuk is therefore that APRICOT's men, probably owing to the inferior quality of their Chinese officers, proved, on the whole, wanting in what had been described as the requisite commando qualities of initiative, dash, and aggressiveness. That BANANA's personnel apparently possessed these qualities in greater measure was insufficient to compensate for APRICOT's shortcomings.

Finally, it must be remembered that the commandos were not designed to be used as regular assault troops. In particular they did not have the armament necessary effectively to carry out attacks on prepared positions such as those of Tanchuk. When their support failed to materialize, as it did at Tanchuk, they were exposed to most unpleasant consequences. Such were some of the results of the Theater policy governing the organization, use, and control of the OSS Operational Groups units.

L. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The Operational Group effort during World War II, both in China and to a lesser extent in Europe, was influenced by three basic questions. The first was: what role should guerrilla warfare play in the Allied effort against the Axis? This question was never really answered in a practical manner. Two schools of thought put forth their ideas on the subject. The first school, identified with Donovan, Cox, and their associates, felt that guerrilla warfare should be waged and should be essentially

strategic in nature. Their basic premise was that in the absence of Allied military capability to defeat the enemy in battle Allied guerrillas should strike him where he was the most vulnerable, that is, to attack his communications lines, small garrisons, and other such installations. Since the guerrillas, by their very nature, could not without support hope to meet the enemy troops on equal terms, they should concentrate on hit-and-run attacks. These advocates felt that the cumulative effect of guerrilla activity could be tremendous, in that it would diminish the enemy's strategic capabilities by attacking and destroying them and by compelling him to divert more and more troops to the task of protecting them. In sum, guerrilla warfare represented the Allied capability of inflicting damage to the enemy pending an increase in their own regular military power. Such a situation pertained in Europe prior to the 1944 invasions. In China, the Chinese armies remained in being, but were completely incapable of inflicting decisive defeats on the Japanese invaders. This school of thought therefore considered the situation as ideal for large-scale guerrilla warfare operations. They felt that to be the most effective from the strategic point of view the guerrilla units should be centrally controlled from highest headquarters in Washington and relatively free from local control by the Theater Commanders. Thus, they would devote themselves exclusively to strategic objectives as indicated.

The second school of thought felt that under no circumstances should any military units, including guerrilla units, operate in a Theater of war without being controlled by the Theater Commander. This would violate

the chain of command principle. Furthermore, as shown by OG activities both in Europe and in China, this school of thought tended to consider guerrilla warfare as an activity which must be directly co-ordinated with regular military operations. In other words, they considered it to be more tactical in nature than did their opponents. It must be tied very closely to the advance of regular military units.

In theory the highest headquarters accepted the existence of guerrilla warfare and the employment of guerrilla units. However, the foregoing basic conflict was never really settled and no clear-cut decision made. The result was that, especially in China, the OGs were termed guerrilla units, but were placed under the complete control of the regular military commanders, who actually employed them as advance regular infantry troops rather than as true guerrillas. Their efficiency was impaired to that extent.

The second basic question was: shall the units be recruited exclusively from among personnel of the American armed forces? This proved to be a question essentially of diplomacy and foreign relations and was dealt with along those lines. The basic decision was made to limit American participation to what was called the "operational nuclei," leaving the bulk of the guerrillas to come from the natives in the territory in which the unit was to operate. It has already been noted that in Europe this policy was not too successful, since the natives tended to think as much in terms of post-war politics as in terms of the wartime military problems. In China this policy led to the organization of the commandos from among

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Chinese personnel, with the Americans limited to the role of advisers in training and in combat operations. It cannot be considered that this idea worked in practice.

The third basic question is related to the second one and like it was a diplomatic rather than a military or organizational matter. This was: should the American "operational nuclei" exercise command, or should the indigenous elements in the units do so? It was finally decided in China that, owing to Chinese sensitivity in the matter of sovereignty, command would rest with the Chinese. They were to follow American advice. The result of this decision was unfortunate, since instead of settling the problem of command and control it merely complicated it. The Chinese were aware of American superiority in techniques and of the necessity to listen to American advice, yet were usually unwilling to allow either this superiority or this advice to influence their conduct of combat operations.

Thus, of these three basic questions, the first one was a matter of fundamental philosophy or doctrine, while the last two represent one of the important problems and difficulties to be faced in waging coalition warfare of any kind. Curiously enough, while the highest headquarters were willing to have Americans command regular American divisions in the field, they refused to allow them to command guerrilla units. But at the same time they permitted the existence of these units. The illogical nature of this decision may be explained by remembering that the very idea of guerrilla warfare was not one which had gained anything resembling universal acceptance in higher or lower military circles.

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Many consequences resulted from the decisions, or lack of them, concerning the foregoing three basic questions, and had an unfortunate effect on all phases of OG affairs. In the matter of OG personnel the Americans operated under a tremendous disadvantage, in that they were forced to rely on Chinese promises concerning personnel procurement. When the Chinese failed to live up to their commitments either in the matter of supplying adequate numbers of men or in the matter of supplying men of the necessary qualifications for OG work, there was nothing for the Americans to do but to bombard both Chinese and American headquarters with letters which grew more desperate and pleading as time went on. Faced with a Theater order for twenty commandos ready for the field by August 1 OSS had to postpone and change training schedules a number of times and had to accept personnel who did not meet minimum OG standards. Neither Chinese nor American headquarters gave the project any particular support in this matter.

The missions given the OGs, as has been indicated, were actually chiefly tactical infantry tasks masquerading as guerrilla warfare. Despite their being compelled to operate as infantry assault units attacking fixed positions, their organization and armament were not modified accordingly. Weapons support was either totally lacking, as in the case of APPLE and BLUEBERRY, or else was supposed to (and did not) come from regular Chinese units, as in the case of BLACKBERRY. When that support did not materialize there was nothing the Americans could do about it. The result was that the OGs were compelled, totally unaided, to attack a stubborn, skilful, and strongly-entrenched enemy. These attacks failed.

The most dismal failure was the twin attempt to combine for field operations the use of American advisers with Chinese commanders and personnel and to solve the language problem by the use of interpreters. The following excerpt from a letter to Cox from one of the Americans in the field illustrates this point clearly. In the absence of authority there must at least be understanding. Such understanding was totally lacking, both from the point of view of language and from that of good relations between the allies. The Chinese officers were usually unwilling to cooperate; the Americans were always forbidden to command. Consequently, the unit's efficiency was seriously diminished.

"However, there are many things to be corrected. ... Very friendly relations of the first part of the boat trip [this refers to BLACKBERRY's trip by sampan from Liuchow to the Tanchuk area] were changed when the Americans started talking in terms of 'these — Chinese', etc. They understand that stuff like we do 'Ding How', only in the opposite sense. Then what was a comfortable ride for the Chinese was so much more Chinese — in a — country for the Americans. Then a search among Chinese troops individually to recover lost American property didn't help. The value of the Chennault attitude can't be overemphasized. It was suggested that there be fewer Americans in combat. Here very serious incidents occurred through misunderstandings, avoidable by intimacy & friendship between Chinese officers & men, & by straightening out about who's to take commands from whom. The Americans can't command directly on the field - 1. Chinese officers already have their orders. 2. The circuit American - interpreter - Chinese officer - interpreter - American is too easily broken in combat. 3. The Ch. officers threaten to shoot the soldier who follows the American rather than himself. My impression was that the whole thing should be made clear before action & then cut the apron strings. This means that the Ch. officers have to be made damned certain of, before they would take off completely on their own. Again - the matter of Ch. & Am. not knowing each other. Contrary to this is the isolated story of a Chinese officer having complete & lasting confidence in the American, but this is exceptional."¹

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1. Letter, "Doc" (Major John B. Hamblet, MC) to "Colonel" (Cox), dated 7 August 1945, in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.7. BANANA Operation. Folder #9.

The foregoing statements are borne out by the following documents and radiograms, to be found in the folders indicated. "Conclusions" on Tanchuk Operation, undated, in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.7. BANANA Operation. Folder #9.

Radiogram, Cox to APPLE and BLUEBERRY, 9 August 1945;
Radiogram, Cox to BLACKBERRY (REAR), 13 August 1945, in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.5. Operation BLACKBERRY. Folder #1.

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1. Report by APRICOT on Tanchuk Operation, dated 8 August 1945, in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.7. BANANA Operation. Folder #9.
2. Report by BANANA on Tanchuk Operation, no date, in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.7. BANANA Operation. Folder #9.
3. Cox to APPLE, BLACKBERRY, BLUEBERRY, no date, in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.5. Operation BLACKBERRY. Folder #1.

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American reaction to this state of affairs, in addition to that indicated above, was to press for some form of reorganization and for a decision to use the OGs according to what was ostensibly their original purpose. The author of the August 8 APRICOT report on the Tanchuk operation recommended that the number of American and interpreter personnel be reduced "to two officers and 4 EM, 2 interpreters."¹ BANANA's Senior American Officer considered in his report that the ideal solution would be to remove all the Chinese OG officers and replace them with Americans who would "assume full command & responsibility." Failing this he would "limit American personnel to 4 ... allowing Chinese Officers to exert full command & responsibility for all actions."² And Cox wrote what might well be considered a fitting epitaph for the entire OG project in China.

"CCC NOW CONVINCED COMMANDOS OPERATE BEST SIMPLY AS GUERRILLAS
PD RESULTS THUS FAR OBTAINED INDICATE CHINESE SOLDIERS WILL FIGHT
BRAVELY CMA COOPERATION OF CHINESE OFFICERS DEPENDENT ENTIRELY
ON RELATIONS OF CHINESE AND AMERICANS PD YOU MUST REMEMBER THAT
JAPS WHO IN ARE DAMN TOUGH PD RECOMMEND YOU DO NOT ATTACK FORTIFIED
POSITIONS UNLESS YOU HAVE COMPLETE SURPRISE OR 3 TO 1 SUPERIORITY
PD CONCENTRATE ON PATROLS CMA ENEMY COLUMNS CMA SUPPLY LINES CMA
ETC PD"³

As it was the Chinese Combat Command (CCC) and the Chinese themselves who had ordered the type of mission in which the OGs were to attack fortified positions, it is rather ironic that at the very end of the war they should have

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decided that the commandos operated best as guerrilla bands and that they should concentrate on true guerrilla targets. As for "cooperation," we have seen what results that brought.

The principal emphasis in this series of papers has been on the OG operations in China. The OSS put a tremendous amount of devotion and effort into the project, but did not succeed in its aims. The Japanese were not hampered particularly from either a strategic or a tactical point of view. OG attacks on Japanese positions failed. OG attacks did not disturb in any particular way a Japanese withdrawal which was being carried out according to plan.

Whoever must judge the results of the effort must do so only after taking into consideration the situation in China and the answers to the three basic questions discussed at the beginning of this section. The OGs appeared on the scene late in the war, too late, in reality, to have any decisive effect on the course of operations or, as has been indicated, on the smooth accomplishment by the Japanese of their withdrawals to the east and north. That the OGs did appear so late was not their fault, since higher headquarters delayed for so long a decision to employ them. The failure to answer the first of the three basic questions caused the OGs to have to operate under a vast handicap. The unrealistic answers given to the other two basic questions made it impossible for the commandos to perform efficiently under any situation whatsoever. Basically, therefore, the OSS was given a large responsibility, but was denied the freedom and authority necessary to fulfil that responsibility and was saddled with unrealistic

and impossible restrictions on the activities of its OG units. While it is true that the waging of modern warfare, with its combination of regular and guerrilla operations, is a difficult art, and while it is true that the waging of warfare by coalition presents many complex problems, it is evident that the planners ignored, either partially or completely, the realities and tended to give half-answers to very important questions. It is regrettable that the industry and valor of Cox, his associates at the training camps, and his men in the field should not have been better utilized. It is indeed doubly fortunate that none of them were killed in this vain cause.

M. BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

The study of the OSS Operational Groups activities in China during World War II is easy in some respects and hard in others. There is material readily available in abundance on some topics, while documents on others are scarce and incomplete. It is difficult for the purposes of this note to classify this material from either a topical or a chronological viewpoint, since the contents of the document folders rarely correspond exactly with their titles. For example, although a title may indicate that the folder deals with BLUEBERRY, the reader will find in that folder material on various other subjects. Each folder must therefore be inventoried with care, lest important documents be overlooked. The topical titles cannot be regarded as anything more than incomplete and tentative.

In general, the most complete documentary material available lies in the planning and operational field, while the topics the most unsatisfactorily covered are those of administration, supply, finance, and other such matters. It has been fortunate, therefore, that the emphasis of the present series of papers has been on precisely those aspects for the study of which the most documents are available. It would be ideal to have the entire supply of documents on the OO project in China completely reclassified in a more rational manner, according to subject matter, and to have it competently cross-indexed.

The following is a list, with notations, of the material used in this study.

I. Secondary Sources:

1. War Report, Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Prepared by History Project, Strategic Services Unit, Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, War Department, Washington, D.C., Printed by U.S. Government Printing Office, Department of State Service Office, July, 1949, Two Volumes. (Volume I: Washington Organization; Volume II: Operations in the Field)

These well-known volumes give a comprehensive account of both the Washington and overseas activities of OSS. The first volume contains many transcripts of important documents, which are vital for any analysis of planning for unorthodox warfare. This work was used extensively in the preparation of Paper Number I of this series, in particular Volume I. Study of Volume II is essential for an introduction to OSS overseas operations, since it gives brief accounts of planning and operations in all the fields in which OSS was active. Limitations of space prevent any extended treatment of selected operations. It is unfortunate that the work as a whole tends to lay stress upon the positive and successful accomplishments of OSS, while glossing over, although admitting the existence of, problems and failures. It is equally unfortunate that no indication of sources is given. In sum, while this

book is extremely useful, and while its character and approach should not be equated with Parson Weems' life of George Washington, it is essentially an uncritical piece of work. Its internal organization has led to a certain amount of repetitiousness.

2. OSS Archives - Washington.
43. Washington - History Branch.
Washington - OG History.

This is a fairly long history of the Operational Group Command from its origins to the conclusion of operations in Europe. It appears to be among the material from which the sections in the War Report on OG activities were written. Contains a few references to documents. Devotes considerable space to early plans and decisions and to accounts of operations in Europe. Particularly valuable as an extended introduction to the subject. Critical as well as chronological.

3. OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.2. OSS/Operational Group Command.
History of Operations in China.

This is a nine-page historical report on the Chinese Commandos. Written by the commanding officer of the OGs, Alfred T. Cox, Lt. Col., Inf., and addressed to the Commanding General, United States Forces, China Theater, 7 October 1945, in response to a requirement that all branches submit historical reports of their activities. Contains no references to documents. Covers briefly all phases of the OG project. A virtually non-critical, chronological summary. Study of this report is essential as an introduction to OG activities in China.

4. OSS Archives - Washington.
218. CHINA - Chinese Commandos.

Contains an OG history similar to Cox's report (#1,3 above). No original documents except a collection of photographs of OG activities.

II. Primary Sources:

1. OSS Archives - Washington.
Dir. AD.44. Box 2. JCS. 245.

Contains staff studies, correspondence, working papers, and the final text of JCS 245, "Special Military Plan for U.S.

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Psychological Warfare Operations Against the Japanese Within the Asiatic Theater*, March, 1943, together with a summary of OSS operations in the Far East (two pages), written sometime in 1944. Study of this folder is essential for information on plans for the use of psychological warfare.

2. OSS Archives - Kunming.
Reg.OP.3.
Subj: PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BOARD
(PW Information). 108.

Contains a limited number of radiograms and letters concerning general psychological warfare in the Far East. Valuable chiefly for the China Theater directives on the subject. While these contain nothing on OG matters, they do reveal the concepts according to which unorthodox warfare was to be organized and waged in the China Theater. The value of this folder is thus limited and lies chiefly in the realm of "background" information.

3. OSS Archives - Kunming.
OSS.OP.1.
Theater Directives.

Contains an incomplete file of directives and letters issued by the following authorities in the China Theater during the period February - September 1945: U.S. Forces; Chinese Combat Command; Tactical Headquarters, U.S. Forces. Contains the following documents important for a study of OG (and OSS) plans and activities: Operational Directive No. 10 (to OSS regarding the organization of, authority for the OG units); documents concerning the organization and role of the Chinese Combat Command; letters and directives governing American - Chinese relations and the role of interpreting officers.

4. OSS Archives - Chungking.
Reg.OP.1.
USF/CT. Hq. Directives. #19.

Contains United States Forces, China Theater, directives from February to October, 1945 (including one document from 1944). Of particular importance is Operational Directive No. 4 (to OSS), authorizing and describing OSS operations. Not a complete file.

5. OSS Archives - Chungking.
Reg.OP.1.
USF/CT. Subject Directives.

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Contains United States Forces, China Theater directives from late 1944 to October, 1945, on a variety of subjects, some of which are of interest to the student of OSS activities. Not a complete file. Many documents governing lend-lease and other aspects of Chinese - American relations. Valuable for background and general authorizations. Also contains some intelligence directives.

6. OSS Archives - Kunming.
Reg.OP.1.
OSS CT: GENERAL (to 1 Oct. 1945). #6A.

Contains a file of OSS and Theater and other directives to 1 October 1945. This folder is essential to any study of OSS activities in China during World War II. Of particular importance is the transcript of the January 24, 1945, "Clandestine Conference No. 1", at which the Commanding General of the U.S. Forces in China laid down the principles by which such activities would be governed.

7. OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.4. Questions.
Folder #22.

Contains two sets of questions concerning OSS problems. The first set deals with questions arising concerning the OG project. The second deals with intelligence questions concerning the Manning and Liuchow areas. Valuable for any study of the early phases of the OG project.

8. OSS Archives - Kunming.
OSS.OP.2.

Contains material important for any consideration of the early planning for the OG units, February, 1945.

9. OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.7.
OSS, CHUNGKING - LETTERS. Folder #21.

Contains various letters concerning OG matters, March - June, 1945. Of particular interest is the answer from Chiang to Wedemeyer's letter of February concerning OG organizational matters.

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10. OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.4.
Commanding General - 1st Parachute Regiment.
Folder #13.

Contains correspondence between OG headquarters and the Chinese authorities, March - August, 1945, chiefly concerning administrative matters. Of particular interest are the text of the Sino-American agreement concerning the OGs and the delineation of Chinese and American responsibilities and Cox's listing of OG job qualifications for the information of the Chinese authorities.

11. OSS Archives - Kunming.
OSS.OP.2. RASHNESS. OPSO.

Contains draft plans and correspondence concerning OSS participation in Operation CARBONADO. Included are maps showing phasing, areas of responsibility, and communications networks (for use during operations), and charts showing airlift requirements and schedules. Valuable for any study of the role in Operation CARBONADO assigned to OSS.

12. OSS Archives - Kunming.
Folder #84 - CARBONADO.
TOP SECRET. A. Reg. Op. 6.

Contains: OSS Plans and General Correspondence; SI Project "PBS", and SO Project "COUGAR"; Theater directives and correspondence (including the Chinese Combat Command, Tactical Hq, and Rear Echelon); 10th Air Force material. Invaluable for any study of Operation CARBONADO.

13. OSS Archives - Washington.
Dir. Files - #16,320.
OSS OPs - China.

Contains OSS organization charts and some General Orders, particularly governing organizational matters, Theater supply charts, command charts, and organization charts. Important for any study of OSS activities in the China Theater.

14. OSS Archives - Kunming.
Reg.OP.6.
Meetings, Commanders, through 15 Aug. (1945). #44.

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Contains agendas and minutes of the regular meetings of U.S. Forces authorities with the unit and organization commanders in the China Theater. Valuable for information concerning all phases of the American effort in China during 1945 and as an introduction to the subject. The minutes are, however, merely recordings of decisions and actions and are correspondingly brief.

15. OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.6. OPSCOM.
Folder #7.

Contains minutes of OSS Weekly Operations Committee Meetings, March - May, 1945. Useful for a general picture of OSS operational activities and problems.

16. OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.7. Staff Meetings.
Folder #1.

Contains minutes of OSS weekly Staff Meetings, June - August, 1945. Useful for information on various problems faced by OSS.

17. OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.AD.1.
Operational Report.

Contains OG weekly operational reports, March - August, 1945. These are of value in obtaining a general idea of events of the period.

18. OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.3.
Monthly Report. Folder #3.

Contains instructions for preparation of monthly reports, as well as OG monthly reports, March - July, 1945. Valuable for obtaining a general idea of the events of this period.

19. OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.1.
CHINA (OO "B") - OPERATIONS.

Contains OG monthly reports, July - August, 1945, and charts, photographs, and descriptive accounts concerning OSS operations in China generally. Of general interest and value.

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20. OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.1.
CHINA (Co "B") - REPORTS.

Contains a miscellany of material concerning the OGs: photographs, charts, and reports. Many of these are duplicated elsewhere and are of but small general interest.

21. OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.4. OPSO.
Folder #17.

Contains correspondence to and from the OSS Operations Officer on OG matters, March - May, 1945, chiefly concerning administrative matters.

22. OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.4.
Chinese Combat Command. Folder #12.

Contains correspondence between OSS and the CCC, May - August, 1945, concerning OG administrative and some operational matters. The value of this folder is diminished, because very few answers to OSS letters are included.

23. OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.4.
CG, USF, CT - LETTERS. Folder #15.

Contains correspondence between OSS and the United States Forces, China Theater, and the Chinese Combat Command, concerning OG matters, February - May, 1945. Of particular interest are the detailed commando training schedule, a lengthy progress report (18 May 1945), and a memorandum from United States Forces to Chiang concerning the OG organization (February, 1945).

24. OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.6.
Table of Organization. Folder #16.

Contains OG table of organization and weapons charts, with various revisions thereof, January - March, 1945.

25. OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.6.
Table of Equipment. Folder #4.

Contains undated tables of equipment for the OGs, 1945.

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26. OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.6.
Table of Basic Allowances. Folder #5.

Contains undated tables of basic allowances for the OGs, 1945.
27. OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.7.
OGC - LETTERS. Folder #8.

Contains correspondence within OSS concerning OG matters, some copies of OSS Research and Development committee meetings, summaries of personal histories of several officers, and OG tables of organization (approved by Donovan), March - August, 1945.
28. OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.7.
CO, Hq. & Hq. Det. Folder #22.

Contains correspondence and reports on OG administrative, disciplinary, etc., matters, addressed by the Operational Group commander to the Commanding Officer, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, OSS, March - July, 1945.
29. OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.AD.1.
Strength Reports.

Contains Operational Groups morning reports, June - September, 1945, OSS strength reports and rosters, June - September, 1945.
30. OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.4.
Personnel. Folder #21.

Contains personnel correspondence, rosters, strength reports, and some tentative OG assignment lists for American personnel, February - August, 1945. Of particular interest is a report of information concerning the Chinese First Parachute Regiment, dated 5 February 1945 (this regiment was to supply the Chinese personnel for the commandos).
31. OSS Archives - Kunming.
Reg.OP.7.
USP/CT CCC (Chinese Combat Command). #122.

Contains correspondence, radiograms, directives, and letters to and from the Chinese Combat Command on administrative and on OG matters, Chinese-American relations, and the organization of the CCC, February - December, 1945.

32. OSS Archives - Kunming.
Reg.OP.3.
Projects: BOSTON, Administration, etc. 149a.

Contains a large amount of original documentary material on the Chinese OG project: training, pay and rations, tables of organization, tables of equipment, and press releases. Invaluable for any study of the OG project.

33. OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.6.
Special Funds. Folder #11.

Contains certifications and other material concerning the use of funds, March - August, 1945. Insufficient material to be of more than little value.

34. OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.6.
Detachment Letters. Folder #12.

Contains a few letters of general interest concerning OG matters, May, 1945. Of very limited value.

35. OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.6.
Training. Folder #17.

Contains a miscellaneous collection of documents and proposals concerning training, as well as items concerning tables of equipment and other such matters. Little of this material concerns the OGs directly and much of it dates from 1944.

36. OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.5.
9th Commando (Combat). #11.

Contains AVOCADO's record of events (very brief), rosters of Chinese personnel and progress and efficiency reports (incomplete).

37. OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.5.
2nd Commando (Combat). #18.

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Contains much information, in the form of the Operation Plan, intelligence reports, a progress report, plane-load rosters, and a large file of radiograms to and from the field, concerning BLUEBERRY. Folder also contains a file of APPLE's radiograms to and from the field. Invaluable for any study of OG operations in China.

38. OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.7.
BANANA Operation. Folder #9.

Contains sketch maps of the Tanchuk area, casualty lists, recommendations for awards and promotions, intelligence and operational reports, and other documents concerning BANANA's part in the Tanchuk operation. Invaluable for any study of OG activities.

39. OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.5.
10th Commando (Combat). #10.

Contains a few efficiency progress reports during training period, personnel rosters, and vacancy list of 10th Commando.

40. OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.7.
APPLE Operation. Folder #11.

Contains equipment packing list for re-supply, intelligence and operational reports concerning APPLE (1st Commando). Essential to any study of OG operations.

41. OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.6.
BLACKBERRY, etc. Folder #1.

Contains communications and other maps, intelligence reports, and intelligence directives bearing on the West River area. Valuable for obtaining data on this area prior to APPLE's and BLACKBERRY's arrival.

42. OSS Archives - Kunming.
Reg.OP.3.
Projects: BOSTON, Operational reports & cables. 149b.

Contains operational radiograms to and from the field, operational plans for APPLE, BLACKBERRY, BLUEBERRY, reports, intelligence material, and maps of the area. Essential to any study of OG operations.

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43. OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.4.
Folder #26. Misc.

Contains intelligence reports, enemy order of battle information, and maps of the Changsha area, in which BLUEBERRY operated. Essential for any study of OG activities.

44. OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.6.
Folder #3. Misc.

Contains city and area maps of West River valley, communications map overlay of the area, intelligence reports, and essential elements of information. Essential to any study of OG activities.

45. OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.4.
General Tu Lei Ming. Folder #11.

Contains progress reports and letters concerning the Chinese commandos from Cox to the General, June - August, 1945, and to other Chinese authorities. Valuable for getting information on commando problems during the training period and a general summary of their activities in the field.

46. OSS Archives - Kunming.
SO.OP.12.
5 OG - APPLE, BLACKBERRY, CHERRY.

Contains several copies of a report on the airlift phase of APPLE operation, with comments and suggestions for the future, and several air re-supply manifests and pilots' reports, August, 1945. Invaluable for information on this phase of OG activities.

47. OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.5.
Operation "BLACKBERRY". Folder #1.

Contains radiograms to and from BLACKBERRY in the field, the complete operation plan for BLACKBERRY, intelligence reports, communications diagram, and notes on plane movement of BLACKBERRY from Chengkung airdrome to Liuchow. Essential to any study of this operation.

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48. OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.5.
1st Commando (Combat). #19.

Contains efficiency progress reports, plane-loading manifests, operation plan, and loading schedules for APPLE. Essential to any study of this operation.

49. OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.3.
Folder #1.

Contains a vast miscellany of documents concerning OSS activities in general and the primarily administrative aspects of the Operational Group Command in particular. There are several personnel rosters, strength reports, commendations, correspondence, intelligence directives, etc. The chief value of this folder lies in the administrative field.

50. OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.7.
Citations. Folder #25.

Contains recommendations for awards for American OG personnel, with description of deeds to support the recommendations, July - August, 1945.

51. OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.4.
Promotions and Citations. Folder #25.

Contains recommendations for promotions and for awards for American OG personnel, with facts to substantiate the recommendations, March - August, 1945.

III. Maps and Charts (Appendixes):

1. Tab "A":

These maps will serve to illustrate the general situation in China in 1944-1945, with particular reference to Operation CARBONADO, and should be used with Paper Number II as a whole, particularly with Section "E" (Operation "CARBONADO" and the Projected OSS Role Therein) thereof.

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- a. Map: "Japanese and Chinese Held Areas in China", 1944-1945, on Kuang-Chou (Canton), China, sheet (SE), Asia Transportation Map, Army Map Service (First Edition - AMS 2), 1943. Scale 1:2,000,000.
- b. Map (#5615): "Situation in China, 1 February 1945." Drawn in R & A, OSS, from R & A, OSS, Map No. 5611. Scale 1:4,000,000. Compiled from information supplied by A-2, 11th A.F., and R & A, OSS.
- c. Map (#16394 H421-16): "Estimated Dispositions of Japanese Army Ground Forces in China, 17 February 1945."
- d. Map (#17805 H421-16): "China Campaigns", February, 1945. Scale 1:4,000,000.

Source for all of these maps: CIA Map Library.

2. Tab "B":

These charts will serve to show the organization, personnel, and equipment of the Chinese Commandos and should be used particularly with Section "F" (Operational Group Organization) of Paper Number II. They will also be of assistance in connection with Sections I, J, and K (the descriptions and analyses of Operations APPLE, BLUEBERRY, and BLACKBERRY) in the same paper.

- a. Chart: Exhibit I, "National Military Council Commando" (Organization of Chinese Commandos), no date (probably March, 1945).

Source: OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.6. Table of Organization.
Folder #16.

- b. Chart: Exhibit II, "National Military Council Commando" (American Personnel), 8 March 1945.

Source: OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.6. Table of Organization.
Folder #16.

- c. Chart: Exhibit III, "Organization of Chinese Commandos" (Chinese Personnel), 8 March 1945.

Source: OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.6. Table of Organization.
Folder #16.

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- d. Chart: Exhibit IV, "Table of Organization and Table of Equipment for OGC Command Hq, Bn Hq, Co Hq, Section" (American Personnel), 19 March 1945.

Source: OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.7. OGC - Letters.
Folder #8.

- e. Chart: Exhibit V, "Organization of Chinese Commandos" (American Personnel: Headquarters and Headquarters Company), no date (probably March, 1945).

Source: OSS Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.6. Table of Organization.
Folder #16.

3. Tab "C":

These maps will serve to illustrate the operations of OG unit APPLE and should be used in conjunction with the study of Paper Number II, Section I (OG Operation "APPLE", July - August, 1945). Map "a." immediately below will show the general area of China in which all the OG units operated. It should be compared with the maps in Tab "A" for assessment of Japanese strength and disposition and for appreciation of the Japanese and Chinese held areas. On this map are outlined, for purposes of orientation, the areas covered, as indicated, by the larger-scale maps used in Tabs "C", "D", and "E". The purpose of the large-scale maps is to show the type of terrain in which the OGs operated and to indicate the places in which they were found and the routes over which they traveled. Except where they cannot be identified, place-names and routes of significance are, respectively, underlined and outlined in red.

- a. Map: Kuang-Chow (Canton), China, sheet (SE), Asia Transportation Map, Army Map Service (First Edition - AMS 2), 1943. Scale: 1:2,000,000.
- b. Map: Tchang-wu, China, Sheet, China Proper, SW (Sheet F 49 D, AMS Series L582). Printed by Army Map Service, Corps of Engineers (Second Edition - AMS). Scale 1:250,000.
- c. Map: Lo-ting, China, Sheet, China Proper, SW (Sheet F 49 J, AMS Series L582). Printed by Army Map Service, Corps of Engineers (Second Edition - AMS). Scale 1:250,000.
- d. Map: Tien-pai, China, Sheet, China Proper, SW (Sheet F 49 P, AMS Series L582). Printed by Army Map Service, Corps of Engineers (Second Edition - AMS). Scale 1:250,000.

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- e. Map: San-shui, China, Sheet, China Proper, SE (Sheet 77, AMS Series L581). Printed by Army Map Service, Corps of Engineers (Third Edition - AMS). Scale 1:250,000.
- f. Map: T'ai-shan, China, Sheet, China Proper, SE (Sheet 83, AMS Series L581). Printed by Army Map Service, Corps of Engineers (Fifth Edition - AMS). Scale 1:250,000.
- g. Map: Ch'ih-Ch'i, China, Sheet, China Proper, SE (Sheet 86, AMS Series L581). Printed by Army Map Service, Corps of Engineers (Third Edition - AMS). Scale 1:250,000.

Source for all of these maps: CIA Map Library.

h. Tab "D":

These maps will serve to illustrate the operations of OG unit BLACKBERRY. See comment under Tab "C", which applies equally to the maps under Tab "D".

- a. See Tab "C", item a. above.
- b. Map: Heng-yang (Heng-chow), China, Sheet, China Proper, SE (Sheet 53, AMS Series L581). Printed by Army Map Service, Corps of Engineers (Third Edition - AMS). Scale 1:250,000.
- c. Map: Hsiang-tan (Siang-tan), China, Sheet, China Proper, SE (Sheet 43, AMS Series L581). Printed by Army Map Service, Corps of Engineers (Third Edition - AMS). Scale 1:250,000.
- d. Map: Ch'ang-sha, China, Sheet, China Proper, SE (Sheet 33, AMS Series L581). Printed by Army Map Service, Corps of Engineers (Third Edition - AMS). Scale 1:250,000.
- e. Map: Shao-yang (Peking), China, Sheet, China Proper, SW (Sheet G 49 D, AMS Series L582). Printed by Army Map Service, Corps of Engineers (Second Edition - AMS). Scale 1:250,000.

Source for all of these maps: CIA Map Library.

5. Tab "E":

These maps and sketches will serve to illustrate the operations of OG unit BLACKBERRY (APRICOT, AVOCADO, BANANA). See comment under Tab "C", which applies equally to the maps and sketches under Tab "E".

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- a. See Tab "O", item a. above.
- b. Map: Ma-p'ing (Liuchow), China, Sheet, China Proper, SW (Sheet G 49 T, AMS Series L582). Printed by Army Map Service, Corps of Engineers (Second Edition - AMS). Scale 1:250,000.
- c. Map: Wu-Hsüan, China, Sheet, China Proper, SW (Sheet F 49 B, AMS Series L582). Printed by Army Map Service, Corps of Engineers (Second Edition - AMS). Scale 1:250,000.
- d. Map: Kuei-p'ing, China, Sheet, China Proper, SW (Sheet F 49 C, AMS Series L582). Printed by Army Map Service, Corps of Engineers (Second Edition - AMS). Scale 1:250,000.
- e. Detailed military and topographical situation sketch map of the Tanchuk, China, area, August, 1945 (Item I).
- f. Detailed military sketch map of Hill #4, Tanchuk, China, August, 1945 (Item II). APRICOT attack.
- g. Detailed military sketch map of the summit of Hill #4 and the Japanese defenses thereon, Tanchuk, China, August, 1945 (Item III). APRICOT attack.
- h. Detailed military sketch map of the action of BANANA at Tanchuk, China, August, 1945.

Source for Maps a., b., c., and d. immediately above: CIA Map Library.

Source for Sketch Maps e., f., g., and h. immediately above:

OSS Archives - Kunning.
CG.OP.7. - BANANA Operation.
Folder #9.

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